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Abstract 
This thesis is an examination of the sentencing practices of judges (known as 
Sheriffs) in criminal cases heard in the Scottish sheriff courts. Despite the 
importance of sentencing, there is little knowledge of how exactly Sheriffs deal 
with cases. In particular, little is known about why and in which cases they decide 
that a custodial sentence is appropriate in the context of summary court 
proceedings. This research aims to understand the rationales behind the Sheriffs’ 
sentencing practice and, through this exploration, tries to examine how Sheriffs 
currently understand their role as sentencers.  
 
To achieve this objective, I negotiated access with the Scottish Judiciary which 
allowed me to carry out my fieldwork during the winter of 2016/2017. I 
interviewed, observed and shadowed 16 Sheriffs in 14 different Sheriff Courts 
throughout the country. The observation entailed shadowing the Sheriffs during 
what is called the ‘remand court’(RC). This is a day where they deal with all the 
criminal business - most of it on summary procedure - concerning sentencing diets. 
By the end of my fieldwork, I had observed Sheriffs dealing with more than 400 
cases.  
 
One of the key findings was to confirm the perception that different Sheriffs have 
distinctive sentencing styles. However, I also found that there were structural 
legal and non-legal factors that partially explained those differences. Critically, 
my findings stressed how the Sheriffs' practices are shaped by the distinctive local 
realities in which they practice. This contextualization of sentencing practices 
allowed me to explore how different social, economic and geographical 
differences impacted the Sheriffs’ decision-making. Furthermore, through the 
observation of the Sheriffs in court and in their chambers, I was able to describe 
the routines behind sentencing practices. This allowed me to explore at which 
stages of these routines the Sheriffs’ decision-making begins to differ from one 
another. As a consequence, I was able to outline two models of sentencing 
practices. The first one is a depiction of the observable stages of the sentencing 
process. The second one is related to the fundamental questions the Sheriff faces 
during the individualisation of punishment which allow us to highlight at which 
moment the different sentencing styles emerge. 
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CHAPTER 1: Introduction 
 
Sentencing is one of the critical stages of criminal procedure. It is the moment 
where discussions on the philosophy of punishment or theoretical debates on 
sentencing purposes have to be translated into practical decisions for a given 
offence and a particular offender. While the continental law systems have 
criminal codes that establish mandatory sentencing guidelines, in common law 
systems, like Scotland’s, the Judges have wide discretion in sentencing. That 
said, recently the trend among common law jurisdictions have been marked by 
the introduction of sentencing guidelines and attempts to limit judicial 
discretion. A Scottish Sentencing Council (SSC) was established in 2015 but 
Scottish Judges still enjoy of wide judicial discretion, at least when compared 
with their continental cousins. 
 
At a macro level, because of the relevance that sentencing has for criminal 
justice, it is one of the critical dimensions that requires exploration in a socio-
political context which, in Western countries, has been characterised by penal 
populism (Garland, 2001; Fassin, 2018; Muller, 2012). In this regard, against the 
punitive trend, Scotland has shown its unique character. Throughout the last ten 
years, the Scottish Government has made several efforts to reduce the use of 
imprisonment by the Courts (Mooney, et al., 2015; Scott & Mooney, 2016). 
Various policies have aimed to deal with this, including the introduction of 
Community Payback Orders (CPOs) and the presumption against short-term 
sentences. However, despite the intention of the Government, there is little 
knowledge of exactly how Scottish Judges, known as Sheriffs, deal with cases1. 
In particular, little is known about why and in which cases they decide that a 
custodial sentence (necessarily of no more than one year) is appropriate in the 
context of summary court proceedings. This Ph.D. research aims to understand 
the rationales behind the Sheriffs’ sentencing practices and, through this 
exploration, tries to examine how Sheriffs currently understand their role as 
sentencers. 
 
                                         
1 In chapter five I am going to discuss in more detail the particularities of the Scottish Legal 
Field. 
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In order to produce scientific knowledge on sentencing, it is necessary, as a first 
step, to enquire into the nature of sentencing. As will be discussed in more 
depth in chapter two, some socio-legal research has been criticised in the past 
for neglecting the theoretical underpinning of social sciences research or for 
being a-theoretical (Cownie & Bradney, 2018, p. 44). More critically, I invoke the 
wise words of Bachelard, who warns us: 
 
‘…in scientific life, whatever people may say, problems do not pose themselves. It is 
indeed having this sense of the problem that marks out the true scientific mind. For 
a scientific mind, all knowledge is an answer to a question. If there has been no 
question, there can be no scientific knowledge. Nothing is self-evident. Nothing is 
given. Everything is constructed.’ (Bachelard, 1938/2002, p. 25) 
 
Therefore, instead of taking for granted sentencing practices as something that 
is given, we need to ask: What is sentencing as a form of human action? And if 
we respond that sentencing is a social practice (Hogarth, 1971; Hutton, 2006; 
2014), then we need to ask, what are ‘practices’, sociologically speaking? What 
does it mean for sentencing to be considered as a practice? Which are the 
sociological implications of considering sentencing a practice? I discuss different 
aspects of these questions in chapters two and three and, of course, again in 
chapter ten. In so doing, I turn to the sociological literature on practices to 
adopt a framework which allows me to study sentencing with the appropriate 
theoretical and methodological tools. In particular, as I will explain in chapter 
three, I adopted Bourdieu's theory of practice.  
 
Once one has clarity on what sentencing is, the research question can be 
refined. Thus, the main question that I try to address during this thesis is: What 
is the logic of practice behind the sentencing practices of Sheriffs at the Sheriff 
Summary Court? This research question is indeed not neutral; the 
conceptualisation of practice is undoubtedly the one adopted by Bourdieu, and 
because of that, it has several methodological consequences, which will be 
discussed in chapter three and four. 
 
To inquire about the ‘logic of practice’ of sentencing means to try to study the 
practices as it happens, and to try to understand the practical rationales 
13 
 
interplaying within their contexts. This involves understanding that the scholarly 
or theoretical conceptualisation of sentencing is different from the way that 
practitioners comprehend them and carry them out. This gap between the ‘law 
in books’ and ‘law in action’ from a sociological perspective involves breaking 
with the ‘illusion’ of the law and trying to observe the mundane realities of 
practice. 
 
In addition, within this framework, the aims of the research are to try to grasp 
the rationale behind the Sheriff's decision-making and through that to grasp the 
penology of the everyday life. In other words, I aim to explore: Which are the 
observable routines of the Sheriffs during sentencing decision-making? Which are 
the contextual legal and non-legal variables that Sheriffs take into account while 
deciding which is the most appropriate disposal for a given case and offender? 
Which are the goals that the Sheriff is trying to pursue or achieve when they 
choose a particular disposal? And, finally, what does this process tell us about 
how the Sheriffs understand their role as sentencers? 
 
Once one has refined the research questions and established clarity on the aims 
of the research, then we need to discuss methods: How can we produce 
knowledge to satisfy the epistemological implications derived from considering 
sentencing a practice? In chapter four, I discuss how I develop my research 
design and how the negotiation for access and the fieldwork itself ended up 
shaping my research in unexpected ways. While my original design aimed to use 
interviews and non-participant observation, the fieldwork allowed me to use 
shadowing or ethnographic methods to improve my study of the field. 
 
An important methodological consequence of adopting a Bourdieusian framework 
is the role that reflexivity plays in the research. Following the tradition initiated 
by Durkheim and Bachelard (Celikates, 2009/2018), this theory requires the 
researcher to adopt an epistemic rupture with ‘common sense’ (Bourdieu, et al., 
1973/1991). These breaks can only be achieved through the acknowledgement of 
the biases derived from the researcher's position in the social space (Wacquant, 
1992). In my case, this means reflecting on my particularity as a researcher: a 
Chilean lawyer - with court experience for the Chilean ‘Crown’ - doing PhD 
research in Scottish courts in the post-Brexit UK. Thus, my position was 
14 
 
ambiguous. In one sense, I was an ‘insider’ because I am a lawyer and a former 
practitioner. However, I was also an outsider because on the one hand, I am a 
foreigner research student, and on the other, despite being a lawyer I am 
trained in continental law, not in common law. The effect of this reflexivity will 
be discussed throughout the whole thesis. The pervasiveness of reflexivity issues 
proved an interesting aspect of the research and provided me with a tool to try 
to balance the externalist and internalist position during my analysis of 
practices. 
 
After reviewing the literature on sentencing, and exploring the theory and the 
methods used in this study, in chapter five I contextualise sentencing practice in 
Scotland. Here, I discuss several topics that help us to obtain a better 
understanding of the legal and non-legal variables that influence sentencing 
practice. I briefly examine both poverty and crime rates in Scotland. I also 
explore which penal disposals are most used by the Sheriff Courts, and the 
length of custodial sentences. I also offer a brief explanation of the Scottish 
legal field and its criminal courts. 
 
In chapters six to nine, I present the findings of my research. In the opening 
findings chapter, I examine the temporal and local dimensions of practice: The 
when and where of sentencing and the connections between them. Then, in 
chapter seven, I deconstruct sentencing practice by discussing the observable 
bureaucratic routine that Sheriffs follow during the process. The discussion of 
this routine allowed me to analyse with the Sheriffs how they perceive other 
penal agents (defence agents, procurators fiscal (PFs), criminal justice social 
workers (SW), etc.), their relationships with them and how they deal with the 
information provided by them. 
 
Then, in chapter eight, I study when and why the Sheriffs use custodial 
sentences, CPOs, fines and admonitions. In this regard, during my fieldwork, I 
was able to discuss with the Sheriffs the provisional decisions they prepare for 
dealing with some cases before entering the Remand Court (RC). Then, I 
observed them dealing with cases during the hearings. Finally, after the end of 
the RC, I was able to discuss with them how their perception of the case 
changed (or not) during the hearing and why.  
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In chapter nine, I shift the focus from the practices to the Sheriffs and I try to 
explore - with them - their legal habitus. Thus, I try to understand how the 
division of the legal labour in Scotland impacts in the way that lawyers 
understand the judicial role before and after being appointed. Furthermore, I 
tried to explore how the legal experience the Sheriffs acquired in the legal field 
before being appointed shaped the way they perform their role. 
 
Finally, in the last chapter of this thesis, I use the Bourdieusian theoretical 
framework to analyse the different aspects of practice and of the legal field that 
I explored in chapters six to nine. The aim is trying to offer a rich analytical 
description of the sentencing process as I observed it. Also, and through the 
analysis of the data I collected, I try to offer a description of the logic of 
practice behind sentencing. I do so in an attempt to describe the rationale 
apparent in the Sheriffs’ everyday penologies. 
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CHAPTER 2: Literature Review 
 
In this chapter, firstly I examine the relationship between lawyers, 
criminologists and sentencing research. Secondly, I am going to explore how my 
legal background appears to fit into a broader trend of lawyers carrying out 
sentencing research in Scotland. Consequently, I will detail why I am 
approaching sentencing research from a penological perspective and what this 
entails. Finally, I am going to show how both quantitative and qualitative 
sentencing research seems to stress the need for a theorisation of what 
sentencing practice is. 
 
2.1. Sentencing research: On Criminologists and Lawyers 
 
One of the Scotland’s most prominent sentencing scholars once confessed, in a 
seminar that I organised at the University of Glasgow, that he is never sure how 
to label his work. He explained that very often, criminologists tell him that his 
work is socio-legal but, in turn, socio-legal scholars tell him his research is 
criminological. This helps to illustrate the ambiguous relationship between the 
two disciplines when it comes to sentencing research. However, since 
criminology is an interdisciplinary science, interaction with others’ approaches 
and perspectives is what one might expect. Also, sentencing, as a field of 
inquiry, seems to be a convergence point for the research interests of different 
disciplines. 
 
Certainly, sentencing research has been historically linked to criminology. For 
example, as noted by Zedner et al. (2016 pp. xviii-xx) the first sentencing 
research studies in the UK were carried by criminologists. Likewise Kritzer (2010 
p. 885) depicts similar developments in the US. The influence of criminology is 
still prevalent today; most of the sentencing research studies carried out In 
Scotland in the last twenty years were conducted by criminologists, or involved 
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criminologists among the researchers or were in the context of a PhD in 
Criminology (Tombs, 2004; Tata, et al., 2008; Jamieson, 2013; Brown, 2017).2  
 
However, the most recent sentencing research in Scotland has been carried out 
by ‘insiders’ who were (former) practitioners. Both Jamieson and Brown are 
solicitors who decided to carry out a PhD in Criminology. Jamieson was a 
prosecutor, Brown worked for the Scottish Judiciary. This may not be a 
coincidence, but rather the consequence of historical developments in this field.  
 
The intertwined relationship between legal scholars, criminology and sentencing 
research in the UK can be traced back to the establishment of criminology in the 
UK during the 50s (Garland, 2002). The ‘founding fathers’ of modern criminology 
in the UK, Grünhut, Radzinowicz and Mannheim were Juris Doctor (Hood, 2004; 
2001). All were experienced legal scholars before arriving in the UK, and 
Mannheim had also pursued a remarkable judicial career in Germany before 
having to flee due to Nazi persecution (Hood, 2004). Grünhut and Mannheim 
were the first criminologists to carry out sentencing research in the UK 
(Ashworth, 2003; Grünhut, 1956; Mannheim, et al., 1957). Their research studies 
were followed by Hood, a disciple and collaborator of Radzinowicz, in his 
ground-breaking research studies at the Magistrates’ court (Hood, 1962; 1972). 
 
If we observe the research questions pursued by Grünhut or Mannheim, it is 
possible to note that their interest in sentencing policy in the juvenile courts 
was secondary to their concern with young people’s offending behaviour 
(Grünhut, 1956; Mannheim, et al., 1957). However, the variation in court 
practices revealed by their findings stressed the need for research on sentencing 
disparities. Researchers like Hood (1962; 1972), and the Canadian criminologist 
John Hogarth (1971), quickly realised that to understand and explain sentencing 
disparity it was necessary not only to explore court practices but also to 
understand the judges themselves, their legal culture and the social implications 
of the law. 
 
                                         
2 While Brown's book was published last year, its content is based on his PhD Thesis which was 
carried slightly earlier than Jamieson's. At the moment of writing this thesis it worth to note that 
Brown's PhD thesis is under embargo until 2019. 
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In the US, these questions were not new. The interest of legal scholars in 
exploring the ‘law in action’ can be traced to the early 20th century.  
Consequently, in that jurisdiction, empirical legal research emerged as early as 
1910s (Kritzer, 2010; Twining, 2009). By contrast, in the UK this field only 
became formalised as a ‘discipline’ or sub-discipline in the late 60s and early 70s 
(Thomas, 1997; Twining, 2009). This late development of ‘socio-legal studies’ in 
the UK, determined that ‘criminology’ is still used to ‘brand’ or ‘label’ most 
sentencing research. In turn, research on other legal practices outside the 
criminal courts has no label but ‘socio-legal’ (Partington, 2010, p. 1017). 
According to the Genn report, since criminology is an established discipline in 
the UK, at least when compared with socio-legal studies, it has been easier to 
fund crime-related legal research in criminological centres than in Schools of 
Law (Genn, et al., 2006). 
 
The formalisation of ‘socio-legal’ research has also been challenging. On a 
purely theoretical level, compared with legal research in the US, what ‘socio-
legal’ research encompasses has been more ambiguous. By the mid-90s, there 
was still no precise definition of what ‘socio-legal research’ meant (Thomas, 
1997). From a more practical aspect, since most ‘socio-legal’ research was based 
in Law Schools, the empirical part of it represented a new challenge for legal 
scholars who, for the most part, did not have any experience or training in this 
kind of research (Genn, et al., 2006; Banakar & Travers, 2005). These growing 
pains were depicted in the mid-2000s by a Nuffield Foundation report, painting a 
bleak depiction of the field. However, as Twinning argued, while the problems 
described were relevant, the report was ‘unduly pessimistic’ (Twining, 2009, p. 
242) as socio-legal research has continued to thrive. 
 
According to Banakar and Travers (2005) an ‘overwhelming majority of socio-
legal researchers are based at law schools’ (p. 2). This seems to explain why 
some researchers understand ‘socio’ as the study of the law through social 
sciences (Feeley, 2001; Silbey, 2013). In a similar approach, Lee (1997) stated 
that socio-legal research is concerned ‘with exploring the processes of the law 
and the workings of the legal system’ (p. 92)  using empirical analysis, which is 
also similar to the definition used by the Genn report (2006) which refers to the 
empirical study of the ‘law and the legal phenomena’. That said, the report 
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argued that it is empirical research that helps us understand ‘the law better and 
an empirical understanding of the law in actions help us to understand society 
better’ (Genn et al., 2006, p. 1). Tomlins (2016) also shared these views, but 
stated that the ‘socio-legal’ refers ‘to the representation of law as a social 
phenomenon’ (p. 35) which requires empirical social science research. Thus - 
despite the different nuances - there seems to be a shared approach among the 
various socio-legal researchers and the emergence of a disciplinary identity. 
However, sentencing research seems to continue to be ‘owned’ by criminology, 
at least in terms of its ‘labelling’. 
 
With this in mind, the anecdote I mentioned at the beginning of this section 
seems to reflect the ambiguity of sentencing as a field of inquiry in the UK. The 
relevance of this historical and structural issue lies in the question concerning 
the conditions of possibility that disciplinary contexts, orientations and locations 
produce. This is to ask questions such as: Who is carrying out this research? How? 
For Whom? or Why? These considerations require us to be reflexive not only 
about our habitus as researchers but also to critically assess the field of inquiry 
in which we are engaging, and from which positions we begin. I am going to 
explore briefly three aspects of these questions. 
 
Firstly, we need to recognise reflexively that any research on the law and its 
institutions, particularly penal ones, is an inquiry into the field of power. These 
institutions cannot be thought about in isolation from the broader context of 
questions about the State, and its powers over individuals, which is, basically, 
what Foucault  (2004/2009; 2004/2008) has called the problem of 
‘governmentality’. This means, for example, that any inquiry into legal or penal 
culture must not forget that the discourses, practices and the ‘power-
knowledge’ these cultures enable, is aimed at governing the conducts of others 
– as much as bio-political and sociological issues - and therefore there are 
power-relations in play. Sentencing research, therefore, is an inquiry into the 
‘question pénale’ concerning the ‘legal-political rationality and the ways and 
means of administration and management of penal sanctions’ (Sabot, 2012, p. 
1). 
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A second issue that we need to consider is that, as Bourdieu argues, within the 
juridical field ‘there occurs a confrontation among actors possessing a technical 
competence which is inevitably social and which consists essentially in the 
socially recognised capacity to interpret a corpus of texts sanctifying a correct 
or legitimized vision of the social world’ (Bourdieu, 1987, p. 817). Thus, society 
recognises in legal agents a specific ‘power-knowledge’ that gives them the 
‘monopoly of the right to determine the law. In a Weberian sense, if the ‘state is 
the form of human community that (successfully) lays claim to the monopoly of 
legitimate physical violence within a particular territory’ (Weber, 1919/2004, p. 
107), the authority of the Judiciary derives from that monopoly, and it is the 
embodiment of it. A consequence of this is the authority of criminal courts to 
impose a punishment on an individual which may entail not only forms of 
physical violence but, as Bourdieu  (2012/2014, p. 4) argues, also symbolic 
violence. In this regard, individual Judges are the embodiment of this Judicial 
Power, the incarnation of this social role. Thus, they possess diverse forms of 
social, legal, symbolic and cultural capital. In the case of Scotland, from what I 
could observe, they enjoy a status higher than most legal scholars. There should 
be no surprise then that, despite the fact that their role and practices have an 
essential impact for and on society, most of the time they can determine who 
may carry research on their practices and in which terms. 
 
The third issue derives from the previous ones - which set the context – and 
concerns the power-relations within and sometimes against which sentencing 
research has to be carried out. The ambiguous relationship between legal 
scholars and criminologists hides the contested reality of sentencing research in 
the UK. In Bourdieu's terminology, legal scholars do not only have to compete 
with legal practitioners for the ‘iurisdictio’- the right to determine the law - 
but also with other social scientists for the right to explain the legal world. One 
may see the pervasive presence of lawyers doing criminological research in 
courts as a lack of interest by other social scientists in that field. However, it 
could be the case that the ‘gatekeepers’ are more willing to give access to legal 
scholars or lawyers than other social scientists.  
 
Thus these questions of ‘branding’, which may seem superfluous, are a way to 
try to identify how these struggles are conditioning the production of knowledge 
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in this field. More to the point, the main concern is what Teubner calls 
‘epistemic competition’. He argues that, 
 
‘social sciences constructs are not only transformed or distorted but constituted 
anew if they are incorporated into legal discourse. They (...) are reconstructed 
within the closed operational network of legal communication that gives them a 
meaning quite different from that of the social sciences’ (Teubner, 1989, p. 749).  
 
Teubner's Luhmannian argument is not at odds with Bourdieu's analysis of the 
scientific field (Bourdieu, 2001/2004; 1975; 1976; 1991b). Both of them seems to 
highlight, from different theoretical perspectives, the ‘hidden’ problems of the 
conditions of production of knowledge, which in this case involves epistemic 
competition. 
 
Consequently, this is not just an argument in support of the relevance of 
reflexivity but also a reminder of how the conditions of possibility of knowledge 
of this field reveal a place of subtle or concealed disputes. Overall, this is 
nothing new for criminology; there has always been the risk of subversion or co-
optation of criminological knowledge. The question remaining is how and where 
does my research fit within this contested field? 
 
2.2. ‘Et tu, Brute?’  - The pervasiveness of lawyers 
 
Brown (2017), the author of recent research on the Scottish Judiciary, argues 
that his work is the ‘first qualitative empirical examination of judicial 
sentencing in Scotland in over a decade’ (p. 227). If he is right, that means that 
Jamieson's research is the second and my own is the third. However, it is worth 
noting that there have been research studies on the Scottish judiciary in relation 
to specific aspects of sentencing practices throughout the last decade. Among 
them, noteworthy examples include interdisciplinary research on the use of pre-
sentence reports in Scotland, which was carried out by Neil Hutton, Nicola 
Burns, Simon Halliday, Fergus McNeill and Cyrus Tata (Tata, et al., 2007; Tata, 
et al., 2008). It is worth noting that Halliday, Hutton and Tata, are legal 
scholars. More recently, a governmental report evaluating the Sheriff's 
perceptions of CPOs, Criminal Justice Social Work Reports (CJSW-Reports) and 
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the Presumption Against Short Sentences (PASS) was published (Anderson, et al., 
2015). In this case, the research was commissioned by the Scottish Government 
and led by the research agency ScotCen. However, this report also credits Neil 
Hutton as an author. 
 
Brown's assertion of the ten-year gap in sentencing research in Scotland is 
perhaps a veiled reference to Jackie Tombs’ research and particularly to the 
reception it received from the judiciary. While I was seeking access, I was 
informally told by several Scottish scholars and also, off the record, by a Judge 
in my sample, that Tombs’ paper titled ‘Denying Responsibility’ (Tombs & 
Jagger, 2006) was ill-received by the Scottish Judiciary at the time. Judges and 
legal scholars told me that the overt critical tone used by Tombs was 
problematic. Also, in the paper, the authors compared Judges’ attitudes towards 
the use of imprisonment with offenders’ attitudes towards their offences. It was 
implied that this created – or confirmed – the concerns the Judiciary had about 
research conducted by ‘outsiders’ and created tension in the relationship 
between the judges and academics. To what extent this explains the ten-year 
gap in Scottish sentencing research, I cannot tell. 
 
However, the gap served as a ‘deafening silence’, because in all the years I have 
been in Scotland, it has been evident to me that there was, and still is, a wide 
interest in sentencing research by non-legal scholars. The real issue here is the 
problem of access and the tense relationship between academics and the 
Judiciary which historically – not only in Scotland but in the UK – has been a 
complex issue that hampers research (Baldwin, 2008; Hammerslev, 2003; Dhami 
& Souza, 2010; Tata, 2013). In any case, the interest in sentencing research in 
Scotland seems to be interdisciplinary as is obvious in the research study carried 
out by Hutton, Burns, Halliday, McNeill and Tata, which, despite aiming to 
research the quality and writing of the Scottish pre-sentencing reports, also 
tried to address certain aspects of sentencing practices (Tata, et al., 2007; 
McNeill, et al., 2009). 
 
These considerations may suggest that the pervasive presence of lawyers in 
Scottish sentencing research is not arbitrary. It cannot be a coincidence that 
Brown, Jamieson and I are not only lawyers but also former practitioners. Even 
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though it could be argued that because I am not a Scottish lawyer I break the 
pattern, I am not the first foreign lawyer to pursue sentencing research in the 
UK. Furthermore, when I sought access, I introduced myself as a lawyer carrying 
out a PhD, not as a criminological PhD researcher. Likewise, the Judges in my 
sample during my interviews spoke with me as a foreign lawyer; implying that I 
was an individual that could understand the problems of the ‘law in action’ or 
the ‘problems of the trade’. 
 
Understanding sentencing as an interdisciplinary field of inquiry not only 
requires us to ask what criminological and socio-legal researchers bring to this 
particular research field, but also how a researcher's background affects their 
approach to the field. With reflexivity in mind, we need to ask what do (former) 
legal practitioners bring to their sentencing research (Bourdieu, et al., 1992). 
How does the ‘legal episteme’ (Teubner, 1989) influence the way we approach 
the field, design and carry out our research and analyse data. This reflexivity 
means challenging our own legal habitus, to look critically at the ‘sense of the 
game’ (Bourdieu, 1987; 1991a). 
 
The reflexivity, in our case, has several relevant aspects. On the one hand, it 
means trying to escape what Teubner called the ‘epistemic trap.’  We risk a 
legal colonisation of sentencing research, transforming or distorting what social 
science offers us by incorporating it into legal discourse (Teubner, 1989). On the 
other hand, former legal practitioners are challenged by how close we are to the 
field we are studying. Furthermore, we need to be aware of how legal practice 
shapes our reasoning. For example, as Scharffs argues, practitioners ‘are 
expected to know how and when, and in what manner and to what extent, to 
make arguments that would be considered fallacious by logicians’ (Scharffs, 
2004). However, the ‘sense of the game’ makes us blind to how often we use 
these fallacies and how much we are used to or willing to accept – uncritically 
and unquestioning - arguments that come from anyone who is recognised as an 
‘authority’ in the juridical field. This allows satirical depictions of practices by 
legal scholars like this: ‘Seventy percent of all legal reasoning is the logical 
fallacy of appeal to authority. The other forty percent is simply mathematical 
errors’ (Gordon, 1990, p. 1000).  
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Thus, the process of ‘objectivation of the subject of objectivation’ (Bourdieu, 
2001/2004) - in my experience - had required me to deal with the ‘hysteresis 
effect’ - the mismatch between the habitus and the field – (Bourdieu, 
1972/1977, p. 78) in at least three relevant dimensions. The most obvious one is 
the fact that - since I come from a different cultural setting – my discordant 
habitus provides me with a double effect. On the one hand, it allows me to 
quickly objectify those practices that are alien to me and that in this field are 
taken for granted. However, in doing so, the hysteresis effect forces me to 
critically challenge the rationale of my own dispositions towards analogous 
practices in my own culture. 
 
The other two aspects derive from the first, and from my background as a 
practitioner who also was a part-time lecturer. I bear different sets of 
dispositions from my positions in the Chilean legal and academic fields which 
mismatch with my current position as a PhD Student in the UK. This goes beyond 
the loss of the social status that follows from moving from a professional 
position to that of an immigrant student in the UK. My primary challenge during 
the whole process of designing, carrying out and writing my doctoral thesis has 
been to be able to recognise how the hysteresis effects determined certain 
decisions and approaches. In other words, my legal training in continental law, 
and my specialisation in criminal law produced a whole set of habitus regarding 
how I think about the law and how I ‘think’ about legal sciences. This means a 
way to think, to write, to quote, or engage with certain ‘legal’ commonplaces 
that are unknown in the UK. This has forced me to ‘catch up’ with the academic 
dispositions that are expected from a criminologist in the UK. 
 
Let me also mention the differences between how criminal law scholars and how 
criminologists think about their field. More critically, during my fieldwork and 
particularly during my observation of the court proceedings the hysteresis effect 
played a crucial role in my study of the field. When I started my fieldwork the 
‘sense of the game’ was alien to me, and the differences shook my own beliefs 
on how criminal law should be practised. By midway through my court 
observations, my habitus had adapted; I realised that I was enjoying the ‘game’ 
as if I were observing Chilean courtrooms. Thus, my legal practitioner habitus 
was trying to replace my ‘new’ role of researcher. Consequently, these 
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challenges have been present throughout all my research, including even now as 
I try to describe what I did. 
 
In this manner, my research questions originate in what I perceived as a rupture 
between criminal law scholarship and legal practice in my country. Critically, 
the problem was the need to understand the construction of penality within the 
penal procedure; to uncover an understanding of an ‘everyday penology’ that 
emerged directly from the practices and not from legal theory nor penal 
philosophy. As I engaged with Scottish criminological literature, I realised that 
these questions were similar in nature and the political context ripe for this kind 
of research. Thus, my research was framed as an attempt to study penality 
through judicial sentencing practices. In the two following sections, I am going 
to explain these two aspects of my research questions. 
 
2.3. Sentencing research as a study of penality  
 
The influence of my legal training appears throughout my whole research. 
Spanish and German traditions heavily influence Chilean criminal law, theory 
and practice. This determined the original approach to my work, which I deemed 
a work of ‘penological sentencing research’. However, soon I realised that 
‘penology’, and penological, mean different things in different legal and 
criminological traditions (Snacken & van Zyl Smit, 2013). To avoid getting ‘lost in 
translation’, I am going to explain how I use the term ‘penology’. Overall, this 
will set the background of my research questions and help me to outline this 
research. 
 
I ought to say that while ‘Penology’ within the UK has been understood as the 
study of punishment, this field of inquiry has usually been limited to prison 
studies or the study of imprisonment (Scott, 2008, p. 7; Sparks, 2013). In some 
contexts the term has been reduced to administrative criminology, ‘where 
penologist-technicians assist the administration’ of penal sanctions (Snacken & 
van Zyl Smit, 2013, p. 4; Garland & Young, 1983). This exemplifies the epistemic 
competitions I mentioned above. 
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However, in 2010 Cavadino used a broad definition of penology that matches my 
own. He argued that it was the ‘study of punishment, including the study of 
‘penality’ (...) which encompass both concrete penal practices and also the 
ideas which people have about punishment’ (Cavadino, 2010, p. 447). Within the 
UK, Garland proposed the use of a broader definition in the late 1990s, probably 
influenced by his readings of early continental criminology which, as Pifferi and 
Garland both argued, determined the emergence of a study of penality as a way 
to react to the ‘new’ criminological knowledge (Pifferi, 2016; Garland, 1985). 
Another potential influence on Garland’s use of the terms may lie in his study of 
Durkheim and Foucault, who have explored and studied ‘La pénalité’ 
(Durkheim, 1899; Foucault, 1975; 1981; 2013). In any case, by the late 1990s, 
Garland advocated for a wider use of the term penology, arguing that penology 
‘properly understood, is the more basic discipline. It is the study of the social 
processes of punishment and penal control, which is to say, of the whole 
complex of laws, ideas and institutions which regulate criminal conduct’ 
(Garland, 1997, p. 181). However, twenty years later, as a recent book on the 
same topic points out, the concept remains ambiguous (Snacken & van Zyl Smit, 
2013). This has prompted authors like Cavadino to discuss the existence of 
different ‘penologies’ in order to describe its varied uses in differing contexts 
(Cavadino, 2010). 
 
It could be argued that Garland managed to successfully introduce the French 
notion of the ‘study of penality’ (Garland & Young, 1983; Garland, 1985; 1990; 
2013; 2018a). In 2013 he explained that penality: 
 
‘…has come to be the standard term used to refer to the subject matter of the 
sociology of punishment. It refers to the whole of the penal complex, including its 
laws, sanctions, institutions, and practices and its discourses, symbols, rituals, and 
performances. As a generic term it usefully avoids the connotations of terms such as 
‘penal system’ (which tend to stress institutional practices but not their 
representations, and to imply a systematicity that often is absent) or else 
‘punishment’ (which suggests that the phenomenon in question is primarily 
‘retributive’ or ‘punitive’ in character, thereby misrepresenting penal measures that 
are oriented to other goals such as control, correction, compensation, etc.)’ 
(Garland, 2013, p. 476). 
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Garland's interest in the notions of ‘penology’ and the ‘study of penality’ seems 
to respond to his efforts to institutionalise the sociology of punishment (Daems, 
2008, pp. 38-40), which, by the early 1990s, had ‘not become a well-developed 
area of social thought’ (Garland, 1990, p. 11). Almost thirty years later, Garland 
is not only able to celebrate the expansion of ‘punishment and society’ 
scholarship but also to note that the field has normalized ‘as it developed the 
characteristic attributes of an established academic subject’ (2018a, p. 9). 
Moreover, Garland openly recognises that the sociology of punishment ‘initially 
grew out of critical penology’ (2018a, p. 14). As with any ‘new discipline’ that 
grow from another, Garland argues that the sociology of punishment has 
developed its own distinctive features that differentiate it from (other) 
penological approaches (2018a, p. 17).  
 
However, the most relevant works in the sociology of punishment that appeared 
in the first decade of the 2000s, such as Garland's ‘Culture of Control’ (2001), 
Pratt's ‘Penal Populism’ (2007), Simon's ‘Governing through Crime’ (2007)  or 
Wacquant's ‘Punishing the Poor’ (2009), appear to be top-down analyses rather 
than bottom-up ones. While these texts offer us a political, social and economic 
contexts within which practices like sentencing are carried out (Garland, 2018a, 
p. 20), they provide little insight into the ‘black box’ of street-level penal 
practices. This characteristic of the first wave of research studies that aimed to 
address the relationship between punishment and late-modern social change 
may be interpreted as neglecting micro-level research studies. Authors like Page 
(2013) have noted these macro-level approaches do not sufficiently explain how 
penal change and penal practices are shaped, experienced and reproduced 
within specific jurisdictions. Likewise, as McNeill et al. (2009) noted, there is a 
‘governmentality gap’, this is to say ‘a lacuna in the existing penological 
scholarship which concerns the contingent relationships between changing 
governmental rationalities and technologies on the one hand and the 
construction of penality-in-practice on the other’ (McNeill, et al., 2009, p. 420).  
 
As noted by Bosworth, et al. (2018) another issue of the ‘first wave’ was its 
focus mostly on imprisonment, neglecting other kinds of penal sanctions such as 
supervision or financial penalties. However, as Garland (2018a) argues, several 
of these issues are now starting to be addressed or are changing. Taking into 
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account all that I have discussed above, can we talk about a study of penality 
through sentencing? Can work on sentencing be labelled as sociology of 
punishment? And, more to the point, what does it means to study penality 
through sentencing?  
 
Firstly, I ought to say that the heart of the matter lies in the focus of the 
research. As I stated above, I argue that sentencing can be the subject matter of 
different disciplines which may offer different perspectives. Consequently, I 
adhere to Garland's (2018a) position when he explains that ‘boundary issues are 
best approached as pragmatic ones and that the scope of inquiry ought to be 
determined by the paths that our research questions open up rather than by any 
prior stipulations’ (p. 17). This is also implied when Bourdieu talks of the need 
to distinguish between the ‘modus operandi’ and the ‘opus operatum’. In this 
context, this means that we must understand that any inquiry does not start as a 
piece of science, there is an evolution that goes from ‘on-going research’ to 
‘already made science’ (Bourdieu, et al., 1973/1991; Bourdieu, 1980/1990; 
1997/2000; 2015).  
 
Thus, as an ‘opus operatum’, this research is influenced by the sociology of 
punishment as it is a micro and middle range exploration of penality-in-action. It 
is also influenced by criminology because it is an inquiry into a critical penal 
institution which not only allocates sanctions but also creates narratives of 
crime, criminality and offenders, which are later imposed upon the accused and 
on society. Finally, it is also inspired by socio-legal research since judicial 
practices and cultures are central to it. However, my ‘modus operandi’ in this 
work-in-progress is quintessentially to explore penality as it is instantiated 
through judicial sentencing practices in the intermediate (Sheriff) courts in 
Scotland. As I stated at the beginning of this subsection, I designed this research 
with a penological approach in mind. This is to say, my specific scope of inquiry 
is aimed at exploring what I term the ‘penology of everyday life’. I wanted to 
study how the philosophical theories and political discourses of punishment are 
not only ‘enforced’, but also shaped and subverted by street-level penal 
bureaucracy.  
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A second aspect that needs to be addressed is why I am focusing on the study of 
judicial practices, adopting a qualitative rather than quantitative approach. 
More critically, why do I stress the relevance of a theorisation of sentencing as a 
practice? And how is this approach relevant to both the study of sentencing and 
penality? The answer to these questions requires consideration of the current 
‘state of the art’ in sentencing research in the UK and to a lesser extent in other 
jurisdictions. I am going to explore these issues in the following subsections. 
 
2.4. From Quantitative to Qualitative approaches 
 
As stated above, sentencing research in the US dates from early 20th century. 
Kritzer argues that three events explain the start of this long tradition: First, the 
development of judicial statistics, second, concerns about crime which 
prompted the first criminological sentencing research; finally, and probably 
most relevantly, the emergence of the legal realism movement (Kritzer, 2010). 
However, from the very beginning, empirical research was equated with 
quantitative approaches (Cane & Kritzer, 2010; Kritzer, 2010). Indeed, in the 
USA, there is a long tradition of quantitative sentencing research, particularly 
studies which try to explore sentencing disparities, and within them, racial 
disparities (Kritzer, 2010; Spohn, 2015). Although this does not mean that there 
are no qualitative or mixed methods studies on sentencing in the USA, it seems 
they have been less common (Cane & Kritzer, 2010). Furthermore, this begs the 
question of the extent to which quantitative approaches suit some legal scholars' 
legal positivism. In other words, we should inquire if lawyers choose to use these 
approaches not because they are the most appropriate way to study something 
but because these methods fit in with their general world view. In turn, this 
history also poses the question of to which extent qualitative interpretive 
research may be seen as ‘weak’ or ‘bad science’ by some legal scholars. 
 
For example, Spohn (2009) argued that the two most common approaches used 
to explore sentencing decisions and to ‘identify the factors that predict 
sentence outcomes’ were the use of vignettes or mock sentencing exercises and 
quantitative research. She stated that the latter was a ‘more common approach’ 
which consisted of collecting data on actual cases from different databases and 
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then using ‘statistical analysis to isolate the effect of one factor (...) while 
controlling’ for others (pp. 82-83). 
 
However, modelling sentencing decisions is difficult not only because of the 
difficulty of collecting adequate data that reflect actual sentencing practices 
accurately, but also because of the challenges of developing a statistical model 
that fits the nuances of the process. Consequently, reviews of the research 
studies that were carried out between the 1930s and the 1960s have revealed 
that most of them relied on flawed or suboptimal methods (Spohn, 2015; 2000; 
Hagan & Bumiller, 1983). Nevertheless, if we look at different reviews of past 
research what becomes evident is that statistical methods, techniques and 
models have continued evolving and growing in their sophistication (Pina-
Sanchez & Grech, 2018; Ulmer, 2014; 2012; Spohn, 2015). 
 
There seems to be some consensus of an overall improvement in quantitative 
sentencing research since the 1980s (Ulmer, 2014; 2012; Spohn, 2015; 2000). On 
the one hand, the work of sentencing commissions provided for the very first 
time ‘high-quality data which improved the quality of the statistical inquiries’ 
(Ulmer, 2014, p. 4759). On the other hand, a critical assessment commissioned 
by the National Academy of Sciences was crucial in pointing out the weaknesses 
of past research and making several suggestions about how this should be 
improved (Blumstein, et al., 1983) – recommendations which, as Ulmer argued, 
were taken seriously by researchers (Ulmer, 2012).  
 
One aspect that was criticised was the lack of theoretical development in 
sentencing research. This started to change in the 1990s where different 
approaches were used to theorise sentencing decisions (Ulmer, 2012). For 
example, perspectives based on uncertainty avoidance and causal attribution in 
the judge's decision-making (Albonetti, 1991; 1997); interpretive theory of legal 
decision-making (Farrell & Holmes, 1991); focal concerns perspectives (Hartley, 
2014; Kramer & Ulmer, 2009; Steffensmeier, et al., 1998); or the test of the 
liberation hypothesis (Spohn & Cederblom, 1991; Wu & Delone, 2012; Hauser & 
Peck, 2017; Hester & Hartman, 2017). The common characteristic of these 
theories or perspectives is their attempt to explain Sentencing decision-making, 
not practices. The particular aim is to explain how non-legal factors and 
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stereotypes may come into play affecting the outcomes. Thus, their goal is to 
offer a theoretical perspective to help interpret the outcomes of quantitative 
research studies.  Other studies had focused on the relationships between the 
legal actors within a court, their internal organisation, their relationship with 
the community. Differences between states and within states were also 
recognised as relevant (Myers & Talarico, 1987; Einsenstein, et al., 1988; 
Flemming, et al., 1992).  
 
Overall, the evolution of statistical approaches has improved our understanding 
of the variables that may shape sentencing decisions and provided us with 
evidence of patterns that may highlight unfair disparities based on race or social 
class (Spohn, 2000; 2015; Ulmer, 2012; 2014). As the models and statistical 
techniques become more complex the number of variables that can be measured 
and the interplay between them seems to keep growing (Pina-Sanchez, 2015). 
Also, the more we realise that non-legal contextual variables are relevant - not 
only those linked to the accused but also variables related to the internal 
organisation and culture of the court or the relationship with the community 
(Ulmer, 1997; Flemming, et al., 1992) - the more we come to see that the 
sentencing decision is only another phase of a larger process that shapes the 
penalities that are finally imposed on offenders (Spohn, 2015). Furthermore, 
these theoretical developments not only helped to enrich the modelling of these 
practices but also shined the spotlight on the complexities and dynamic nature 
of the variables influencing these decisions.  
 
However, if we aim to better understand sentencing decision-making, we need 
to continue developing sociological, criminological and penological 
understandings of them. The theories that I mentioned above have several 
limitations derived from the fact that they are the by-product of an analysis of 
patterns and variables in the outcomes of sentencing practices. In other words, 
there are several limitations to our capacity to theorise sentencing decision-
making by only studying its consequences (Ulmer, 2012). Therefore, the only 
way to improve theory and models is through qualitative explorations of the 
process (Hogarth, 1971; Hagan & Bumiller, 1983; Spohn, 2000; Ulmer, 2012).  
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Quantitative research approaches then are not a panacea; they have their own 
problems. For example, one of the key issues with quantitative approaches is the 
quality of the data used for the analysis. Until recently, the problem of 
accessing databases and the quality of them was one of the main issues 
hampering and limiting quantitative research in the UK (Dhami & Souza, 2010; 
Pina-Sanchez, 2015; Pina-Sanchez & Grech, 2018). In turn, qualitative research, 
as discussed above, has had to deal with negotiating access via gatekeepers and, 
even when doing their best, they can fail or be offered very limited access that 
may change the whole purpose or import of their project. 
 
Consequently, when Ulmer or Zatz recognise the value of qualitative research, 
they are mainly arguing for the need for ethnographies or court observations 
(Ulmer, 2012, p. 33; Zatz, 2000). If we claim that quantitative methods cannot 
describe and explain court dynamics, this is a limitation that can also be 
extended to interviews, focus groups and mock exercises. While judges' views on 
their practices are valuable, they cannot offer any more insight into court 
dynamics than statistics; both are indirect post-hoc accounts of practice. This is 
not to say that their input is irrelevant; these different kind of data critically 
improve our global understanding of the court and sentencing process. However, 
if our main concern is judicial practices, the only way to explore these dynamics 
first-hand is through ethnographic research or court observation. 
 
Within the UK, there have been several research studies that have relied on 
court observation or ethnographic methods (Baldwin, 2008). Not all of them 
explored sentencing; for instance, some focused on different aspects of criminal 
trials (Rock, 1993; Cammiss, 2006), but since the late 70s there has been a 
growing amount of research studies that have explored - directly or indirectly - 
sentencing through these methods (Carlen, 1976; Burney, 1979; Parker, et al., 
1989; Flood-Page & Mackie, 1998; Morgan & Russell, 2000; Moore, 2003). 
 
Despite the fact that some of these research studies are dated, most of what 
they describe seems to highlight the relevance of non-legal contextual variables, 
as suggested by the American sentencing research. For example, the 
management or internal organisation of the courts, the volume of cases and the 
times available to deal with them, are several variables that had an impact on 
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decision-making. Furthermore, these research studies seem to confirm Hood's 
finding that, while the background of judges is relevant, the ‘bench culture’ 
seems to have a more direct influence in the way they approach sentencing 
(Hood, 1962; 1972). In the particular case of lay magistrates, despite not being 
lawyers, these research studies seem to suggest that they, as a group, develop 
what Morgan and Russell called a ‘lay judicial culture’, as a way to differentiate 
their culture from district judges' ‘legal, judicial culture’ (Morgan & Russell, 
2000). Consequently, it could be argued that judicial practices and judicial 
culture are not necessarily a sub-class of legal practices or legal cultures. This is 
to say that the nature of the social function exerted by the judiciary may be one 
that produces a distinctive culture and set of practices regardless of whether 
judges themselves do or do not have a legal background. 
 
If quantitative research shows us the variables that may be shaping penality, 
ethnographies reveal just how complex the dynamics between those variables 
are. Moreover, court observation also provides us with an insight into not only 
the practices of legal agents but also their professional culture (Darbyshire, 
2011). Along these lines, Hutton has argued the relevance of exploring 
sentencing as a social practice (2006) and initially suggested analysing 
sentencing using Bourdieu's theory of practice, which also means to explore the 
Judge's habitus and social capital within the legal field. However, more recently, 
he seems to have preferred Latour's Actor-Network theory and argued for a study 
of sentencing as a cultural practice (Hutton, 2014; 2016). Again, this requires us, 
as researchers, to theorise about the nature of sentencing practices and the 
judicial role.  
 
There is no doubt that the study of sentencing is, or should be, one of the 
critical aspects of exploring and understanding penality. While the political 
climate, and the law that it produces, provides a legal framework within which 
penal institutions have to fulfil their functions, this does not mean that the 
latter do not (re) shape punishment. As Ashworth (2015) argues, it is too 
simplistic to reduce sentencing to the ‘allocation of criminal sanctions’, as this 
may lead people to believe that the law is the only variable that matters (2015, 
p. 10). Both quantitative and qualitative studies have shed light on the 
complexities of sentencing practices. Again, as Ashworth point out, the question 
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of how we should define ‘sentencing’ begs the question of who are the actors 
and the institutions that are involved in such processes and how they affect the 
outcomes (Ashworth, 2015). Moreover, the definition of sentencing begs the 
question of whether and how the different theories of the purposes of 
punishment are finally put into practice by judges. This is to say that the ‘flip-
side’ of exploring sentencing practices is to examine the variables that are 
articulating and modulating punishment in a given place and time. 
Consequently, if we move towards the judicial culture, we need to retain a focus 
on understanding how the institutional, organisational or professional cultures 
alter, inform or modify the understanding of penality of penal actors. 
 
Finally, from these qualitative and quantitative sentencing research studies 
emerges a convergence towards the idea that sentencing research must involve 
observing what is happening in court. Accordingly, a multi-method approach 
seems advisable to make sense of court dynamics and practices. However, the 
need for interpretative analysis of sentencing understood in a broad sense, 
requires having an appropriate theorisation that could provide an answer to 
what kind of social behaviour sentencing is. 
 
2.3. Research studies in Scotland 
 
As I have argued above, sentencing research in Scotland is restricted only to a 
few research studies, most of them carried out in the last two decades. In this 
section, we are going to focus on the four most recent studies since 2004.3  This 
is not an arbitrary date; it was the year that Tomb's sentencing research was 
published (2004). There are several reasons why this work is relevant, however it 
is worth noting here that I will only explore two aspects of it. It was the first 
research study in almost a decade since Hutton and Tata's research on 
sentencing patterns in Scotland was published in 1995 (Hutton & Tata, 1995). 
 
Tombs’ (2004) research was designed to be ‘compatible with an earlier study’ by 
Hough et al. (2003), that was carried out in England and Wales. Concerning the 
                                         
3 For a list of older research studies see Brown’s work (2017, pp. 6-8) 
35 
 
methods, Tombs stated that she used statistics, observation of decision-making 
in courts (she did not specify how many or what the observation entailed), 
focus-group and semi-structured interviews with thirty-four Sheriffs from sixteen 
different Sheriff Courts, five High Court judges and one stipendiary magistrate. 
The findings of her research were published first in a report (Tombs, 2004) and 
later on in several articles that analysed specific aspects of sentencing in 
Scotland (Tombs, 2009). 
 
Tombs’ primary goal was to explain the use of custodial sentences within a 
context where the prison population was rising in Scotland; despite that intent, 
she carried out court observations. Her work relies mostly on two sources: 
statistical data and the Judges’ accounts of their sentencing practices. This 
seems to be simultaneously the main strength and weakness of her work. She 
managed to obtain a lot of insight into how the Scottish judges perceive and 
understand their practices; particularly about why sentencers use custodial 
sentences and which kind of cases they deem to be borderline (Tombs, 2004) 
between a custodial sentence and a community sentence. She went on to use 
this data to explore policy implications for reducing the use of imprisonment 
(Tombs, 2005), women’s imprisonment (Carlen & Tombs, 2006), how judges 
justify the use of custodial sentences (Tombs & Jagger, 2006), a comparative 
analysis of sentencing practices between Scotland and England (Millie, et al., 
2007), and an analysis of the judicial narratives used to impose a sentence 
(Tombs, 2008). 
 
However, the main problem with her analysis is that it relies too much on the 
Judges’ perceptions of their work. Despite the fact that Tombs stated that she 
observed ‘decision-making in Sheriff Courts’, the core of her analysis seems to 
be based on the interviews and focus groups she carried out. Moreover, her 
report seems to fail to differentiate between the different sources of data she 
collected. She does not provide any theorisation on what sentencing practices 
are or what they entail. The main consequence of this is that Tombs’ 
interpretation seems to assume that the perceptions that the Judges' have of 
their practices offer an accurate depiction of them. As a consequence of this, 
when the Judge fails to explain her/himself satisfactorily, the response is 
construed as a way of denying their responsibility.  
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In addition, Tombs never reflects on the possibility that the interviews may be 
post-hoc reflections of practice. This has several consequences; for instance, 
there is minimal mention of the influence that other actors, such as solicitors or 
SW, may have on the Judges’ decision-making. Furthermore, in a later work 
(Tombs & Jagger, 2006), there seems to be a contradictory depiction of these 
practices. On the one hand, she argued that the judges develop ‘neutralisation 
techniques’ that they use to distance themselves from their decisions to 
imprison. The problem is that some of these techniques entails routinization and 
role distance (pp. 811-813). Consequently, she depicts sentencing as an 
extremely routinised, detached and uncritical practice. However, when Tombs 
turns to analysing ‘borderline cases’, in the same article, the accounts she uses 
describes thoughtful decision-making (Tombs & Jagger, 2006, pp. 814-817). In 
other words, Tombs’ lack of theorisation on what practice is leads her to see no 
apparent contradiction between arguing about a mechanical management of 
cases and a conscious and deliberated use of penal discourses. It is worth noting 
that I am not arguing that this may not be the case; I am pointing out that these 
claims require a more in-depth explanation which is not provided. 
 
Tombs’ critical criminological approach contrasts with more recent research 
studies carried out by Jamieson (2013) and Brown (2017). Both research studies 
addressed the question of the nature of judicial practices, which in turn requires 
a sociological theorisation and framework on what practices are. Jamieson uses 
a Bourdieusian framework and his theory of practice to explore the judicial 
habitus and culture of retired Judges through a ‘biographical narrative research 
approach’ (2013, p. 236). In turn, Brown’s approach to ‘practice’ is inspired by 
the work of Flyvbjerg's on ‘Phronesis’ or ‘practical wisdom’ (2017, pp. 133-140).  
 
In Jamieson's exploration of judicial culture, there is an acknowledgement of the 
‘cultural turn’ in the sociology of punishment (2013, pp. 15-18). Furthermore, 
within the exploration of judicial culture, she recognises that judges, within 
their sentencing role, are bearers of a ‘penal culture’, which is a relevant aspect 
for the sociology of punishment (2013, p. 36). Ultimately, she stresses how vital 
the judicial culture is for penal reform and argues that we should understand it 
as a relevant ‘field of penal inquiry’ (2013, pp. 244-250). 
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Jamieson carried out unstructured interviews with twelve retired Sheriffs and 
High Court Judges; her primary goal was a reflexive exploration of their ‘judicial 
lives’ (Jamieson, 2013, pp. 236-237). Her inquiry relied on a narrative approach 
to explore her participants’ experiences, views and practices as Judges. Thus, 
she focused on exploring judicial culture and how this influenced, shaped or 
explained their sentencing practices and political views on punishment and penal 
reform. Because of this, her work relies on Bourdieu's notion of habitus as a way 
to explain Judges’ dispositions (Jamieson, 2013, pp. 94-130). Finally, Jamieson 
argued that the most important narrative in understanding judicial practices is 
the under-researched notion of ‘judicial independence’ (Jamieson, 2013, pp. 
181-187). This notion, she argued, helps us to understand Judges’ approach to 
‘discretion’ in sentencing and, from a judicial culture perspective, it contains 
several dimensions that may explain these practices (Jamieson, 2013, pp. 232-
233). 
 
It is fair to say that her work managed to explore the penal culture of her 
participants. However, since her participants were retired at the time of her 
research, this insight may reflect a ‘dated’ judicial culture. Also, even if one 
disagrees with Tombs' interpretation of her findings, the actual responses 
provided by the Judges she interviewed seem to be consistent with Jamieson's 
findings. Moreover, as discussed below, some of the responses provided by the 
Sheriffs in both studies are consistent with the findings from my interviews and 
court observations. 
 
In turn, Brown's exploration of Scottish sentencing practices seems to be an 
attempt to value the Judges' ‘practical wisdom’ in the exercise of sentencing 
discretion through his concept of ‘Phronetic synthesis’ and the relevance of 
‘principled judicial discretion’ (2017, pp. 133-140). Building on the interviews he 
carried out with twenty-five Judges and Sheriffs, and the analysis of case law 
(from different commonwealth countries including Scotland), he builds an 
argument against the introduction of sentencing guidelines in Scotland (2017, 
pp. 176-194 & 227-228). Brown seems to aim to offer empirical research on 
Scottish sentencing practices as a way to both explore and defend them from 
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political reform. As a consequence of this, there is little engagement or dialogue 
analysing the criminological or penological impact of such practices.  
 
The main problem with this approach is that it fails to critically assess the 
practices that he wants to defend. His use of Flyvbjerg's notion of ‘phronesis’ 
seems limited. It is true that Flyvbjerg’s framework requires, and values, the 
experience of the agents. However, this does not mean an uncritical analysis of 
the practices this experience produces (Flyvbjerg, 2001; 2006). Consequently, 
while Flyvbjerg wants to go beyond the study of ‘know-why’ and ‘know-how’, he 
also wants to ‘clarify and deliberate about the problems, possibilities, and risks 
that organizations face, and to outline how things could be done differently’ 
(Flyvbjerg, 2006, p. 383). For example, he explains that the researcher: 
 
‘…attempts to understand the roles played by single practices studied in the total 
system of organizational and contextual relations. If it is established, for example, 
that a certain organizational practice is seen as rational according to its self-
understanding – that is, by those practicing it, but not when viewed in the context 
of other horizons of meaning – the researcher then asks what role this ‘dubious’ 
rationality plays in a further context, historically, organizationally, and politically, 
and what the consequences might be’ (Flyvbjerg, 2006, p. 378) 
 
These are the kind of questions that Brown's analysis fails to address. While I can 
agree with his criticism of thinking of Judges as ‘metronomic clockwork men’ 
(sic.); we cannot neglect that what lies behind sentencing reforms is not an 
attack on judicial practice but rather an attempt to improve sentencing. 
Moreover, at times, his argument seems to ask for a ‘leap of faith’ on Judges' 
capacity to impose fair sentences. In other words, the fact that one argues that 
sentencing cannot be mechanical and that legal experiences and judgement are 
relevant to its practice does not necessarily mean that all current sentencing 
practices are good. This is particularly relevant when the main data used to 
support his arguments are the Judges’ accounts. 
 
From a ‘meta’ perspective all three research studies are also, themselves, a 
reflection of the field. As I mentioned above, both Jamieson’s and Brown's work 
pose questions about the relationship between lawyers, sentencing research, 
Scottish Academia and the Judiciary. This is to say that these research studies do 
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not only outline the practices of this particular field but rather, they, 
themselves, are ‘events’ we need to consider in the analysis of the Scottish 
penal field. In a Foucauldian sense, these works also beg questions of the 
conditions of possibility for such research.  
 
Finally, the last research I am going to analyse is the study carried out by 
Hutton, Burns, Halliday, McNeill and Tata. This research aimed to explore ‘the 
communication processes between the producers of [pre-sentence] reports and 
their principal consumers’ (Tata, et al., 2008, p. 839). Probably because of this 
Brown does not consider it as a previous ‘sentencing research’. However, this is 
genuinely sentencing research. Firstly, it included extensive observations of 
sentencing, mock sentencing exercises and interviews and focus groups with 
sentencers about sentencing. Secondly, for what I could observe during my 
fieldwork, social work reports play a crucial role during the sentencing process, 
particularly at the summary court. Consequently, the production of these 
reports, the dynamics they create and the way that the different legal actors 
perceive and use them is an essential variable in the process.  
 
The research was carried out between 2004-2005, and it was composed of four 
parts: (1) an ethnography of social workers’ routine production of the reports; 
(2) interviews with Sheriffs and observations of how they incorporated the 
reports in sentencing at two sheriff courts; (3) focus groups with Sheriffs on 
issues regarding the reports; (4) simulated sentencing diets with Sheriffs and 
Solicitors (Tata, et al., 2008, pp. 839-840). The findings of the research were 
published not in a single report but as different articles addressing different 
aspects of the study; the Sheriffs’ perceptions of the reports (Tata, et al., 
2008); a description of the ethnographic technique used to ‘shadow’ the social 
workers while writing the reports (Halliday, et al., 2008); a study of these social 
workers as ‘street-level’ bureaucrats (Halliday, et al., 2009); and an exploration 
of the penetration of risk-management discourses in the social workers’ 
practices (McNeill, et al., 2009). Much of this work became very relevant during 
my fieldwork while noticing that several of my observations and interviews 
confirmed some of their findings and allowed to contextualise them within the 
Sheriffs' sentencing practices. 
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2.4. Sentencing: The practice of penality 
 
In this chapter, I have tried to explain the background to this study and my 
research questions. I have argued that sentencing research in the UK is 
characterised by a theoretical, historical and practical relationship between 
lawyers and criminologists. The relevance of these links is the pervasive 
presence of lawyers doing criminological sentencing research. I have recognised 
that I do not escape from this trend, and therefore, I am aware of the need to 
be transparent on how my legal habitus may have shaped some of my research 
decisions and my interpretation of the data.  
 
Consequently, my original approach to sentencing research was influenced by my 
legal understanding of penology and penological research. I have explained that 
this approach resembles what has been called the ‘study of penality’. However, 
instead of looking at general or mid-range explorations of penality, I aim to 
explore the micro-level practices that shape it. The main goal is to continue 
exploring McNeill et al.’s (2009) ‘governmentality gap’. 
 
In this regard, when we look at quantitative and qualitative sentencing research, 
both seem to point out the need for an in-depth theorisation that allows us to 
understand and study criminal justice practices. Thus, it is not enough to try to 
explore sentencing decision-making if we are unable to theorise what these 
practices entail and the dynamics that interplay in shaping these processes. 
Thus, in the following chapters, I am going to explore an approach to theorising 
practice and how this framework will shape an understanding of penality within 
the sentencing process. 
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CHAPTER 3: Theoretical Framework 
 
In the introduction, I argued that both the sociology of punishment - as its aim is 
a study of punishment - and socio-legal studies influenced my research design. 
Thus, the question that I aim to answer in this section is what ‘socio’ means 
within my research; how is the ‘sociological’ part of the study of punishment to 
be articulated, taking into account my research objectives and the field where 
my research is located? In other words, I aim to show how my understanding of 
the ‘socio’ is linked to adopting a specific social theory to study sentencing as a 
practice, informing the methods I used to explore and analyse it. 
 
The chapter will be divided into four sections. In the first, I will explore what 
the ‘socio’ entails in my socio-legal research. Secondly, I will argue the need to 
problematize what sentencing is from a sociological perspective. I argue that 
sentencing, as a human activity, needs to be understood as a social practice. 
Thirdly, I explore the different possible theories of practice and why I have 
chosen Bourdieu's theoretical framework for my research. Finally, I examine and 
explain the Bourdieusian theory of practice and its implications for the study of 
sentencing as a practice. 
 
3.1. The ‘socio’ and the ‘sociological’  
 
In recent years, the epistemological and methodological debates in social 
sciences have been influenced by the ‘cultural turn’ that took place in the 70s 
and 80s. According to Bonnel and Hunt (1999), this turn was not the ‘discovery’ 
of the relevance of culture for Anglophone social sciences, considering that this 
was already a central issue for Weber, Durkheim and, later on, Parsons (p. 27). 
They argue that instead, the turn reframed the role of culture in social sciences 
not only by restating its influence in the study of the ‘social’ but also in 
suggesting that culture influences researchers themselves (Bonnell & Hunt, 
1999). In other words, the cultural turn also brought epistemological and 
methodological challenges, which had to be solved across and within different 
fields.  
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The ‘legacy’ of the cultural turn affected both ‘socio-legal’ studies and the 
sociology of punishment in different ways. Regarding the former, while the 
notion of ‘socio’ in ‘socio-legal’ already encompassed several distinctive 
approaches (Clarke, 2013; Feenan, 2013), the cultural turn widened the meaning 
of ‘socio’, introducing new questions regarding the scope and status of the 
‘social’ in legal research (Silbey, 2013). Concerning the latter, Garland (2006) 
argues that the turn allowed the sociology of punishment a ‘new self-
consciousness about cultural issues’ and also brought attention to new 
theoretical frameworks (p. 421). Moreover, while the work of Foucault had 
already been central to the sociology of punishment, the shift encouraged new 
ways of thinking about and studying punishment, and thus Geertz’s, Bourdieu’s 
and Elias' frameworks become sources of theoretical inspiration (Garland, 2006). 
As a consequence, the blurred line that distinguishes socio-legal studies from the 
sociology of punishment, at least when it comes to sentencing, became even 
more obscure.  
 
The cultural turn poses sentencing researchers several epistemological and 
methodological questions that need to be addressed. The turn allowed 
researchers to reassess the way they were studying the legal field. For example, 
Silbey explained that those engaged in socio-legal studies were studying the law 
as ‘if it were a separate realm from society’ (Silbey, 2013, p. 25). However, the 
cultural turn suggested that the law could not be understood in isolation from 
the culture where it is produced. This does not mean to deny that, as a field, it 
has autonomy from the rest of social space, but this autonomy is a relative one 
(Bourdieu, 1986; 1991a). The law, legal agents and their practices are still part 
of social space, and thus determined by the web of relations that emerge in that 
space. However, seeing the law as if it were an autonomous social space may 
explain why, as Silbey (2013) argued, some socio-legal researchers were using 
the law's language as tools for their analysis, and thus, ‘relying on insufficiently 
theorised concepts’ (p. 25). Thus, the challenge for socio-legal researchers is to 
break with, using Teubner terminology, the legal epistemic trap (Teubner, 
1989); the illusion of the autarkic autonomy of the legal field (Bourdieu, 1991a). 
 
In turn, from the perspective of the sociology of punishment, as discussed in the 
previous chapter, much of the research in this field has aimed at the macro or 
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meso-level of analysis (Garland, 2018a). Thus, through the primacy of grand 
narratives analysis, the local contextual dimension has been neglected. This also 
linked to some analysis of the law in which its relative autonomy from the wider 
social structures was neglected or ignored. For example, Bourdieu argues that 
within the Althusserian-Marxist approach conceived laws as ‘direct reflections of 
existing social power relations, in which economic determinations and, in 
particular, the interests of dominant groups are expressed’ (Bourdieu, 1987, p. 
814). The notion of relative autonomy of the legal field reflects the view that 
while political, economic or social structure affects the way the law is shaped, 
this does not mean that the law, and its practices, are just a mechanical 
reproduction of these influences. This would mean denying or ignoring the legal 
field’s own rationales and the internal struggles to determine the nature and 
meaning of law and how it should be exerted. Furthermore, it would be to 
neglect the fact that legal actors have, themselves, enough capital to influence 
or shape practice in other social fields. 
 
Thus, in this research, the ‘social’ and the ‘sociological’ aspects in my research 
require the use of the tools of social theory to help us understand sentencing as 
a human process (Hogarth, 1971) within the social space of the law and the 
practices it produces. This means problematizing sentencing as a social action, a 
practice, which obtains its meaning by fulfilling a social function within a 
specific field in a given social space and time. 
 
3.2. Conceptualising sentencing? 
 
Concepts like judicial intuition (Lovegrove, 2000) or sentencing craft (Tata, 
2007), have been used to explain why and how sentencers arrive at what they 
feel is an appropriate decision. The problem is that they seem to require a ‘leap 
of faith’. We need to trust that the judges are experienced enough and that this 
intuition or craft is the manifestation of their proficiency. I argue that this 
depiction of practice fails to provide an appropriate insight into sentencing 
itself. They are trying to grasp the judges’ habitus, but they only seem to 
scratch the surface of it. This is so because the whole effort of trying to 
rationalise and describe practice while ignoring its temporal dimension is 
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frustrated by the practical logic of sentencing. In other words, they neglect the 
fact that the purpose of the logic of practice is to act in such a way that you 
quickly do what needs to be done without overthinking. However, these 
depictions of what sentencing is, which are based on the primary experience of 
scholars and practitioners, become an obstacle that it is necessary to surmount. 
As Bachelard argued ‘[p]rimary experience or to be more precise, primary 
observation is always a first obstacle for scientific culture’ (Bachelard, 
1938/2002, p. 29). This means there is a need to adopt a critical inquiry into the 
nature of sentencing which involves challenging our ‘common sense’ 
understanding of it. This also involves exerting a reflexive surveillance of our 
potential cognitive biases toward the subject of our research.   
 
A different approach - in a Weberian tradition - would be to describe sentencing 
as the act by which the monopoly of legitimate violence is exercised by the 
embodiment of the state: The Judge. This depiction is helpful to show two social 
dimensions of sentencing, the structural and the agential. As a set of human 
practices that has several social implications, it is relevant to ask: What, 
sociologically, does it mean to sentence?  
 
On one hand, it can be argued that it is a human action that is carried out by an 
individual who is exerting a specific role. Therefore, it is tempting to reduce the 
conceptualisation of sentencing decision-making to the discretionary powers of 
each judge to decide individual cases; this is to say, limiting it to the judge's 
agency. However, this account neglects the fact that the normative legal 
framework structures the judge's discretion. Moreover, it also overlooks what it 
means for sentencing, as human action, to be situated at the heart of the social 
and penal structures. 
 
On the other hand, if sentencing is merely a social function which happens to be 
carried out by a judge, from a structural point of view the judge's agency is 
irrelevant. The penal system will carry out its punitive function regardless of the 
identity and agency of any judge or penal agent. Thus, from this approach, the 
law and the social, political, economic and governmental pressures behind it, 
determine and shape the penal function. The problem here is that this position 
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risks overstating the relevance of social and political forces in shaping the 
practices of judges.  
 
Having said this, to conceptualise sentencing as a practice mean to study the 
structured, habitual and regular customs of allocating sentences by the penal-
legal agents (judges) within penal-legal institutions (courts). Therefore, instead 
of studying the conditions of possibility of sentencing, I aim to examine how 
sentencing practices take place within a specific jurisdiction, within a particular 
type of court and a specific class of judges. This is to say, to carry out a micro-
level analysis of the social actions and interactions that embody the social 
function of determining punishment in intermediate courts in Scotland. Thus, it 
becomes necessary to adopt a theoretical and methodological framework that 
allows us to go beyond the structure/agency divide and helps us to grasp the 
rationale behind sentencing. 
 
3.3. Looking for a theory of practice 
 
From a very early stage of my research, I conceptualised sentencing as a 
practice. This was the consequence of the confrontation between my legal 
experience – using Bachelard’s terminology, my primary experience in the field; 
what I thought I knew - and the adoption of a sociological gaze. This epistemic 
rupture forced me to re-evaluate my legal knowledge and experiences from a 
different epistemological paradigm. Thus, I became aware of the limits of 
scholarly approaches in explaining legal practices, which, in my experience, 
obeyed a rationale that was not in the ‘books’. On the contrary, legal practices 
aimed to deal with the practical problems the field posed. However, through the 
sociological gaze, I realised that while I could explain what I did, I failed to 
convey why I did it other than saying that it was an intuitive processes based on 
experience. 
 
At the same time, I realised that sociological approaches were also struggling to 
grasp the logic of legal practices. If you focus too much on what agents say 
about what they think they do, but you do not observe them carrying out their 
practices, you risk missing the rationale you aim to capture by settling instead 
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for how practice is justified or accounted for by legal actors. Furthermore, you 
may be tempted to reduce practices to either arbitrary or mechanical actions. 
As Bourdieu (1994/1998)explained, this may happen ‘when, in the name of a 
narrow rationalism they consider irrational any action or representation which is 
not generated by explicitly posed reasons of an autonomous individual, fully 
conscious of his or her motivations’ (p. viii).  
 
Therefore, from the outset I felt I needed a theoretical framework that was able 
to explain practices. At first glance, in socio-legal studies, there was no shortage 
of theoretical frameworks that were being applied to the field. For example, 
some works were inspired by the Giddens (Henham, 1990), Garfinkel 
(Vanhamme, 2009; Dupret, 2006/2011), Luhmann (Wandall, 2008), Bourdieu 
(Jamieson, 2013; Hammerslev, 2003) or Flyvbjerg (Brown, 2017). Moreover, some 
researchers, borrowing from the work of Flemming et al. (1992), had developed 
theoretical frameworks around the notion of ‘craft’ or ‘judgecraft’ (Kritzer, 
2007; Tata, 2007) to try to understand the role of practical knowledge in 
sentencing (Roach Anleu & Mack, 2017; Young, 2012).  
 
However, among them, the social theories that focus primarily on social 
practices are Bourdieu's Theory of Practice, Giddens’ Theory of Structuration 
and Garfinkel's Ethnomethodology. These theories aim to grasp the logic behind 
practice and, because of the epistemological position-taking required, they 
narrow down the list of possible methods that should be used to ascertain this 
logic. A common characteristic among them is a distinctive praxeological 
approach.  
 
In the end, several reasons led me to adopt Bourdieu's work as a theoretical 
framework. Most importantly, I felt that given my background as a practitioner I 
needed a theory with epistemological foundations that could help me to break 
from the legal episteme in which I was trained. In other words, I needed 
theoretical tools that could help me to surpass the Bachelardian obstacle 
imposed by my primary experiences. Bourdieu's theory of practice deals with 
these issues at different levels. As a theory of practice, Bourdieu is not oblivious 
that the craft of science is also a practice. Thus, his theory starts with a critique 
of scholarly reason and the epistemological and methodological challenges that 
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‘practical logic’ poses to researchers (Bourdieu, 1972/1977; 1980/1990; 
1997/2000). On a different level, Bourdieu's epistemic reflexivity is a 
‘requirement and form of sociological work, that is, an epistemological program 
in action for social science’ (Wacquant, 1992, p. 38) and requires researchers to 
be aware of scholarly bias. Overall, Bourdieu's approach is both epistemological 
and methodological, which provided the tools that I felt I needed to explore 
sentencing. 
 
3.4. Bourdieu’s Theory of Practice 
 
It is essential to approach Bourdieu's oeuvre taking into account that he 
developed his theory in response to the theoretical, practical and 
methodological problems that his early fieldwork experiences posed to him 
(Heilbron, 2011; Sapiro, 2004). As Heilbron explains, Bourdieu’s early research in 
Algeria was not conceived concerning ‘any particular theory, specific method, or 
distinct research specialty, but in a language that was borrowed from French 
epistemological tradition’ (Heilbron, 2011, p. 191). This epistemological and 
methodological position-taking can be seen in the book he wrote along with 
Chamboredon and Passeron, ‘The Craft of Sociology’ (1973/1991). Thus, as 
Bourdieu explained, ‘good theoretical ideas can only be found through research 
itself’ (Bourdieu, 2013b, p. 15). This is to say that Bourdieu favoured the 
development of ‘research-based’ concepts; of a theory that was oriented by - 
and against - theoretical, methodological and practical problems. This approach 
pervades the critical texts of his theory of practice: the ‘Outline of a Theory of 
Practice’ (1972/1977) and later ‘The Logic of Practice’ (1980/1990). These are 
books in which he developed a critique of scholarly thought and practices before 
proposing his theory of practice as a method of surmounting the issues. 
Therefore, his theory of social practices is inevitably a critical approach to 
scientific practices or as he called it ‘scholarly reason’ (1997/2000), thus the 
relevance of reflexivity. 
 
Bourdieu's theory emerged in a time when the French intellectual field was 
dominated by Sartre's existentialism and Levi-Strauss's structuralism. In a 
Bachelardian spirit, he positioned his theory against both of them. For Bourdieu, 
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both ‘schools of thought’ seem to be at odds. Simplifying in extremis, objectivist 
structuralism appeared to neglect the subject, which is a key aspect of 
existentialism which, in turn, seemed to neglect social structures and how they 
affect individuals. As a consequence of this, Bourdieu's work emerged as a way 
to overcome the methodological problems that both of these theories have in 
the practice of sociological research, as Wacquant explains: 
 
‘A total science of society must jettison both the mechanical structuralism which 
puts agents ‘on vacation’ and the teleological individualism which recognizes people 
only in the truncated form of an ‘oversocialized 'cultural dope' or in the guise of 
more or less sophisticated reincarnations of homo economicus. Objectivism and 
subjectivism, mechanicalism and finalism, structural necessity and individual agency 
are false antinomies.’ (Wacquant, 1992, p. 10) 
 
Thus, for Bourdieu, escaping this false dichotomy means seeing that objectivism 
and subjectivism are in a dialectical relationship. Hence, he proposes that it is 
necessary to adopt a ‘relational mode of thinking’ (Bourdieu, 1989, p. 16; 
Bourdieu, 1994/1998, pp. 3-9). In analytical terms, this is to say that the social 
world consists of objective relations which are, in turn, located in a social 
space. These relations are between the structure and the agents and between 
the agents and other agents (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992; Bourdieu, 1989). As 
Joly explains, this thought could be summarized in the following statement:  
 
‘Human beings are situated in relation to each other and are, so to speak, 
programmed to be situated in relation to one another - to situate others and to be 
situated vis-à-vis others’ (Joly, 2018, p. 39). 
 
Consequently, within this mode of thought, Bourdieu set out his philosophy of 
action or dispositions (Bourdieu, 1994/1998; 2013a) which is built on the 
foundation of three core concepts and the network or interplay of relationships 
between them: Habitus, Field and Capital. 
 
Having said this, before offering a brief explanation of these concepts and how 
they interplay, it is necessary to deal with the issues Bourdieu highlighted in 
relation to the study of practice. I introduce the theory firstly through the 
epistemological and methodological issues that it attempts to surmount, aiming 
49 
 
to mirror the way that Bourdieu himself presented his theory. It is also an 
attempt to avoid -- from the perspective of a ‘reader’ or as he called it a 
‘lector’ (Bourdieu, 1997/2000, pp. 53-54) - approaching theory as a canonised 
set of precepts which one must follow, oblivious to the fact that those very 
concepts emerged from fieldwork (Bourdieu, 1997/2000). This is to risk 
forgetting that the genesis of these concepts lies in Bourdieu’s attempt to solve 
fieldwork issues, surpass the dominant theoretical paradigms and allow 
researchers to offer a reflexive interpretation of practices (Heilbron, 2011). As 
Bourdieu said, this risks conflating the ‘modus operandum’ - the theory in the 
making - with the ‘opus operatum’ - science already done (Bourdieu, 2015). 
 
On this subject, the particular question ‘How should Bourdieu and his oeuvre be 
studied?’ has been the core of a recent intense debate in France between 
Fabiani (2016) and Joly (2018) concerning the critical assessment of Bourdieu's 
work, and thus should not be taken lightly. In this thesis, I have aligned myself 
with Joly's position, which warns us to avoid what Bourdieu called the ‘lector's 
mistake’ (2016; 1987/1990). This means that in our understanding of Bourdieu’s 
work we need to avoid those approaches that are ‘aimed at a type of ‘reading’ 
of social theory governed by the scholastic disposition, having its end in itself, 
foreign to all practical use’ (Joly, 2018, p. 10). The position that I have adopted 
in this thesis is a practical one. As I argued earlier, I approach Bourdieu’s theory 
of practice as a theoretical and methodological toolbox for the practice of the 
study of practice. 
 
Therefore, in the following subsections I am going to discuss the epistemological 
and methodological issues of practice, then I will explain briefly Bourdieu’s triad 
of concepts. Finally, I am going to use the Bourdieusian analysis of the legal field 
to show how the concepts come together. 
 
3.4.1. The problems of practice 
 
As stated above, Bourdieu’s theory emerged from the issues he had to deal with 
during his study of practices in Algeria and Bearn. In this fashion, there are some 
critical epistemological and methodological issues that it is necessary to discuss 
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before studying his key concepts. In the following subsections, I am going to 
focus on three aspects: firstly, I will examine Bourdieu's criticism regarding 
scholarly bias and its impact on the proper study of practices. Then, I will 
explore the specific epistemological and methodological challenges that 
research on social practices entails. Finally, I will outline the relevance of the 
temporal and spatial dimension of practices. 
 
3.4.1.1. ‘Scholastic epistemocentrism’ 
 
The starting point is an epistemological critique of what he calls ‘Scholastic 
epistemocentrism’ (Bourdieu, 1997/2000, pp. 52-53). This is inevitably a 
methodological criticism, or, if you prefer, a criticism of scientific practice.  For 
Bourdieu, the conditions that make it possible for scholars to think about the 
world - removed from its mundane problems - is both a source of liberation but 
also a constraint. He argues that there is the risk of incurring an epistemological 
bias in the ‘universalising of a particular case, the vision of the world that is 
favoured and authorised by a particular social condition’ (Bourdieu, 1997/2000, 
p. 50). This is to say, doing so risks a bias which researchers incur when they fail 
to analyse critically how their ‘theoretical position’ impacts their approach 
towards their object of inquiry. He uses Bachelard's phrase to illustrate this: ‘the 
world in which one thinks is not the world in which one lives’4 (Bourdieu, 
1997/2000, p. 51). 
 
If in his early writings he attacked the ethnocentrism he found in ethnology 
(Bourdieu, 1972; 1980/1990); in his later years, he highlighted that the source of 
this bias produces analogous problems in sociological practices. The effects of 
this scholastic bias, he argued, ‘are all the more significant and scientifically 
disastrous when the people that science takes as its object are more remote 
from academic universes in their conditions’ (Bourdieu, 1997/2000, p. 50). Thus, 
researchers may describe the world as it appears to them, this is to say as an 
object of contemplation, as a spectacle, oblivious to the fact that, for the 
individuals who belong to that world, this is the world in which they live. This is 
not just about failing to understand, or in this case to apprehend, the conditions 
                                         
4 ‘Le  monde où l'on pense n'est pas le monde où l'on vit’ (Bachelard, 1940, p. 110) 
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of possibility of their practices: Rather, ‘[i]mputing to its object what belongs in 
fact to the way of looking at it (…) projects into practice (...) an unexamined 
social relation which is none other than the scholastic relation to the world’ 
(Bourdieu, 1997/2000, p. 53). Consequently, researchers may project 
‘theoretical thinking into the heads of acting agents’ (Bourdieu, 1997/2000, p. 
51) failing to depict the practical rationales of those agents or the logic of 
practice at all.  
 
As a reaction to these issues, Bourdieu suggests that we must ‘objectify the 
objectifying subject’ (Bourdieu, 1997/2000, p. 10). This means that researchers 
need to objectify their position in social space, deploying a socio-analysis the 
goal of which is to objectify the conditions that separate researchers from the 
observed agents and their practices. However, it is also to objectify the position 
the researcher has in the scholarly field, and how this also influences his or her 
relationship with the production of knowledge. Therefore, the main goal is to 
highlight ‘how the social position and the structure of the field concerning 
objects of study shape knowledge claims’ (Maton, 2003, p. 58).  
 
This is the source of the distinctive approach Bourdieu takes regarding 
reflexivity as an epistemic stance (Wacquant, 1992). As Maton argues, this 
epistemic reflexivity is not easily achieved (Maton, 2003), nevertheless it is 
epistemic surveillance that helps us to be aware of our role in the production of 
knowledge. This should prompt a continuous assessment of the scholarly point of 
view we adopt while attempting to grasp the logic of (another’s) practice. 
 
3.4.1.2. The elusive logic of practice 
 
Once we have ‘objectified the objectifying subject’, and we are aware of our 
scholastic bias and the need for epistemic reflexivity, we need to inquire how 
we can grasp the logic of practice. At first glance one is tempted to approach 
practices by taking them for granted. We can observe them, interview the actors 
and ask them for the logic, strategies or rationales behind them. We can try to 
measure the outcomes statistically. Thus, why should we problematize 
practices? However, it is necessary to return to Bachelard's epistemic obstacle, 
which Bourdieu follows in this aspect; it is necessary to break with ‘common 
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sense’, with our primary experience of that practice that may not allow 
understanding of what is behind the superficial observation of them. Thus, 
Bourdieu warns us that merely by taking practice as an object of inquiry, 
observing it, describing it and analysing it, the logic of practice eludes us; the 
‘very fact of thought and discourse about practice separates us from practice’ 
(Bourdieu, 1997/2000, p. 52).  
 
Part of the scholastic bias that I explained above is also rooted in the very 
nature of practices, which are ‘opposed to the logic of thought and discourse’ 
(Bourdieu, 1980/1990, p. 80). As discussed above, we may try to characterise 
practices just as mechanised routines or rather as a strategic game played by a 
‘homo economicus’. Bourdieu suggests that the practices lie in the dialectics 
between ‘an organising consciousness and automatic behaviours’ (Bourdieu, 
1980/1990, p. 80). 
 
To exemplify this, he uses the notion of ‘games’ (Bourdieu, 1980/1990). We can 
learn the rules of a game, but there is a difference between knowing the rules 
and playing the game. Only once we get used to playing the game can we 
develop a ‘sense for the game’. For instance, Rugby players are very often 
required to make tactical decisions within seconds, which means having to 
choose within seconds or fractions of seconds what is the best or most 
appropriate action. These decisions cannot be characterised as a thoughtful 
assessment of all the available options, but they cannot be deemed a 
mechanical reaction either. Furthermore, good players adapt their game 
strategies as the game unfolds. Since rugby is a collective sport, some strategies 
require the involvement of a whole team, which has, within seconds, to grasp 
the tactic that is going to be used and adapt to the strategy that is deployed.  
 
However, while we can, through observation, and maybe also statistics, try to 
grasp these practices, we lack the individual's account of these strategies. Yet 
when we do ask practitioners about their practices, when we make them reflect 
on what they do, we get post-hoc explanations of them. Bourdieu explains, 
‘Simply because he is questioned, and questions himself, about the reasons and 
the raison d'etre of his practice, he cannot communicate the essential point, 
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which is that the very nature of practice is that it excludes this question’ 
(Bourdieu, 1980/1990, p. 91).  
 
Thus, our starting point is to recognise that ‘practice has a logic which is not 
that of the logician’, and thus, we need to avoid affording it ‘more logic than it 
can give’ (Bourdieu, 1980/1990, p. 86). The logic of practical action is not a 
reflexive logic, but this does not means it is arbitrary or mechanical. The issue is 
that its rationale is different and eludes reflexive thought. Furthermore, even 
taking all these precautions into account, we still have the issue that ‘the logic 
of practice can only be grasped through constructs which destroy it as such’ 
(Bourdieu, 1980/1990, p. 11). This requires us to try to adopt approaches that 
can capture practice within its unique temporality and spatiality. 
 
Given these epistemological and methodological difficulties, Bourdieu argues 
that ‘science should make its aim not to adopt practical logic for itself, [but] to 
reconstruct that knowledge theoretically by including in the theory the distance 
between practical logic and theoretical logic’ (Bourdieu, 1997/2000, p. 52). To 
do so, we not only need to adopt a practical gaze towards practice but to try to 
apprehend its rationale by its own logic. This means to understand that the 
researcher's position towards the practice object of their inquiry is that of 
spectator, not ‘the position of an active agent, involved in the action, invested 
in the game and its stakes’ (Bourdieu, 1997/2000, p. 54).  
 
3.4.1.3. The problem of space and time 
  
It is also necessary to try to approach practice in its context, which is to say ‘on 
the spot’, taking into account its social and temporal space, it is when and 
where. This is the contrast with scholarly practices, which are removed from the 
mundane world, taking place in an office, within a University, in a social space 
where introspection is favoured by the social, economic, symbolic conditions 
that allow scholars to think about the world. For example, when law students, or 
even lecturers, are faced with mock sentencing exercises, the academic task 
cannot be equated to real sentencing practices. It is not the fact that it has a 
pedagogical purpose, but also because its context, the temporal space in which 
the exercise takes place, cannot be equated to real practice. Ultimately, the 
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main difference can be reduced to one variable: the mock exercise will never be 
able to send an individual to prison. 
 
As Bourdieu notes, practice and the actions that configure it, take place in a 
particular space and time. He argues that ‘[s]cience has a time which is not that 
of practice’ (1980/1990, p. 81). Hence, we cannot truly understand how 
sentencing practice works if we do not take into account its temporality. This 
imposes a different time-frame to that which legal scholars experience, and one 
which is also different to the frame of ‘case vignettes’. The Sheriff Court also 
has a ‘tempo’, time pressures, which are quite different from that of the High 
Court.  
 
Time is one of the most defining aspects of sentencing practice at the Sheriff 
Court. As Bourdieu poses it: ‘practice is inseparable from temporality, not only 
because it is played out in time, but also because it plays strategically with time 
and especially with tempo’ (1980/1990, p. 81). Hence, it seems logical that 
these temporalities affect how practice is shaped; practice always has to be 
contextualised by both the amount of available time for accomplishing the goal 
but also by the desired time-span in which these goals are to be achieved. 
 
Finally, once you become aware of all these issues, you have objectified yourself 
as an objectifying subject. This is to say, you have taken into account the 
elusive logic of practice and adopted a theoretical point of view on your 
theoretical approach to practice and embraced epistemic reflexivity. Only then 
you can finally approach the theoretical concepts of Bourdieu's theory of 
practice. 
 
3.4.2. Theoretical Tools 
 
Bourdieu's experiences in Algeria transformed him. He abandoned his idea of 
following a career as a philosopher, and his work as anthropologist or 
ethnographer changed, opening the path that would end in sociology (Heilbron, 
2011; Bourdieu, 2004/2007). The pervasive mark that his research in Algeria left 
on Bourdieu can be seen in his theoretical works, both in the ‘Equisse...’ (1972) 
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and in the ‘Logic of Practice’ (1980/1990). The research practices and the 
theoretical concepts he created to surpass these difficulties are contextualised 
using his Algerian experience. 
 
However, as Yacine notes, the young Bourdieu started his fieldwork without his 
conceptual framework, and thus, his early works are attempts to explain the 
practices that he studied (2008, p. 13). Bourdieu's back-and-forth with his 
ethnographic experiences can be seen in his book ‘The Bachelor's Ball’ 
(2002/2008) which contains three different studies on the same topic. Consistent 
with his distinction between modus operandi and the opus operatum, he offered 
in this book an account that explained the logic of its development, which 
shared his conviction that ‘the deeper theoretical analysis goes, the closer it 
gets to the data of observation’ (2002/2008, p. 1). This, in turn, also makes us 
realise the never-ending dimension of sociological analysis, which despite 
presenting itself as finished, is always an on-going work. 
 
Ultimately, as Heilbron (2011) argues, on his return to France, Bourdieu would 
start developing his concepts separately. This general synthesis can be seen in 
the logic of practice. Thus, at least in its origins, both habitus and field were 
intended to explain different levels of analysis. In this case, habitus aimed to 
deal with the issues of practice, while ‘champ’ or field emerged in an analysis of 
the literary field during the 60s (Bourdieu, 2015, pp. 537-538). As stated above 
then, these theoretical concepts aimed to explain the elusive logic of practices, 
trying to address the dialectic between the objective and subjective approaches, 
both of which were deemed as insufficient (Bourdieu, 1972; 1980/1990; 
1997/2000). Bourdieu's synthesis aims to address both the structure within the 
agent (Habitus) and the agent's actions within the structure (Field). 
 
In this section, I am going to briefly discuss ‘Habitus’ and ‘Field’, and in the final 
subsection, I will use an analysis of the legal field to show how the concepts 
come together. 
 
3.4.2.1. Habitus  
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The notion of habitus is part of a sociological tradition that tries to explain the 
socialisation of individuals; the processes by which we incorporate the cultural 
schemas of the society in which we are embedded (Fabiani, 2016). That is why 
Bourdieu explains that the habitus is the product of the incorporation of 
objective structures - the social space in which we are immersed. In other 
words, habitus aims to describe an ‘objectivity of the second order’ (Wacquant, 
1992, p. 13) meaning that – through this process of internalisation - the social 
structures also live within the subjective mental schemas of individuals. 
Wacquant further explains: 
 
‘Habitus designates the system of durable and transposable dispositions through 
which we perceive, judge and act in the world. These unconscious schemata are 
acquired through lasting exposure to particular social conditions and conditionings, 
via the internalization of external constraints and possibilities. (Wacquant, 2008, p. 
267)  
 
Wacquant notes, that the theory of habitus is against structuralism. It 
acknowledges that ‘agents actively make the social world by engaging embodied 
instruments of cognitive construction: but it also insists, against constructivism, 
that these instruments are themselves made by the social world through the 
somatization of social relations’ (Wacquant, 2016, p. 67).  Thus, habitus helps us 
to explain how we internalise culture, cultural practices, social structures, or if 
you prefer, the principles of vision - and division - of a given society. Also, this 
internalisation produces a system of dispositions for action. Bourdieu argues that 
the dispositions are consciously and unconsciously inculcated in the actors by 
other human beings or by the fact that actors are situated in the world. Thus, 
the process of incorporation of social structures can be through intentional 
pedagogical actions but also outside any explicit education (Bourdieu, 2013a, p. 
87). Bourdieu proposes a distinction between a primary habitus and secondary 
habitus (1997/2000). The former is ‘the set of dispositions one acquires in early 
childhood, slowly and imperceptibly, through familial osmosis and familiar 
immersion (...) it constitutes our baseline social personality as well’ (Wacquant, 
2014, p. 7). The latter concerns the ‘acquisition of the specific dispositions 
demanded by a field’ (Bourdieu, 1997/2000, p. 164). For instance, the specific 
habitus acquired through the pedagogical training that allows us to become 
lawyers, medical doctors or social workers. 
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The habitus, as a set of dispositions for action, is also a set of expectations; we 
can move within social spaces as ‘a fish in the water’ (Bourdieu, 2015, p. 216) 
because we know what to expect of others and anticipate their reactions to our 
behaviours. Overall, this allows us to develop practices with ease, within a 
rationale which is practical knowledge. However, habitus, both primary and 
secondary, is never static nor immutable. While it is true that the primary 
habitus sets a baseline through which we start to position ourselves within the 
social space, as we grow older and accumulate new experiences and our position 
within the social space and within individual fields (or specific subfields) change;  
so the habitus changes. Both the individual and the social spaces can and do 
change, and therefore, the habitus may also become maladjusted. Thus, the 
individual habitus is quintessentially malleable, due to this ‘permanent revision’ 
(Wacquant, 2016, p. 68). 
 
As a final note, it is essential to understand that the habitus is ‘not a self-
sufficient mechanism for the generation of action: like a spring, it needs an 
external trigger, and so it cannot be considered in isolation from the definite 
social worlds (and eventually fields) within which it operates’ (Wacquant, 2016, 
p. 69). Thus, we need to explore the notion of field before understanding how 
practices are produced. 
 
3.4.2.2. Field 
 
As I mentioned above, Bourdieu - borrowing from Cassirer - adopts a relational 
mode of thinking about the social world. Thus, to think of the ‘social’ in terms 
of relations means to think in a space of positions in which we can locate 
individuals according to their proximity or distance from one another. Thus,  
 
‘[w]e can compare social space to a geographic space within which regions are 
divided up. But this space is constructed in such a way that the closer the agents, 
groups or institutions which are situated within this space, the more common 
properties they have; and the more distant, the fewer. Spatial distances on paper 
coincide with social distances.’ (Bourdieu, 1989, p. 16).  
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Given that modern complex societies have undergone a process of 
differentiation, the notion of field, as a theoretical tool, allows us to construct 
an object for the study of specific aspects of it. Bourdieu argues that this 
process of differentiating leads to the existence of ‘autonomous fields’, which in 
turn produce different modes of knowledge of the world, different points of 
views. Moreover, the principle of division and subdivision and the specific mode 
of knowledge within a field, ‘can only be known and understood in relation to 
the specific legality of that field as a social microcosm’ (Bourdieu, 1997/2000, p. 
99). 
 
Thus, within this ‘microcosm’ the relations between the agents can be seen as a 
‘network’; a web of objective relations between the different positions each 
agent occupies in the field. In turn, the positions within the field are also 
objectively determined, defined…  
 
‘….in their existence and in the determinations they impose upon their occupants, 
agents or institutions, by their present and potential situation (situs) in the 
structure of the distribution of species of power (or capital) whose possession 
commands access to the specific profits that are at stake in the field, as well as by 
their objective relation to other positions’ (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 97). 
 
For example, within the Scottish legal field, the Judge, the PFs and the 
accused’s lawyer all assume objectively determined positions. Each of them can 
only be occupied by one individual after they have satisfied the requirements to 
be appointed as such. However, while lawyers hold all of these positions, the 
way that this microcosm is organised ensures that some of them have a higher 
status within the hierarchy of the field. Moreover, the dominant positions can 
only be attained by agents that have acquired and accumulated what Bourdieu 
calls ‘capital’.  Bourdieu uses an economic term in order to explain that in 
different fields there are relationships of power among the various positions 
which, more or less, can be characterised using the notion of capital (Bourdieu, 
1997/2000). Several fields operate in what appears to be a relative disinterest in 
the accumulation of economic wealth; the literary field or the academic field for 
example. However, even in these fields, we can observe that there are different 
kinds of interests, in and through which recognised forms of technical or cultural 
competence translate into a symbolic form of wealth. Thus, the accumulation of 
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this specific form of wealth, within a field, can be seen and understood through 
the economic notion of capital. 
 
Consequently, the positions of the agents in a given field are not static; the 
agents’ positions are related to the particular forms of capital in that field. The 
different hierarchies within the position of the agents are determined by the 
amount of capital the agent possesses. Therefore, the acquisition or 
accumulation of capital in a field means that agents can improve their position 
in that social space in relation to other agents. Thus, deployment of strategies 
for the agents to improve their position or to accumulate more capital impact 
the relations between the agents in the field. This is why Bourdieu describes 
fields as places of struggle. In other words, the way the agents invest their 
capital in the field or play the game may change their position in the power-
struggle in this field. Hence, this also means agents in a field are determined by 
their actual positions but also by their potential ones. On the one hand, we have 
the relationship between the agents who dominate the field and the ways that 
they would exert their capital to preserve and reproduce the mechanisms of 
domination. On the other, there may be some dominated agents who will try to 
struggle to change the ‘game’ in their favour. 
 
3.4.2.3. Habitus, Field and Capital 
 
Finally, to understand how practices emerge within this framework, we need to 
understand the dialectical relationship between habitus and field. If the habitus 
is a generative matrix of practices, they will remain in a potential state until the 
agent is faced with recognisable problems posed to them by the field in a 
relationship with the position the agent holds in the field. In the relation between 
habitus and field, we can observe Bourdieu's attempt to surpass the 
objective/subjective divide. His theoretical tools help us to move beyond those 
conceptualisations of practices that either describe it as a mechanised action or 
put too much emphasis on the agent's discretion. What is implied in this position 
is an ontological and epistemological position that Bourdieu described as 
structuralist-constructivism. On one hand, it is structuralist because he recognises 
the existence of structures - in the social world - that are independent of the 
agents. On the other hand, it is constructivist in the sense that social genesis is 
60 
 
twofold, emerging from the interaction between individuals (and their habitus) 
and the social structures (and the fields) (Bourdieu, 1989). 
 
Thus the relationship between fields is dual; the field determines the habitus as 
a set of dispositions for actions, but the habitus also determines the field. Since 
different fields have different rationales or internal laws, the individuals - who 
have paid the entry fee required to be considered agents of that field - must 
internalise the rules of that social space. In other words, the internalisation of 
‘rules of the game’ produces a set of dispositions and anticipation for action that 
provide agents with a finite number of possibilities – or admissible - actions and 
reactions.  
 
However, practices are not the outcome of the habitus alone nor a mechanical 
way of behaving within a field. Concerning the former, this is to say that the 
habitus is just a set of dispositions, a set of internalised potential ways to react 
to the problems posed by the field, but not practices themselves. Regarding the 
latter, fields impose upon the agents ‘rules for playing the game’. However, these 
rules do not determine their practices, nor prevent them from improvising new 
practices, rules or exceptions to the rules. 
 
Consequently, the agent's practices will be the outcome of that interaction of a 
habitus with a field. An actor who has internalised the principles of vision and 
division of the field - thus, acquired a set of dispositions for actions – will deal 
with a specific issue or problem that is presented to them because of their position 
in that field. This interaction will elicit or trigger the set of dispositions that are 
internalised by the agents. However, the space of possible reactions will also be 
determined by the position that agents have within the field and the accumulated 
capital (or lack of it) at their disposal. Overall, then, between the dispositions, 
the problems and the positions in the field, and the ‘sense’ or ‘feeling’ for the 
‘game’, the agent will be have to take a position regarding the more appropriate 
variant of possible practices they should adopt. If the agent's habitus is completely 
synced with the field, this will lead to a coincidence between the agent's positions 
and the kind of practices that the others ‘players’ expect from them. On the 
contrary, if there is a mismatch between the habitus and field, this will destabilise 
that agent and may elicit a counter-reaction by others agent's in the field. 
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Thus, a judge within the legal field and exerting their role within criminal 
procedure is required, at a precise moment, to sentence an individual. The field 
presents the judge with a specific problem, and does so because of the particular 
position the judge has in that field. Therefore, sentencing practices should be 
understood as a by-product of the dialectic of the finite possible decisions or 
solutions that are presented to the judge with the internalised matrix of action, 
based on his or her past experiences, which - according to the information that is 
provided to them - will determine their penological position-taking. 
 
3.4.3. The legal field 
 
In this final section, borrowing from Bourdieu's work, I am going to try to outline 
the ‘Legal Field’. As Bourdieu explained, the legal field is  
 
‘…a universe in which we play a certain game according to certain rules, in which 
one enters only if one has paid a certain entrance fee, such as having a specific 
competence, a legal culture, indispensable for playing the game, and a disposition 
with regard to the game, or an interest in the game (…) What a field requires, 
basically, is that one believes in the game and to concedes to the game that it 
deserves to be played, that it is worth the effort; the game ‘is worth the candle’ 
(Bourdieu, 1991a, p. 96)5 
 
In the following subsections, I am going to explore this definition. 
 
3.4.3.1. Specific Competence? 
 
The first question that this definition raises is: What are the specific competencies 
that we recognise as being held by lawyers? The legal field is a place of struggle 
for the ‘iurisdictio’, the right and the authority to determine the law (Bourdieu, 
1987, p. 817; 1991a, p. 97). This competency, or should we say this legal and 
technical competency, is by no means limited to a social recognition of the 
knowledge that legal actors have about the law, it also involves the capacity to 
put the ‘law in action’. This is to say that the constitution of the legal field - and 
                                         
5 The translation from French is mine. 
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thus the monopoly of the ‘iurisdictio’ - also means the formation of a market of 
legal services, which explains the high degree of intricacy of the division of 
juridical labour (Bourdieu, 1987, pp. 834-835; Bourdieu, 1991a, p. 97). 
 
The legal services that lawyers provide are a set of techniques, a symbolic capital, 
that lies in words. As Bourdieu says ‘Jurists thus have a capital of words, a capital 
of concepts, and they can contribute in this way to the construction of reality’ 
(Bourdieu, 2012/2014, p. 331). This symbolic power can be seen through any court 
judgement, for example, during the sentencing diets. The words uttered by the 
sheriff, the sentence they impose on the accused is a ‘form of authorised, public, 
official speech’ (Bourdieu, 1987, p. 827). This is to say, it is collectively recognised 
by society, in those specific circumstances, as a legal competence; an 
‘auctoritas’; a symbolic power that allows the judge to create a reality in which 
the accused, now the offender, is going to be punished in the terms the judge has 
decided. As Garcia Villegas suggests, legal authority is a privileged form of power 
‘in terms of legitimate symbolic violence - monopolised by the state - which the 
state both produces and practices’ (2004, p. 60).  
 
However, this ‘power of naming’ is never the product of isolated lawyers nor the 
by-product of a radical nominalism; it is a product of a ‘symbolic struggle between 
professionals possessing unequal technical skills and social influence’ (Bourdieu, 
1987, p. 827). These struggles are not limited to the right to determine what the 
law says. They also reflect the capacity to influence or shape legal practices, 
ultimately to know how to play the ‘game’ to achieve particular goals. 
Accordingly, legal agents, even those that have a high position in the field like 
judges, are constrained by the limits of what the legal ‘game’ allows. Any attempt 
to reshape the rules or produce a ‘legal revolution’ must be made according to 
the very same rules that you may want to change (Bourdieu, 1991a, p. 97). 
 
Thus, despite the position that sheriffs occupy inside the courtroom their decisions 
are constrained firstly by the normative framework; secondly by the struggles of 
the other agents that aim to influence the decision and to whom the judges must 
listen; thirdly, by the supervision exerted by the appeal court. These variables 
restrict the spaces of possible choices that sheriffs have available to them and, 
accordingly, produce a corresponding space of impossibles. 
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3.4.3.2. Monopoly of the legitimate use of violence 
 
It is also important to note the close relationship between the legal field, the 
State and the field of power (Bourdieu, 2012/2014; 1989/1996; 1994; 1988). What 
is particularly important for my analysis is that the sub-field of criminal law exerts 
a critical social function by rationalising the monopoly of physical and symbolic 
violence by the State (Bourdieu, 1994, pp. 3-4; García Villegas, 2004, p. 60). This 
is to say that criminal procedure legitimises, normalises and provides a rationale 
for the use of this violence in its different dimensions. However, the symbolic 
power of the sheriffs can only be exerted within a legal ritual that provides the 
force behind the words that are uttered. The judicial ‘power of naming’ can only 
produce its consequences if it is uttered in the proper manner, moment and place. 
Therefore, the ritual dimension of criminal procedure is also part of what provides 
the law with its symbolic power. More critically, as Miller argues, one of the legal 
functions of the ritual is to shape the identity of the individuals who take part in 
it (2005, p. 1189). Moreover, the symbolic nature of rituals does not mean that 
they cannot be violent. Rituals may involve symbolic violence and lead to physical 
violence (Miller, 2005), which is what may happen during criminal procedure.  
 
The reference to physical violence needs to be understood in how penal 
institutions exert legitimised violence against the citizens. For example, the 
police are entitled to use force against individuals, even in cases in which that 
violence is not used to arrest citizens; imprisonment and carceral regimes are 
forms of violence in many different ways which are normalised continuously as a 
part of the reality of punishment (Fassin, 2018; 2011/2013; 2015/2017). Thus, the 
law and legal decisions play a critical role in normalising and legitimising the 
violence exerted by the penal institutions (in the case of the police) or by enabling 
and making possible the physical violence that can be exercised in the context of 
punishment (in the case of imprisonment). Thus, legal competency requires the 
ritual dimension to be able to legitimately and symbolically exert the ‘monopoly 
of violence’ in the social function of punishment by the state. 
 
The judges’ symbolic power is exerted through a ritual that aims to legitimise the 
decisions that are taken by the legal agents. As Tait argues, these rituals ‘embody 
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and enliven the law’ (2002, p. 471). Thus, within those performances, judges are 
not individuals but the embodiment of the state. The ‘ritual’ words must be 
uttered in the hearing at the courtroom and in the precise and specific opportunity 
that the legal ritual creates (Tata, Forthcoming). The higher the stakes, the more 
ritualized the procedure becomes. The best example of this is the criminal trial 
at the High Court. The jury, as lay people, are invited to exert the ‘lawful 
judgment’ by the accused’s peers in a heavily ritualized procedure that aims to 
legitimize the verdict.  
 
Simplifying the complexities of legal rituals, we can easily find two great moments 
in the criminal procedure: First, the culmination of the judicial process where a 
declaration of the guilt or innocence of the accused is uttered. Secondly, if the 
accused is declared guilty, a hearing where the punishment for that individual is 
announced. From a Foucauldian perspective, both rituals are the consequence of 
what he calls the ‘inquiry’ (L'enquête) (Foucault, 1974/2001; 2012/2014). He 
argues that this is a form of knowledge-power that aims to determine (or 
construct) the ‘truth’ of what happened (Foucault, 1974/2001), and, if and when 
the accused is declared guilty -by any means- it shifts into an inquiry into the 
‘nature’ of the now ‘offender’ (Foucault, 2012/2014; 1981; Tait, 2002). Thus, the 
rituals are the communicative culmination of both of these processes and require 
to be carried out retaining at least the core aspects of the established rituals of 
justice. From these perspectives, judicial practices, and particularly sentencing 
practices, involve a symbolic dimension that further shapes and constrains the 
‘space of possibles’; meaning the range of possible actions or reactions the judges 
may adopt. 
 
3.4.3.3. Legal Habitus 
 
The ritual aspect and the consequences of the legal competence that society 
recognises in lawyers are the external manifestations of the internalization of 
the legal structures by the legal actors. As Bourdieu argued, lawyers ‘can make 
others believe [in the law] only because they believe in it. If they contribute to 
the force of the law, it is because they themselves have been caught in the trap, 
notably at the end of the work of acquiring the specific belief in the value of 
legal culture’ (1991a, pp. 96-97). These effects can be seen in the courtroom 
65 
 
particularly during solemn trials at the sheriff court or the High Court. The ritual 
solemnity imbues the process and forces the lay people, mainly when they are 
officiating jury duty, to be part of the illusion of the law.  
 
Thus, the sociological question to ask is how do lawyers move from studying the 
law to believing in it? How can the legal epistemology become a set of legal 
manners, bodily postures, and ways to talk, ways to conduct the self and 
perform in court? To be a lawyer means not only to know the law but also to 
possess a set of dispositions that allow them to ‘know-how’ this knowledge can 
be put into practice within the legal game. However, all these considerations 
mean that to reconstruct the logic of practices, it is necessary to take into 
account the way that the agents, in this case the judges, acquire their specific 
legal habitus. 
 
3.4. Bourdieu and sentencing practices 
 
One of the critical aspects of my approach towards sentencing in this thesis was 
to acknowledge the need to inquire into the sociological nature of sentencing. In 
this regard, I stated that I conceptualise it as a social practice that fulfils the 
social function of punishment. However, this further requires us to discuss the 
theoretical, epistemological and methodological implications of this position-
taking. One of my main concerns was the need to adopt a theoretical framework 
that could help me to attain an epistemic break from the legal episteme 
imposed by my past as a practitioner. In other words, to adopt theoretical tools 
that could help me in my study of the field, aiding me to be aware of my 
position on it and the potential biases I may have. As explained during this 
Chapter, I adopted Bourdieu's theory of practice because it recognises that 
research is also a practice, thus providing epistemic and methodological tools.   
 
As a consequence of this, the discussion of the Bourdieusian framework is 
preceded by a brief discussion of the epistemic and methodological difficulties 
that the researcher faces when studying practice. This discussion influence the 
theoretical concepts of habitus, field and the interactions between them. 
Overall, this chapter outlines the methodological implications of this theory, and 
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highlights some issues that will be discussed in the next chapter. Furthermore, 
several aspects that are going to be discussed in the methods chapter, such as 
the problem of reflexivity and the methods used, are directly or indirectly linked 
with the conceptualisation of practice provided by Bourdieu. Thus, this and the 
next chapter have to be considered as two different aspects of the same 
process.  
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CHAPTER 4: Methods. 
 
In this chapter, I am going to discuss the methods that were used during my 
research. The chapter is structured in four sections. In the first one, I am going 
to discuss the relevance of reflexivity as a starting point for research design. The 
second section deals with the long period of negotiation of access. In the third 
section, I discuss how the final research emerged from the negotiation for 
access. This section deal with several subsections such as sampling, ethics and 
most importantly the methods that were used: shadowing, interviews and 
passive observation. The final section deals with data analysis.   
 
4.1. The research design: Reflexivity as a key aspect 
 
From the outset of the research-design process, I was interested in exploring the 
sentencing practices of the Sheriff Courts in the wake of the commencement of 
the Criminal Justice Licensing (Scotland) Act 2010 (CJL-2010 Act). Among several 
reforms this Act rebranded community sentences as ‘Community Payback 
Orders’ and it introduced a presumption against short sentences of 
imprisonment. As will be discussed in more detail in chapter five, one of the 
goals behind this reform was to provide a credible alternative to short-custodial 
sentences. However, in the beginning - and influenced by my experience in the 
Chilean legal field - I thought that these changes could be measured easily by an 
in-depth study of written sentencing decisions. Unbeknownst to me was the fact 
that sentencing decisions at the Sheriff Court are rarely written down or 
transcribed. The few that are actually transcribed are due to an appeal or ‘in 
cases where there is public interest or where the sentence may be complicated 
or controversial’ (Judiciary of Scotland, 2018b). 
 
To obtain a better understanding of the field, apart from reading existing 
literature on sentencing research, particularly in Scotland and England, I knew I 
needed to learn the ‘law in action’. Thus, I randomly visited five Sheriff Courts 
to learn ‘in situ’ about the normal functioning of legal practices. I was able to 
observe a solemn procedure criminal trial and civil and criminal hearings. I also 
attended a trial at the High Court. 
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My first experience with the Scottish legal field was enlightening. I was 
observing the practices not only as a foreigner but also as a foreign lawyer. 
Before coming to Scotland, I worked for the Chilean Prosecution Service for 
almost five years. During the last three years before coming here, my position 
involved, among other duties, being instructed by the equivalents of procurator 
fiscals as a solicitor-advocate at the Appeal Courts. During the same period, I 
was a part-time criminal law instructor at two Chilean universities. Thus, my 
approach to the study of the Scottish field is that of an ‘outsider-insider’. I came 
from a different culture, as a foreign researcher, but I am an insider in the legal 
field, within a legal culture of my own. I not only have experience with legal 
theory and criminology, but I also have experience investigating crimes, 
preparing them for trial and standing before the Chilean courts. Therefore, the 
legal practices I observed in Scotland felt both familiar and radically different. 
For example, the practices of solicitors or advocates performed at criminal trials 
felt the most familiar to me. Despite the different language and legal system, 
the examination techniques, the theatricality, the way the solicitors or 
advocates conducted themselves in court, were practices that I could relate to. I 
could identify myself with them. 
 
However, during the time I have been in Scotland, I have never felt so alien to 
its society and culture than during my first time observing sentencing diets at 
the Sheriff Courts. I was not able to identify the source of this discomfort 
immediately. After a reflexive exercise, I realised that the ‘cultural shock’ lay in 
the way my legal habitus determines the way I approach and analyse social and 
political realities. As a lawyer, we are trained to believe in the law – in my case, 
the specific Chilean version of continental law - and thus, particularly in legal 
contexts, I was accustomed to ‘seeing’ how the behaviours of the individuals are 
determined by legal structures. Through the sentencing hearings, I was able to 
get a ‘glimpse’ of a socio-political structure that was completely at odds with 
my own culture. For example, the existence of a welfare state creates a network 
of relations, interactions, obligations, control mechanisms, etc., between 
citizens and the State and between citizen themselves. Some of these relations, 
like the role of the NHS in Scottish society, are unthinkable or unthought-of in a 
neoliberal society with almost no welfare state like Chile. 
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My attempts to try to understand this rupture were another of the reasons why 
Bourdieu's framework seemed to fit my needs. It helped me to understand 
practices theoretically and also provided me with tools for interrogating my legal 
practices and habitus. Moreover, through the advice to attempt a reflexive 
sociology, its theory helped to make sense of the rupture I faced. Thus, 
reflexivity forced me to assess how my past legal experiences, practices and 
habitus might have an impact on my study of the new field. And notably, given 
the otherness I was experiencing, I wondered how this could be used to improve 
my approach to the new field and, in particular, my research design.  
 
As I explained in the previous chapter, Bourdieu asks researchers to bear in mind 
how their habitus and their position in the field may affect their analysis. 
Wacquant argues that Bourdieu's approach to reflexivity has three key points:  
 
‘First, its primary target is not the individual analyst but the social and intellectual 
unconscious embedded in analytic tools and operations; second, it must be a 
collective enterprise rather than the burden of the lone academic; and, third, it 
seeks not to assault but to buttress the epistemological security of sociology’ 
(Wacquant, 1992, p. 36) 
 
Hence, reflexivity has to overcome three kinds of bias: (i) the social origins and 
coordinates of the individual researcher; (ii) the position that the analyst 
occupies in the microcosm of the academic field; (iii) the intellectualist bias, 
the risk of collapsing practical logic into theoretical logic (Wacquant, 1992, pp. 
39-40). Consequently, when I had to deal with what my legal habitus meant for 
my research, I had to consider questions that I never thought of before. For 
example, how my legal habitus - the legal training received - has shaped my own 
views on penology and judicial practices and how this habitus made me take for 
granted important penological questions. In turn, this led me to realise that, 
despite the fact that my research was not a comparative study on sentencing, as 
a foreign researcher I was facing some of the methodological issues that emerge 
in such contexts. The most evident problem was the risk of incurring an 
ethnocentric bias (Bourdieu, 1997/2000) by overstating similarities or neglecting 
differences. This was so because the rupture I felt was so powerful that it could 
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only be understood as a manifestation of the extent to which my legal training 
and experiences were unconsciously determining my vision of the field. 
 
Having said this, it is important to stress the difficulty of trying to convey the 
rupture I felt. Before attending the courts, I had read as much I could about 
criminal proceedings in Scotland, about common law, about punishment in 
Scotland. Thus, I was aware of the differences that I might find and, I thought, I 
was prepared to deal with them. However, written words can hardly provide you 
with an understanding of a reality which you have never seen. That's why 
ethnocentric bias is so common; we use what we know to try to understand the 
unknown, we ‘fill the blank spaces’ with whatever we have already experienced  
(Bourdieu, 1997/2000). 
 
I also want to stress that the otherness I felt in court was both a source of 
external and internal insight. The more I interrogated the Scottish field, the 
more I challenged my legal habitus. Thus, the rupture gave way to a double 
gaze, one that looked onwards while looking inwards. To learn what is possible 
and impossible in a new field led me to critically reassess what is allowed and 
forbidden in mine. When you are trained as a lawyer - and led to believe in the 
law or normative systems - you internalise the idea that some practices should 
only happen in a precise manner or never happen at all. Thus, when you are 
confronted with a field in which those forbidden practices are ingrained, they 
are standard, and the field ‘works’, then you are faced not only with structural 
differences but also with core epistemic ones. Which is to say when you are led 
to believe that the field can only exist if specific rules are observed, and you 
learn a new space in which none of this is true, this indeed reframes the way you 
think about legal fields. 
 
To make things more complicated, I tried to deal with this sort of dual inquiry 
(external and internal) by attempting to retain or adopt a sociological gaze and 
thus trying to exert reflexivity or, at least, epistemic surveillance of my legal 
habitus. More critically, while my study of the new field helped me to challenge 
or deconstruct my legal habitus, I realised that I needed to be careful because I 
could still - inadvertently - ‘fill the blank spaces’ of my analysis using my legal 
experiences to make sense of it. In this process, embracing otherness, and thus, 
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embracing the rupture, helped me to try to sustain a kind of epistemic 
surveillance through a conscious break with my primary previous experiences.  
 
It worth noting three final things. Firstly, reflexivity is not something you 
achieve; it is a constant process. Secondly, my three supervisors played a vital 
role in guiding me and helping me to analyse and challenge my predispositions 
critically. Their intellectual support was essential in the development of a 
sociological way of thinking about both my habitus and the field. Finally, all 
these considerations do not mean that I have not relied on my legal experiences 
or have not been influenced by them in my research. They did, in very different 
ways, help to design the research and particularly affected the way I approached 
negotiating access. They also played a role in the way I engaged with Judges 
during my fieldwork, and more widely with the literature on sentencing. 
However, what reflexivity did was make me aware of the necessity of being 
cautious about how these experiences, this habitus, the former position I had in 
the Chilean field, may impact upon my research. 
 
4.2. Negotiating the research design 
 
From the very beginning, one of my main concerns in designing my research was 
the issue of access. Actually, one of the reasons why I decided to carry out my 
fieldwork in Scotland was the naive assumption that it would be easier to get 
access here than in Chile. After my first review of the English and Scottish 
literature I realised my mistake. If anything, the panorama described by the 
literature depicted a more hermetic judiciary than the Chilean one. During the 
1980s and 1990s, some researchers had provided different accounts of the 
difficulties that they had faced in getting access or, even worse, of access being 
denied or withdrawn. In the particular case of Scotland, the lack of research 
studies in this area was a ‘deafening silence’ that alerted me that something was 
happening. Several researchers who I met during my first two years in Scotland 
confirmed that there was a lot of interest in sentencing. However, they also told 
me that the relationship between scholars and the judiciary was uneasy. 
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After reading Scottish literature and talking with several scholars and a few 
practitioners, I arrived at the view that this tension existed and was very 
complicated because it seemed to involve - and sometimes to conflate - 
different problems. On the one hand, I noticed that some practitioners seemed 
to see criticism by legal scholars as unfair, wrong or biased. In brief, there was 
the presumption that legal scholars do not grasp what real legal practice 
involves. Later on, I would understand that in Scotland practitioners and legal 
scholars have a very different relationship with each other than they do in Chile. 
On the other hand, in addition to a field that has been - both in Scotland and 
England (Baldwin, 2008; Ashworth, 2003) - hermetic and disinclined to be an 
object of research study, a critical paper published by Tombs and Jagger (2006) 
had made this tense relationship worst. Or at least that was what several 
practitioners and lecturers told me or implied to me during my first year in 
Scotland. However, I also realised that despite the interest in sentencing, the 
perceived tension might have made some researchers refrain from carrying out 
research on sentencing under the assumption that they will not get access, and 
thus making it harder to make sense of the reasons behind the lack of research. 
 
Overall, I felt I needed to understand the extent of these tensions to be able to 
‘read’ the field appropriately. I had to prepare a research design that would not 
only allow me to explore practice but, at the same time, address any concerns 
the Judiciary may have. Thus, I started working, making certain assumptions 
based on my perception of the field given what I had managed to learn. For 
example, I perceived that practitioners distrusted the capacity of researchers to 
depict practice accurately. I realised that this distrust mirrored similar 
differences between scholars and practitioners in Chile. I also became aware 
that some areas within the criminal justice system, such as juries, were out of 
bounds for any researcher. Luckily for me, sentencing did not seem to be one of 
them.  
 
Nevertheless, one of the issues I thought could impair access was what I 
perceived as a more ‘political issue’. At that time, 2014-2015, in the wake of the 
introduction of the SSC6, the issue of sentencing disparities was a very sensitive 
                                         
6 I am going to discuss the introduction of the SSC in more detail in chapter five. 
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topic. I felt that if my research could be seen as an indirect way to measure 
disparities in sentencing then that may reduce my chances to get access. Thus, 
despite the fact that sentencing disparity could have been a measurable 
variable, I consciously limited the scope of my design leaving it out. My reading 
of the legal field was that incorporation of sentencing guidelines was not a 
popular idea among judges, and therefore any research measuring that variable 
may not secure access. 
 
Therefore, my strategy was to develop a research design that was flexible, to 
guard against the possibility that during negotiations with the judiciary I would 
be forced to drop certain aspects of it. Consequently, I decided that the core 
aspect of the research should be one-on-one interviews with the Sheriffs. 
However, I was concerned that interviews would not allow me to measure 
practices accurately. Research based only on interviews, even if I managed, as 
Tombs (2004) did, to carry out mock sentencing exercises, would provide 
evidence only of the Judges’ perceptions of what they do.  
 
One of my supervisors suggested I consider what now seems obvious - using 
ethnographic methods or at least passive observation of sentencing proceedings. 
However, at that time I was not confident in making ethnography the core of the 
research design for two reasons. First, I thought that the Judiciary might not 
agree with what this kind of method requires; secondly, at that time, I was also 
worried that my hearing disability could hinder my ability to use this method. 
While the use of hearing aids allows me to get along in an ‘able-bodied world’ 
without difficulties, during my first visits to the Sheriff courts, I realised that, at 
least from the public galleries, it was hard for me to grasp what was said. While 
the voice of the Sheriff and the Sheriff Clerk could be heard clearly most of the 
time, solicitors tended to speak at a moderate to lower volume. In addition, 
very often they positioned themselves facing towards the Sheriff and, thus, 
speaking with their back to the public gallery. I learned that understanding what 
they said is hard even for native Scottish people without impaired hearing.   
 
It is important to stress that, for me, this was one of the crucial moments where 
the support of my supervisors was vital. The difficulties that I have described 
above were undermining my confidence. I became quite pessimistic, and I was 
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terrified that I did not have what was required for doing this empirical work. I 
was seriously worried that my limitations, the fact I was foreign and my hearing 
disability, would make me fail. However, my supervisors did not allow me to quit 
and forced me to challenge those fears. Ultimately, they were right. I did have 
what was required to carry out the research, and the observational part of my 
fieldwork proved to be a critical aspect of my research. 
 
It is worth mentioning at this point, that there are currently 39 Sheriff Courts in 
Scotland. These courts are organized under six judicial districts called 
‘Sheriffdoms’ and headed by a ‘Sheriff Principal’ (SP). The Sheriffdoms are 
Glasgow and Strathkelvin; Grampian, Highland and Islands; Lothian and Borders; 
North Strathclyde; South Strathclyde, Dumfries and Galloway; Tayside, Central 
and Fife. During the research design process, I requested statistical data relating 
to criminal proceedings from the Justice Analytical Services of the Scottish 
Government. This unit annually releases a report called ‘Criminal Proceedings in 
Scotland’ which contains data on the size of the business, which kind of 
sanctions are imposed, on which offenders, etc. Nevertheless, the published 
data does not include individual information by Sheriff Court or Sheriffdom. 
These datasets were provided. I also looked at other data such as crime rates, 
population density and deprivation indexes. With that data, I decided to request 
three Sheriffdoms which - according to the data I examined – would ensure that I 
had the chance to visit almost every kind of local reality existing in Scotland. I 
discuss the sampling in more detail below. 
 
Regarding the methods, I particularly asked for two things: On the one hand, to 
carry out interviews with at least twenty-five Sheriffs. On the other, permission 
to visit one Sheriff Court per Sheriffdom on a daily basis during two to four 
weeks and observe the criminal proceedings. However, because the Judiciary 
required that the request should be brief, I was expecting to discuss the details 
later, during the negotiation process itself. 
 
The actual negotiation was a very lengthy process. Following the guidelines 
contained in the ‘Research access to courts and judicial holders’ guidance (The 
Scottish Judiciary, 2017) the proposal was submitted to the office of the Lord 
President. At that time the Lord President's office was vacant, and thus my 
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request was sent to the Lord Justice Clerk – deputy to the Lord President - who 
was, at that time, Lord Carloway. The research request was submitted on 19 
October 2015. On 22 November 2015, my supervisors and I were informed that 
the Lord Justice Clerk had discussed my request with staff from the Lord 
President's Private Office and the Secretariat of the SSC. They invited my 
supervisors and me to meet and discuss my research proposal. This meeting was 
held on 11 January 2016. A further meeting on 16 February 2016 was arranged to 
allow me to explain the methodological aspects of my research with the 
Principal Research Officer of the SSC Secretariat. It is important to note that SSC 
was going to have its first meeting in December 2015. Also, the Lord Justice 
Clerk is the head of the SSC, and thus, this explains why the SSC's secretariat 
was involved in considering my request for access negotiation.  
 
Consequently, during the second meeting of the SSC held on 7 March 2016, my 
proposal was briefly discussed. According to the minute of that meeting: 
 
‘Andrew Bell updated the Council on the research proposal from Mr Javier 
Velásquez, provided at Paper 5.1, and provided recommendations. The Council 
noted the research proposal and the Secretariat would keep members informed of 
its progress’ (Scottish Sentencing Council, 2016, p. 6) 
 
After this meeting, the SSC sent my request back to the Lord President’s private 
office. At this point, Lord Carloway had been appointed Lord President, so, 
again, in this capacity he dealt with my proposal. On 20 April 2016, I was 
informed that Lord Carloway authorized my research, subject to ‘obtaining 
approval of the relevant Sheriffs Principal in relation to the carrying out of the 
research in their Sheriffdoms’.7 
 
During the same period, I prepared request letters to the three SPs. By the end 
of June 2016, I was informed that the three SPs had agreed to meet me to 
discuss my research request. This meeting was held on 16 July 2016. As 
expected, they suggested some changes to the proposed research design, which I 
am going to discuss in detail in the next subsection. During the meeting, they 
informed me that even if they agreed to the research, they could not force 
                                         
7 Private communication with the Lord President, dated 4 May 2016. 
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Sheriffs to take part in it. They also asked me to send them a draft of the semi-
structured questions I intended to discuss with the Sheriffs so that they could 
consider this before making a decision. 
 
In August 2016 – around ten months after I made my first access request - I was 
informed that the three SPs had agreed to authorise me to carry out the 
research, and they also reported that some Sheriffs had decided to take part in 
it. For two Sheriffdoms (which I am going to call Sheriffdom A and B), the SPs 
appointed a Sheriff Clerk to help me make arrangements for my visit to the 
different Sheriff Courts. Thus, the participant sampling was carried out by the 
SPs, and therefore I had no control over it. They informed me they would 
personally contact potential Sheriffs, but could not ensure they would accept to 
take part in my research. Nevertheless, the sample of Sheriffs meant that - 
within the two jurisdictions - I visited all the Sheriff Courts in those Sheriffdoms 
except one. 
 
However, for the third Sheriffdom (Sheriffdom C), despite the fact that I was 
told that I was allowed to carry out my research, they did not contact me. 
Consequently, I waited until I made all the arrangements with the other two 
Sheriffdoms and I began to fear that the authorisation granted for Sheriffdom C 
would be revoked. Thus, I contacted the SP of Sheriffdom C and requested to 
carry out my research in three Sheriff Courts. Given the profiles of the Sheriff 
Courts I had already been granted permission to visit, I asked for access to 
courts with profiles that were not represented in my sample. The SP agreed to 
allow me to attend two of these Sheriff Courts. 
 
Finally, during October 2016, when I was already in the middle of my fieldwork, I 
submitted a new request to the Lord President asking for his authorisation to 
explore two more Sheriffdoms. Due to the positive experience I had with the SPs 
of Sheriffdoms A, B and C and the successful fieldwork I had been carrying out, I 
decided to incorporate new Sheriff Courts. I thought that the access I had 
already been granted could ease a new request that could allow me to enrich my 
sample. 
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On 22 November 2016, I obtained his approval, under the same conditions as the 
first request. Consequently, I wrote letters to the two SPs. One SP declined to 
authorise my research arguing that this particular Sheriffdom was over-
researched. The second SP first asked me to postpone my request until March 
2017, which I did. I re-submitted my application, but I never obtained a reply. 
Thus, I decided not to pursue any further applications. 
 
4.3. The final design: methods in action and the 
‘sample’ 
 
As expected, the negotiation with the SPs led to adjustments to the proposed 
research design. Firstly, they informed me that they were of the view that given 
that Sheriff Courts deal with civil and family law cases I would only need to 
attend court on the one day the Sheriffs deal with criminal business. This meant 
that an ethnography - as traditionally understood (Murchinson, 2010; Fetterman, 
2010; Campbell & Lassiter, 2015) - was off the table because I would not be able 
to visit the same court nor observe the same Sheriffs for an extended period. 
Following this, I enquired, due to my hearing problems, if it could be possible for 
me to observe the hearing from the jury box. They told me that I should make 
these arrangements with the Sheriff Clerk of the courts I visited. 
Concerning the interviews, since I would only be visiting on one day, I was 
warned that the Sheriff might have little time to talk with me if they had any 
time at all. Then I asked if I could use mock sentencing exercises, but the SPs 
rejected such an idea. I was told by the SPs that those exercises do not capture 
the complexities of sentencing, and thus, it would not be advisable for me to use 
them. 
 
Nevertheless, the fieldwork itself changed everything. Given the negotiation 
with the SPs, the methods were discussed under the assumption that my visit to 
the court would be limited to observing the hearing and, if and only if the 
participant Sheriff had time, I would be able to interview them. Consequently, I 
planned to use a mixed-method approach using passive observation of the 
sentencing hearings and semi-structured interviews. 
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However, this design - where the two methods complemented each other in 
different stages of the fieldwork – could only be carried out in four of the 
sixteen visits to the courts. During the other twelve visits, the arrangements 
adopted by the Sheriffs to manage my visit forced me to redefine my methods. 
This was not because they imposed further restrictions; on the contrary, they 
allowed me to stay with them throughout the day. Thus, the methods merged 
organically, interviews overlapped with passive observation. Also, this change 
meant that I was not only able to observe the Sheriffs in the courtroom, but I 
was also able to see how they deal with their work in their chambers. 
 
In the following sections, I am going to explore briefly the methods that were 
used, given these changes. I will also explain, briefly, why I opted not to use 
statistical data. Finally, I am going to explain the strategic decisions and 
limitations of the sampling process and then describe the profiles of the 
participants, their courts and their Sheriffdoms. 
 
4.3.1. Concerning the Sample 
 
As explained above, there are thirty-nine Sheriff Courts in Scotland and they are 
organized in six Sheriffdoms, as you can observe in table (1). I requested access 
to courts in three of the six Sheriffdoms. 
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Table (1): List of Sheriffdoms and Sheriff Courts. 
 
 
As you can observe in table (2) below, the busiest Sheriffdoms in the last four 
years are Tayside, Central and Fife followed by Glasgow and Strathkelvin. On the 
opposite side, the Sheriffdoms with the lower number of cases are Grampian, 
Highlands and Islands followed by North Strathclyde. There is a correlation 
between the size of the business and the population density of the areas 
encompassed by the Sheriffdoms. The population density also affects the size of 
the territory included in the Sheriffdom. For example, Glasgow and Strathkelvin 
Sheriffdom is the smallest territorially but one of the busiest ones because of 
the high population density in Glasgow - the biggest city in Scotland. On the 
contrary, Grampian, Highlands and Islands Sheriffdom includes the larger masses 
of territory in Scotland, but, at the same time, it is one of the jurisdictions with 
the lowest population density of all the Sheriffdoms.8 
 
 
 
 
                                         
8 The characteristic of Scotland will be discussed in depth in chapter five. 
Sheriffdom Sheriff Courts
Number of 
Courts In 
Sheriffdom
Glasgow and Strathkelvin Glasgow Sheriff Court 1
Grampian, Highlands & Islands
Aberdeen Sheriff Court and Justice of Peace Court - Peterhead Sheriff Court  and 
Justice of Peace Court- Banff Sheriff Court  and Justice of Peace Court- Elgin Sheriff 
Court  and Justice of Peace Court - Inverness Sheriff Court  and Justice of Peace Court- 
Tain Sheriff Court  and Justice of Peace Court- Fort William Sheriff Court  and Justice 
of Peace Court- Wick Sheriff Court - Lerwick Sheriff Court - Kirkwall Sheriff Court - 
Stornoway Sheriff Court - Lochmaddy Sheriff Court - Portree Sheriff Court 
13
Lothian & Borders
Edinburgh Sheriff Court and Justice of Peace Court - Livingston Sheriff Court and 
Justice of Peace Court - Selkirk Sheriff Court and Justice of Peace Court - Jedburgh 
Sheriff Court and Justice of Peace Court
4
North Strathclyde
Oban Sheriff Court and Justice of Peace Court - Campbeltown Sheriff Court and 
Justice of Peace Court - Dunoon Sheriff Court and Justice of Peace Court - Greenock 
Sheriff Court and Justice of Peace Court - Dumbarton Sheriff Court and Justice of 
Peace Court - Paisley Sheriff Court and Justice of Peace Court - Kilmarnock Sheriff 
Court and Justice of Peace Court 
7
South Strathclyde, Dumfries & 
Galloway
Airdrie Sheriff Court - Lanark Sheriff Court and Justice of Peace Court - Dumfries 
Sheriff Court and Justice of Peace Court - Stranraer Sheriff Court and Justice of Peace 
Court - Ayr Sheriff Court and Justice of Peace Court - Hamilton Sheriff Court and 
Justice of Peace Court 
6
Tayside, Central & Fife
Falkirk Sheriff Court and Justice of Peace Court - Stirling Sheriff Court and Justice of 
Peace Court - Alloa Sheriff Court and Justice of Peace Court - Dunfermline Sheriff 
Court and Justice of Peace Court - Kirkcaldy Sheriff Court and Justice of Peace Court - 
Perth Sheriff Court and Justice of Peace Court - Dundee Sheriff Court and Justice of 
Peace Court - Forfar Sheriff Court and Justice of Peace Court 
8
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Table (2): Total sanctions imposed per Sheriffdom (From 2012-2013 to 2016-2017) and the percentage that 
number means of the total amount of sanctions imposed that year. 
 
 
 
Thus, the strategy behind the sampling of the three Sheriffdoms took account of 
two factors. Firstly, given the density and territorial differences existing in 
Scotland, I chose Sheriffdoms with Sheriff Courts that could reflect the different 
realities of Scotland, both concerning low or high density jurisdictions and also 
regarding rural, urban and mixed rural-urban jurisdictions. Secondly, I was also 
interested in visiting courts with different volumes of business. Thus, I managed 
to visit small courts (those with only one or two resident Sheriffs) and also larger 
Sheriff Courts with several resident Sheriffs.  
 
Nevertheless, once I was granted access to the Sheriffdoms, I started to lose 
control of the sampling process. Although I was able to ensure the diversity of 
the sample regarding density, rural vs urban profiles and regarding the size of 
the business and court, it was the SPs who invited my participants to take part in 
the research. Thus, I did not know if they asked all their Sheriffs or if they sent 
the invitation only to specific Sheriffs. Thus, it seems evident that the sampling 
process has limitations, I do not know how the SPs went about identifying 
participants. I will discuss this issue in more detail at the end of this section. 
 
That said, I was able to visit fourteen Sheriff Courts which means that I visited 
around thirty-six percent of all the Sheriff Courts in Scotland. To protect the 
identity of the Sheriff, Courts and Sheriffdoms I visited, I will not provide more 
details about the profile of these courts. Otherwise, I risk revealing features that 
may allow the reader to deduce the Sheriffdoms where I carried out my 
research, which may undoubtedly lead them to infer which courts and Sheriffs 
took part in the research. 
 % Average
Glasgow City 12,451 19.34% 11,709 18.47% 11,413 17.64% 10,942 17.04% 10038 16.67% 17.83%
Grampian, Highlands & 
Islands
8,995 13.97% 8,675 13.68% 8,919 13.79% 9,180 14.29% 9,458 15.70% 14.29%
Lothian & Borders 8,320 12.92% 9,597 15.14% 10,559 16.32% 10,329 16.08% 9,117 15.14% 15.12%
North Strathclyde 9,767 15.17% 8,946 14.11% 8,766 13.55% 9,440 14.70% 8,526 14.16% 14.34%
South Strathclyde, 
Dumfries & Galloway
10,897 16.93% 11,203 17.67% 11,042 17.07% 11,401 17.75% 10,825 17.97% 17.48%
Tayside, Central & Fife 13,917 21.62% 13,256 20.91% 13,966 21.59% 12,918 20.11% 12,243 20.33% 20.91%
Total Sanctions Imposed 
2016-172015-16
60,20764210
2014-152013-142012-13
64,347 63,386 64,665
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Regarding the Sheriffs, I interviewed sixteen Sheriffs across the fourteen courts, 
meaning that I visited two Sheriff Courts twice. Among my sample, there were 
thirteen Sheriffs, two Summary Sheriffs and one retired Sheriff who was working 
in a part-time capacity. According to the data provided by the Scottish Sheriff 
Courts, at the time of initiating my fieldwork - September 2016 - there were one 
hundred and forty-two appointed Sheriffs, fifteen Summary Sheriffs and thirty-
nine part-time Sheriffs. Thus, my sample of sixteen Sheriffs represented eight 
percent of the total number of Sheriffs at that time. 
 
The sample also varied regarding the profile of the Sheriffs; from those with less 
than five years of experience in the office to some that had more than eight 
years of experience. Only four of my participants were women; this is to say 
twenty-five percent of my sample. According to the list of appointed Sheriffs on 
the Judiciary of Scotland website in September 2016, only twenty-seven of the 
one hundred twenty-seven Sherriff that were in office at that time were women, 
or 21%. Thus, the proportions were similar. As a final note, the sample 
encompassed Sheriffs that before being appointed had been solicitors, solicitor-
advocates and advocates. 
 
Having discussed the process, one question must be addressed: are these Sheriffs 
representative of the population of Scottish Sheriffs as a whole” (in terms of 
providing an account of sentencing practices that can be generalised beyond the 
Sheriffs that you did interview)? While this was one of my concerns during the 
sampling process and before starting the fieldwork, I think that my sample it is 
representative of at least of the various rural, rural-urban and small to mid-size 
urban jurisdictions. The only local realities that my sample lack was from large 
urban courts.  It is worth noting that if there was an attempt by SPs to influence 
the composition of the sample this was limited only to the Sheriffs but not to the 
courts I visited. This was so because I was allowed to visit almost all the Sheriff 
courts from two Sheriffdoms (A and B) and I was granted access to the specific 
courts I requested in the third jurisdiction (Sheriffdom C).This is important, 
because, if the SPs attempted - consciously or not - to restrict my access to 
certain Sheriffs, this was limited to the number of resident Sheriffs in those 
courts. For example, I visited a few Sheriffs court with only one, two or three 
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resident Sheriffs. Thus they had limited to no option in terms of which Sheriff to 
pick.   
 
Even if an attempt to influence the sample of my participants was made, I think 
any effects of this would have failed because the backgrounds, profiles and 
sentencing styles of all my participants were so diverse and seems not to follow 
any pattern, which makes any bias in their selection seems unlikely. 
Furthermore, in Sheriffdom C the SP allowed me to interview the Sheriffs of the 
Sheriffs Court I requested and, as stated above, in Sheriffdoms A and B, there 
was a limited number of Sheriffs in the Sheriffdom.  
 
Finally, even if there was a deliberate attempt to depict an idealised image of 
practice, the observation of RC proved a handy way to triangulate the data and 
ground it in real practice. In this regard, the RCs that I observed were 
characterised by their unpredictability. Some cases challenged the Sheriffs in 
different ways, even without factoring in the behaviour of the other penal actors 
and the public that attended the hearings. In other words, if there was an 
attempt to offer a specific depiction of what practice is, the RC forced the 
Sheriff to exert their role as they usually do.  
 
4.3.2. Ethics 
 
Before it could commence, my research needed to be approved by the College of 
Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee at the University of Glasgow. Due to 
the long process of negotiation, I only submitted the ethics application after I 
obtained the authorisation from the Lord President. Since my aim was to explore 
how an exceptionally powerful occupational group – Sheriffs - understand their 
purposes, roles and tasks, the topic was not considered to be particularly 
personal or sensitive (since it concerns their performance of a public duty). 
Furthermore, my research population cannot be considered vulnerable (in 
general). Therefore, it was regarded as low-risk research. My ethics application 
was submitted on 11 May 2016, and approval was granted on 8 June 2016 
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Due to the relatively small number of Sheriff Courts and Sheriffs, I took a 
number of steps to secure the anonymity and confidentiality of my participants. 
Due to the relatively small number of Sheriff Courts and Sheriffs, when reporting 
my findings, I avoid any direct or indirect reference that might lead to disclosing 
the identity of my participants. Moreover, on a more logistic level, the data 
containing the audio recordings and interview transcriptions was kept on an 
external hard drive. Whenever it was not used, the hard drive was stored in a 
steel pedestal which was kept locked. This was located in a room at the 
University which could only be accessed with a key. The consent forms with the 
name of my participants were also kept in a different lockable pedestal, in a 
different room, which also required a key for access.  
 
In this thesis, I have tried to protect the anonymity of my participants by the use 
of neutral pronouns ‘s/he’ or ‘herself/himself’. Also, in chapter nine, where I 
examine career trajectories of Sheriffs, I chose not to analyse the career 
trajectories of my research participants. Instead, I used the biographies of 
recently appointed individuals – all of whom were appointed after my fieldwork 
concluded. In this way I was able to ensure that I did not expose my own 
participants to the risk of being recognised because of their past trajectories. 
 
 
4.3.3. Methods in the fieldwork 
 
The lengthy process of negotiation, the many meetings, and my informal visit to 
some Sheriff Courts, made me pessimistic about gaining anything other than 
minimal access to the judiciary. Thus, after the negotiation with the SPs, I 
thought the fieldwork would be restricted to brief observations and post-hearing 
interviews. 
 
In practice, in twelve of the sixteen courts I visited, after arriving at the court I 
was escorted to the Sheriff's chambers where I was able to talk with the Sheriffs 
before the hearing. Thus, I stayed at Chambers until the Court Officer came to 
inform the Judge that the courtroom was ready. Then, we walked through the 
maze of internal corridors of the Sheriff Courts towards the courtroom. I was 
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always asked to go in alone. Once I took my seat, generally in the jury box, the 
court officer would come into the courtroom, while the Sheriff waited outside. 
They would observe the courtroom and if everything was ready, say ‘All Rise’. 
While everyone rose from their seat, the Sheriff would make their entrance. The 
sentencing diets lasted all morning, in some occasions there was no break until 
lunch time, in others the Court adjourned briefly. When that happened and the 
Sheriff left for their chambers, I was invited to follow them, and thus, I was able 
to talk with them for a while on or off the record. When the lunch break came, 
in seven courts I had lunch with the Sheriff in their chambers or a restaurant 
near the court. On two of these occasions, other resident Sheriffs had lunch with 
us. In the rest of the courts, I had lunch alone and then came back to the court 
to observe the last hearings of the day. By the time the criminal business of the 
day was done, the Sheriff left the courtroom and I was invited to follow them 
and had a final chat with them in their chambers. 
 
This brief description of several of my visits to Sheriff Courts during my 
fieldwork aims to illustrate how flexible and organic the whole experience was 
in some courts. There was an overlap between the interviews and the 
observation to the extent that, for me as a researcher, they seem to blend or 
merge. Because of the dynamics of the fieldwork in those courts where I was 
granted more access than expected, the method was something other than just 
interviews and passive observation. This is not to say that I did not interview the 
Sheriff or observe the hearings in those cases but rather that I also did 
something else: I adopted shadowing methods. 
 
And because it was much more than just those two methods, it required me to 
quickly adapt to these dynamics and be able to process what I was obtaining 
from the fieldwork. I had to make sense of the new position that opened up for 
me as a researcher, and for them as the subject of the research. For example, 
these new dynamics led me to be reflexive regarding the ‘Hawthorne effect’ 
(McDonald, 2005, p. 459), and other methodological issues, as discussed below. 
 
4.3.3.1. Shadowing? 
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In a strict sense, I did carry out interviews with the participant Sheriffs, and I 
did observe them during sentencing hearings. However, as I explained above, the 
dynamics of my experience in some courts transformed the methods into 
something else. In a sense, this was so because both interviews and observation 
become ingrained in an indivisible method, which was characterized by myself 
being there. I was able to follow the Sheriffs during the day, occasionally just 
talking, but at other times interviewing them or just observing how they worked 
in and outside the courtroom. 
 
However, to be subjected to this dynamic meant that ‘on-the-record’ interviews 
were constantly interrupted. Sometimes, I was able to carry out short interviews 
while the Sheriff and I were waiting in Chambers for the hearings to be resumed. 
Between the to and fro from the Courtroom to Chambers it was very hard not to 
lose ‘the thread’ of what we discussed. In addition, there was a close link 
between the discussion of practice and the cases the Sheriff was dealing with 
that day. Thus, every time we came from the courtroom there were more and 
more aspects of practice that I wanted to discuss. One critical dynamic that 
emerged - that could not be characterised as interviews or passive observation - 
was the possibility of discussing with the Sheriffs some cases both before and 
after the hearings; being able to listen to the Sheriff’s first impression of a case 
before going to court and then their thoughts after coming back from the 
courtroom, in a context in which I was also able to observe the hearing itself and 
how the case was dealt with. Overall, this dynamic allowed me to grasp the 
practice in its contexts and in a more organic way. 
 
In a sense, my experience in these twelve courts seemed similar to the method 
used by Darbyshire (2011) in her ethnography of judges: shadowing. To shadow is 
‘a research technique which involves a researcher closely following a member of 
an organization over an extended period of time’ (McDonald, 2005, p. 456). This 
description fits what I did by spending the day with some Sheriffs. Nevertheless, 
it is more accurate to say that I used shadowing methods not that I carried out a 
shadowing or an ethnography, due to the fact I only observed or followed the 
Sheriff between one and three days. And, as discussed earlier both ethnography 
(Campbell & Lassiter, 2015; Fetterman, 2010) and shadowing (McDonald, 2005; 
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Czarniawska, 2007) – at least as traditionally understood – require a more 
extended period of observation than the one I was allowed.  
 
In brief, confronted with an unexpected change in the fieldwork I realised that 
the shadowing method used by Darbyshire (2011) was very useful considering the 
new circumstances I was facing. It is important to highlight that I had to quickly 
adapt myself to the challenges that this opportunity posed; particularly 
concerning how the shadowing dynamic changed the structure of the interviews 
and incorporated other variables through the different kind of interactions that 
my presence there elicited.  
 
Having said that, the same reflexivity that led me to realise the dynamics 
required me to reconsider the relationship between my participants and me. As 
Bourdieu explains, a ‘research relationship from most of the exchanges in 
everyday life, it remains, whatever one does, a social relationship. As such, it 
can have an effect on the results obtained’ (Bourdieu, 1993/1999, p. 608). Thus, 
I had to take into account the Hawthorne or observer effect. This 
methodological issue means that the presence of the researcher alters the ‘very 
nature of the work they are trying to describe’ (McDonald, 2005, p. 459).  
 
Regarding the passive observation of the court hearings, I was confident that my 
presence would have no impact on practice. For starters, to suggest that a 
Sheriff would act differently in court because of the presence of a researcher 
would be overstating the power that a researcher has when interviewing a 
member of a legal elite. Moreover, Sheriffs are always under pressure from 
different social actors who may want them to decide a case in one way or 
another. This is to say, if there could be a Hawthorne effect, it would be most 
likely in the presence of individuals who have a level of capital that can match 
the capital of the Judges, like press members. This is not because the court 
reporters have, individually, much capital - most of them were from small and 
local news outlets, with a limited audience. Rather it is because Sheriffs are 
aware that, very often, the big news outlets - such as the Daily Mail, Daily 
Record, the BBC or even the Sun - reproduce the news from these local news 
organisations, allowing the report to reach a much wider audience and raising 
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the possibility that the Sheriff's decision-making could become widely known, 
potentially exposing him/her to fair or unfair criticism. 
 
The presence of an immigrant researcher may have been the least of their 
concerns, when dealing with complex cases. Also, even if they were - 
unconsciously – concerned about having me observing their practice, the scale of 
the business and the pressures that it put on them may, again, have made me a 
lesser concern. This is to say that there were so many things going on that my 
presence was likely overshadowed by the demands of the business. 
 
Nevertheless, the opposite was true concerning my presence in the Sheriff's 
chambers. Despite the fact that it allowed me to have a better rapport with the 
Sheriff and contextualise the material dimension of the Judges’ practices, my 
presence did alter their routines. It would be naive on my part to think that my 
observation of them in chambers is not tainted or influenced by my presence. 
However, even though I was there, the Sheriffs were still required to sort out 
some practical issues and thus I was able to observe them dealing with 
paperwork and other bureaucratic tasks. More importantly, I was able to observe 
them interacting with court staff and others resident Sheriffs. Therefore, while I 
cannot and will not claim that my presence in chambers led me to an 
observation of their practices ‘in chambers’, the organic experience of this 
‘shadowing’ did allow me to understand the materiality of their practical 
universe. 
 
4.3.3.1. Interviews 
 
As argued by Brinkmann and Kvale (2015, pp. 125-135), the process of designing 
interviews has to be preceded by a thematising stage. In this regard as discussed 
in chapter three, I made several theoretical decisions (related to the discussion 
in the preceding chapter about sentencing as practice and the use of the 
Bourdieusian framework) - which had an impact on my approach to the design of 
the semi-structured interview. The most critical issue I faced was, how to 
construct an instrument that could elicit responses that would allow me - as a 
researcher - to grasp what is beneath post-hoc explanations of practice. Thus, 
the conundrum was how to introduce questions that could prompt responses that 
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could discuss practice as such and avoid ‘textbook’ responses. However, as I 
stated above, during the negotiation process I was required to submit my 
questions for the approval of the SPs before they would grant me access. Thus, 
there was three different aspects that worried me: methodologically, political 
and ethically. 
 
On a methodological level, the challenge was to think about how to elicit an 
insightful discussion with the Sheriffs about their sentencing practice without 
knowing the level of access that I was going to be granted. At the time that I had 
to design the interview schedule, I was not even sure that I was going to be able 
to obtain much information through observation of the hearings.  On a political 
level, this posed two different problems. On the one hand, if the Sheriff 
Principals were to find the interview schedule inappropriate, inadequate or 
irrelevant that could hinder my access. On the other hand, if the schedule was 
not objected to, my concern was that it could bind me and limit the scope of my 
research. While I did present the interviews as semi-structured, the control 
exerted over the questions - and the implicit approval of the topics - implied 
that I should remain within those areas of inquiry. Finally, there was an ethical 
issue. If I was granted access, it was very likely that the document was going to 
be used by the SPs during the sampling process. Thus, the sampling process 
would be influenced by the interview schedule, and some participants may have 
wanted to take part in the research (or not take part in it) because of the topics 
contained in the schedule. Overall, I was aware back then that these problems 
and concerns are part of the usual challenges faced by researchers interested in 
carrying out research with elite subjects (Cochrane, 1998; Harvey, 2011; Mikecz, 
2012). However, the fact that you can expect these problems does not make 
them less challenging, especially when the negotiating process took so long, as 
happened in my case. 
 
Taking these issues into account, I turned to my pilot observations of the Sheriff 
Courts, to the Scottish literature on sentencing and penal sanctions (Tombs, 
2004; 2009; McNeill, et al., 2009; Tata, et al., 2007; 2008; Jamieson, 2013; 
Schinkel, 2013) -, to the statistical reports, and to Bourdieu's framework. I used 
these different sources of information to think about the pivotal axes that make 
sentencing possible both at a theoretical and practical level. I tried to 
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understand which are the fundamental aspects of sentencing that can be tackled 
both theoretically and practically? Thus, I focused on axes that could be 
understood at both levels. 
 
The schedule was designed around six main topics: how the Sheriffs understand 
their sentencing role; how they describe their sentencing decision-making; how 
they explain the use of the various disposals available to them; what is the 
meaning and purpose of their penal practices; what is their perception of their 
practice and, finally, their perceptions regarding the issues of recidivism and 
non-compliance. Additionally, and to be able to grasp the Sheriffs’ legal habitus, 
I also asked them about their legal background and how they decided to become 
Sheriffs. 
 
The research questions were framed in a more abstract rather than practical 
way. On the one hand, I was expecting that the observation of the hearings 
would allow me to link the questions with real cases and situations, which in 
turn would lead me to discuss practice in context. On the other hand, I was also 
aiming to structure the topics and questions in such a way that from a single 
reading of it the Sheriffs could understand what I wanted to discuss with them. 
In this regard, the interview schedule served different purposes. It not only 
served as a guide for the semi-structured interviews, but it also helped me to 
gain access. One of the critical aspects of any process of acquiring access, but 
which has a particular dimension in elite research, is to be able to gain the trust 
of the gatekeepers and participants (Mikecz, 2012; Harvey, 2011). In the context 
of sentencing research in Scotland, this involved focusing only on the sentencing 
process and avoiding topics that may be sensitive, such as disparity in sentencing  
(Tata & Hutton, 1998; Tata, 2013; Brown, 2017). 
 
The interviews were intended to last around one hour. However, by the end of 
the fieldwork I had around twenty-four hours of audio recordings. On average 
the interviews lasted around ninety minutes; fifty-eight minutes was the shortest 
one and two hours the longest. Nevertheless, in those courts where I ‘shadowed’ 
the Sheriffs, the total length of the recordings was the sum of several short 
interviews. As I mentioned in twelve courts, I used shadowing methods and in 
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four courts - those in which I was not allowed to shadow the Sheriff, but I did 
spend all day observing the hearings - I carried out interviews in a strict sense. 
 
As Bourdieu argues, interviews are inevitably a ‘social relationship’ and thus the 
way we present and conduct ourselves in them has an impact on them. In this 
regard, Bourdieu warns us that interviewers have to ‘reduce as much as possible 
the symbolic violence exerted through ‘this relationship’ (Bourdieu, 1993/1999, 
p. 609). Thus, the interviewer could not forget the power that he/she can exert 
within this privileged position they have as an interviewer. However, within elite 
research, how does this relationship ‘translate to the context of elites’? 
(Cochrane, 1998, p. 2124). 
 
As Smith (2006) warns us, the power relationship in the context of interviews 
cannot be seen or understood naively. This is to assume, that because the 
interviewed is part of an elite, he/she will automatically exert power over the 
power-less interviewer. Smith is right to remind us of that Foucauldian 
explanation of power. He argued that ‘in human relations, whatever they are 
(...) power is always present: I mean the relationships in which one wishes to 
direct the behaviour of another. These are the relationships that one can find at 
different levels, under different forms’ (Foucault, 1987, pp. 122-123). This to 
say that within ‘elite research’ the power relations between interviewer and 
interviewee are different to how they are traditionally conceptualised. This 
cannot be simply equated on the predominance of one over the other (Smith, 
2006). Interviewers also have some power. 
 
Therefore, one of the critical aspects in establishing this relationship was to 
develop a rapport of trust (Cochrane, 1998; Mikecz, 2012; Harvey, 2011). 
Fielding argues that elite subjects ‘are alert to status and expect to be 
interviewed by individuals of similar standing who are knowledgeable about legal 
work’ (Fielding, 2011, p. 99). As I explained earlier, due to the fact that the 
situation between scholars and practitioners seemed tense, I introduced myself 
as a Chilean lawyer researching Judges. Interestingly enough, other former 
practitioners doing a PhD seemed to present themselves as legal practitioners as 
well, for example, Brown (2017), Jamieson (2013) and Nir (2018). 
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Before starting the negotiating process, I realised that I had little knowledge of 
the judicial culture in terms of the presentation of the self. Thus, I opted to go 
full ‘Chilean-lawyer’ during the whole process and even the fieldwork. This 
meant that I presented and conducted myself as if I were doing the research 
back home. However, I quickly noticed that my suits were unsuitable for the 
Scottish winter. I spent around £700 on a good suit, shirts, ties, trench-coat, an 
appropriate shoulder bag, and good leather shoes. I shaved before every visit 
and kept my hair short. 
 
In brief, I tried as much as I could to offer a presentation of the self that could 
be seen and recognised as a lawyer. Retrospectively, I can say that I blatantly 
failed to present myself as a lawyer. The Chilean legal habitus, the presentation 
of the self-linked to that habitus is entirely different to the Scottish one. 
However, the fact that I presented myself in my legal-cultural terms - rather 
than trying to imitate a habitus which I was not aware of - allowed Sheriffs to 
construct me as something else than ‘just’ a researcher, which was my goal.  
 
Thus, most of the Sheriffs who I shadowed constructed me either as a 
continental criminal lawyer (they used many references to French criminal law 
which I understood) or as a law student. The relationship with the Sheriffs I was 
not able to shadow was a bit more distant. However, in all my interactions they 
eventually reach a point when they decided that I could be trusted, at least to 
the point of offering insightful responses, even when they considered some 
questions obvious. As a consequence of this, in one way or another Sheriffs 
constructed me as a lawyer and treated me as such. I made efforts to keep our 
conversation focussed on what their practices entailed, and thus, I used my own 
experiences as a practitioner to continue the discussion on that level. Despite 
this, there were some occasions when some Sheriffs, I noticed, wanted to ‘move 
up’ to more normative discussions.  
 
Ultimately, the interactions were paradoxical. Since I am no longer in Chile, my 
social position as a Chilean lawyer is worthless, valueless; it has no symbolical 
meaning, nor social relevance in Scotland. However, during my interactions with 
the Sheriffs, most of them recognised me as a lawyer. This was either because 
they took me at my word that I was one, or because of the way that I framed the 
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questions that I put to them. Thus, in those interactions, the recognition 
provided, temporarily, a social position that I lacked outside the interview or 
shadowing. A position that allowed me to discuss specific topics with a certain 
level of mutual understanding. However, in other aspects of the interactions, my 
distance, my foreignness, became apparent and allowed me to ask self-evident 
and basic questions that would have delegitimised a Scottish lawyer. 
 
In other words, the recognition of my foreign positionality gave me certain 
power over the relationship generated in the interview. It gave me the power to 
ask certain questions, and furthermore, it allowed the Sheriffs to open up with 
me, trusting that I would not use what they said against them. Thus, as Smith 
and Foucault argued, in some dimensions I did have some power over them. 
Some of them, the ‘younger ones’, in particular, were more concerned about 
saying things that would not be seen as inappropriate. The older ones were more 
straightforward, seeming to care less about what I could do with what they told 
me. This tension was obvious when I asked their permission to turn the recording 
machine on or off. 
 
As a final note, the Sheriffs’ recognition of me also affected my distance from 
and within the field. After a while, my legal habitus began to adapt to the 
Scottish field, and thus, the more insight I obtained from the Sheriffs and the 
observation, the more sympathy and empathy I felt for them, as practitioners. 
Thus, it began to be harder to keep my reflexivity and my sociological gaze. By 
the end of my fieldwork, I realised that my observation of the hearings was 
starting to change.  Sometimes, I followed the hearings like a fan following a 
rugby or football match, rather than a sociologist observing these rites. This 
issue forced me to reposition myself and to reassess my position as an observer. 
 
Given that my deadlines were tight, I decided to send the audio files to a 
transcriber who had worked with the Scottish Centre for Crime and Justice on 
previous research studies. No special funding was given for this, so I spent my 
savings. Instead of sending all of them at once, I decided to listen to all the 
interviews and take notes, before sending them to the transcriber. This allowed 
me to ‘relive’ the fieldwork and was the first step I took into data analysis. The 
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whole transcription processes lasted three months, from December 2016 to 
February 2017. 
 
4.3.3.2. Passive Observation 
 
The observation of hearings took place in a similar way in almost all the Courts I 
visited. In thirteen courts, I was allowed to sit in the Jury Box which gave me a 
side view of the interactions between the Sheriffs and the other court 
professionals. In two courts, the Sheriffs let me sit next to them. In one Sheriff 
Court, I was told to sit in the ‘press box’ which was next to the ‘public 
galleries’. As I mentioned earlier, while I was designing the research I visited 
some Sheriff Courts and observed hearings from the public galleries. 
 
Because these were sentencing diets, all the hearings I observed took place 
without the presence of juries. Thus, the jury box was either empty or used by 
the Court Social Workers and members of the press. Very often the former used 
the seats next to him or her for piles of reports of the cases that would be heard 
that day. The latter very often arrived and stayed only until the hearing they 
were interested in, taking notes of what the Sheriff said in small notepads. 
Diagram (1) depicts a ‘generic’ layout of Sheriff Courtrooms. Despite the fact 
that no two courtrooms are identical, all of them were variations around the 
same layout I have provided. In a certain way, to be seated in the Jury Box was a 
paradoxical position. On the one hand, everyone in the room could see me. On 
the other, since I was only observing - and sometimes taking notes - the ‘action’ 
or ‘legal drama’ very often made me ‘invisible’ or irrelevant. 
 
From the Jury Box, I was granted a perfect view of the whole courtroom, and it 
allowed me to follow the dynamics of the hearings, observing the Sheriff and 
legal actors in ‘action’. If I had any fear that my presence might affect the 
hearing, these were soon dispelled, as the intensity of the business made all the 
actors - Sheriffs, prosecutor fiscal, solicitors, social workers, court officers, 
clerks, etc. – become absorbed by the ‘game’. This was evident when there were 
issues - which was often - that disrupted the flow of the business and revealed 
the more human nature of the practices at the Sheriff Court. 
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The court observation was affected by two variables: the size of the business 
and the capacity of the legal actors to deal with it swiftly. For example, in one 
court a relatively small quantity of cases took longer than expected due to the 
inexperience of a trainee prosecutor fiscal. In another court, due to traffic 
disruption, the court started later than usual, and this delayed the court 
schedule leading to it finishing very late. On average the observation lasted 
between five to seven hours. It usually began between nine or ten in the 
morning, extended until twelve or one in the afternoon, when the hearings 
stopped for a lunch break. The hearings resumed again around two or three until 
the business was over.  As a final point, I was allowed to take notes in the field 
which I later used to supplement the interviews transcriptions for my data 
analysis. 
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Diagram 1: Generic Sheriff Court Layout
 
 
 
4.3.3.3. A note on the non-use of statistics. 
 
Initially, another way I wanted to triangulate the data obtained during my 
fieldwork was using statistical analysis available on judicial practices. Every year 
the Scottish Government publishes a report entitled ‘Criminal Proceedings in 
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Scotland’. While the first official statistics can be traced back to 1928, since 
1980 these reports have been published on an annual basis. Currently, these 
reports are produced by the ‘Justice Analytical Services’ division of the Scottish 
Government. Thus, this seemed to be a relevant database in which to look for 
patterns in sentencing. 
 
Since the reports that are published contain only aggregated data of all the 
courts in Scotland, I contacted ‘Justice Analytical Services’. I asked if they could 
send me disaggregated data by Sheriffdom excluding Justice of Peace and High 
Courts, which they kindly agreed to do. Furthermore, to better understand the 
nature of the data, I met with them on 9 February 2016. 
 
During the meeting, they informed me of several aspects of the data that I had 
until then – not appreciated. Contrary to what I thought, the data comes from a 
‘Criminal History System (CHS)’ which is a database managed by Police Scotland. 
In the annexes of the ‘Criminal Proceedings Scotland’, it is explained that this is 
a ‘central database used for the electronic recording of information on persons 
accused and convicted of committing a criminal act’ (Justice Analytical Services 
, 2018, p. 80). While the data is held and managed by the Police, the Crown 
Office and Procurator Fiscal Service9 and the Scottish Courts and Tribunal 
Service feed the CHS from their internal database. Thus, this data does not 
come directly from the court system, but rather in an indirect way. 
 
However, other issues led me to decide not to include these statistics as a 
method for analysis and only as a mere reference for understanding the field. 
The way the reports have been organising the data relies upon several technical 
decisions that do not reflect legal practice. For example, there is a division 
between ‘Crimes’ and ‘Offences’ which makes sense for continental criminal law 
but has no legal basis in the Scottish penal system. Furthermore, there were 
some issues related to the way the data has been recorded by some courts and, 
as I am going to explain in the findings chapters, some sentencing practices that 
were not reflected accurately by the statistics. 
 
                                         
9 In Scotland, the public prosecutor is called Procurator Fiscal. 
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Therefore, I opted to use the statistical data provided only as a reference that 
could allow me to get a ‘flavour’ of the field but not as a method to triangulate 
the data. 
 
4.4. Data analysis 
 
As I explained in the previous chapter, Bourdieu's theory of practice provides 
ontological and epistemological positions that influence the analysis of the data. 
Furthermore, Bourdieu's theory emerged from his earlier fieldwork and was 
constructed taking into account his empirical work studying social practices. 
Thus, from this perspective, the theory of practice is not only a group of 
concepts that inform data analysis (Layder, 1998) but rather it is also an 
epistemological position that helps us to make sense of the data we are 
exploring. 
 
The transcriptions of the interviews were analysed using the qualitative data 
analysis software NVivo 11. The notes of the fieldwork observations were 
analysed manually.  As I mentioned above, before sending the audio recording to 
be transcribed, I listened to them again to start to familiarise myself with the 
data. Thus, I began a process of coding through the identification of themes, 
using both an iterative process that came from the analysed data and an 
‘aprioristic’ approach provided by practice theory (Ryan & Bernard, 2003, p. 88). 
Subsequently, I started to index and sort the themes, which provided me with 
‘trees of nodes’ that discussed different micro-aspects of the sentencing 
practice. For example, a main node aimed to explore how the Sheriffs described 
their sentencing process (Node: ‘sentencing process’) and another one aimed to 
explore the interactions between Sheriffs and other legal agents (Node: otros 
agentes). It is worth noting that some of the nodes were named in Spanish and 
others in English. I think this reflected also the internal or subjective process of 
trying to understand the data through a contrast between the field I was 
studying and the Chilean field. 
 
The next phase was trying to make sense of the analysed transcriptions in terms 
of practice. Once again this was an iterative process from the theoretical and 
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methodological implications and what had emerged from the data. In order to 
understand the relationship between my data and the theory, Layder’s adaptive 
theory (Layder, 1998; 2013) – which is a theory of data analysis – was very 
helpful to the process. The more critical aspect of this part of the analysis - as 
Layder warns - was to be able to understand how the theoretical concepts are 
aimed to ‘guide the analysis, not to determine or preconceive it’ (Layder, 2013, 
p. 134). 
 
The challenge, at this stage, was to inquire how the different themes and the 
‘trees of nodes’ could be pieced together as a practice. This is one of the more 
tricky aspects of Bourdieu's theory of practice, because, ‘the logic of practice 
can only be grasped through constructs which destroy it as such’ (Bourdieu, 
1980/1990, p. 11). The process required a further immersion in the data, which 
also produced some new nodes and the re-sorting of some trees of nodes. 
 
From this process, the first three findings chapters emerged. The first findings 
chapter aims to reflect the locality and temporal dimension of practice. The 
second findings chapter seeks to explore the sentencing process through the 
interactions between the sheriffs and the other legal agents. Finally, the third 
findings chapter focuses on the decision-making itself, through the analysis of 
the use of different disposals. Therefore, through the process of making sense of 
the themes and ‘tree of nodes’ as pieces of practice, I was able to outline three 
different dimensions of sentencing that, if they are read together, attempt to 
provide an organic depiction of it. The final stage of the data analysis required, 
again, an iterative process between theory and the empirical data, aiming to set 
the grounds for an interpretative explanation of the Sheriffs' logic of practice. 
From this analysis, and shaped by the three previous findings chapters, the 
fourth findings chapter emerged. 
 
4.5. Conclusions 
 
In this chapter, I have described the process of my research design, and its 
evolution during the negotiation process and fieldwork. In this regard, I 
continued with some of the discussion from previous chapters linked to the 
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epistemological and methodological dimensions of research in practice. In 
particular, I examined the role that my positionality as a foreign lawyer 
researching in Scotland played in this research. After a long process of 
negotiation, the access I was granted, and the dynamics emerging from the 
fieldwork, allowed me to use mixed methods to explore sentencing practices 
better. In the next chapter, I am going to briefly examine some important 
aspects of the Scotland field, to contextualise this study.  
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CHAPTER 5: The Scottish Legal Field 
 
In this chapter, I have tried to contextualise or at least explain some aspects of 
the Scottish field that are relevant for my research. In the first section, I discuss 
how this small nation has developed a unique identity both in the legal field but 
also in a more politically understood dimension of the criminal justice system. 
Section two deals with the relationship between poverty and crime. Then, 
sections three and four deal with a structural depiction of the Scottish field, 
where I explain the different criminal courts and criminal procedure at the 
Sheriff Court. Sections five and six focus on the actors, explaining how 
individuals become part of the legal field and, in particular, how you become a 
lawyer and how you become a judge. Finally, sections seven and eight present 
statistics on the use of disposals and the length of sentences. 
 
5.1. A small nation with a unique identity. 
 
Scotland is a relatively small nation; recent reports estimate its population to be 
around 5,424,800, which is a historical record high (NRoS, 2018, p. 2). However, 
the most populated areas in Scotland can be found in the so called ‘central 
belt’, which encompasses, roughly, from the Council of North Ayrshire and 
Inverclyde in the West to the councils of Fife and East Lothian in the East. The 
average for Scotland is 70 people per square Km, however, at the extremes, we 
can find 3,555 people per sq. km in Glasgow and 9 per sq. km in Na h-Eileanan 
Siar. The density in the northern areas like the Highlands or the Islands, and in 
the south, in Dumfries and the Scottish Borders, is lower than the national 
average (NRoS, 2018, p. 25). This has several consequences for the Scottish 
Criminal Justice System, for example, more than a third of the Sheriff Courts in 
Scotland, are located around the central belt. 
 
On a political dimension, it worth noting that since the Acts of Union of 1707 
Scotland has been part of the United Kingdom. One of the most pervasive 
consequences of the union was that the Scottish Parliament was replaced by a 
Combined Parliament for Great Britain that has sat in Westminster ever since. 
However, the fact that, historically, Scotland has had a lower population than 
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England meant that the ‘Treaty of Union’ created 45 Scottish constituencies, 
each with a Member of Parliament in the House of Commons, and 16 Scottish 
members of the House of Lords – in both cases, much fewer than the number of 
seats England has. This reduced the amount of self-determination of Scotland in 
the union. Nevertheless, under Article 19 of the Treaty of Union, the Scottish 
legal and judicial system remained unchanged, and as a consequence of this, the 
treaty ensured that Scots law would remain the law of the land in Scotland. That 
said, under the Union, the UK Parliament became the legislature that makes the 
laws. 
 
Thus, while Scotland is part of the UK, its legal system and law has evolved in a 
legal order that - despite similarities to and some influence of the English law - 
‘has assiduously cultivated the belief in a special historical relationship with the 
community and the Scottish personality’ (Farmer, 1997, p. 184). Thus, when one 
stresses the uniqueness of Scots legal order, this not only involves a unique 
normative tradition, but a wider legal field that encompasses the evolution of 
unique legal and judicial institutions on one side, and a legal culture and habitus 
of its own, on the other (Farmer, 1997; Tata, 2010). 
 
More recently, 1997’s devolution referendum - which led to the creation of the 
Scottish Parliament in 1999 - and the devolution of powers it entailed, has made 
possible a debate on the distinctiveness of the Scottish criminal justice system, 
particularly when compared with England and Wales. According to some of these 
accounts (McAra, 2008; Mooney, et al., 2015; Scott & Mooney, 2016), the 
Labour-Liberal coalition Scottish Governments between 1999-2007, during the 
Premiership of Tony Blair and New Labour, ‘de-tartanised’ the Scottish CJS. The 
Scottish Government’s policies relating to the CJS became more aligned with the 
ones in England. Conversely, since 2007 and under the premierships of Alex 
Salmond and Nicola Sturgeon from the Scottish National Party, they argue that 
Scotland has experienced a ‘re-tartanisation’. 
 
Tata (2010), has argued that while it is true that the ‘de-tartanisation’ 
introduced several changes to the judicial practice (the use of risk assessments, 
for example), this had a limited effect (Tata, et al., 2008; Tata, 2010; McNeill, 
et al., 2009). However, his argument could be equally applied to the ‘re-
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tartanisation’ process. This is so because the main argument here is the capacity 
of practitioners to, at some limited extent, resist or adapt those changes or 
reforms that do not reflect their current practices. In other words, the 
resistance may be less because of the existence of a ‘Scottish’ identity but 
rather because public policies fail to understand the particularities of a given 
field and its practices. This is what McNeill et al. (2009) calls the 
‘governmentality gap’ - the ‘contingent relationships between changing 
governmental rationalities and technologies on the one hand and the 
construction of penality-in-practice’ (p. 420). 
 
One of the direct consequences of the process of ‘re-tartanisation’ for 
sentencing was the CJL-2010 Act. This piece of legislation encompasses a broad 
range of issues. For the current study, three aspects of this law are particularly 
relevant. Firstly, the act introduced the SSC, the main objectives of which are to 
(a) promote consistency in sentencing practice, (b) assist the development of 
policy in relation to sentencing, and (c) promote greater awareness and 
understanding of sentencing policy and practice’. Secondly, section 17 
introduced a presumption against the imposition of a custodial sentence for a 
term of three months or less. Thirdly, the Act rebranded community sentences 
as CPOs and reshaped the legal mechanics of imposing them. In other words, 
instead of having different regulations for probation or unpaid work, the new 
framework unified the provisions altogether. This allows Sheriffs to tailor orders 
according to what they may see fit and mix different community sentences, 
simplifying this process. As Hutton and Tata (2010) explained, these changes 
obeyed to a twofold aim of the Scottish Government: to reduce custodial 
sentences and promote the use of community sentences. In particular, these 
changes were aiming at persuading Sheriffs to use community sentences as an 
alternative to imprisonment.  
 
In a political context where penal populism is common, at least among common 
law countries, this act was quite progressive in some aspects. More importantly, 
as I see it, the SNP government in Scotland has undoubtedly taken the re-
tartanisation of criminal justice seriously in attempting to craft a Scottish 
criminal justice system that has a distinctive and more progressive approach 
than its neighbour in the South. Therefore, one of the aspects that inspired my 
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research was to explore how the aspects of this Act - that aimed to change 
sentencing - had impacted practice. In other words, to address the 
‘governmentality gap’ between the intentions of the Government and the 
Scottish Parliament to change sentencing and the real impact that the act had in 
sentencing practice. 
 
5.2. The Scottish Penal Field 
 
In this section, I am exploring different aspects of the uniqueness of the Scottish 
legal field. Firstly I am going to explain the hierarchy of criminal courts and their 
sentencing powers. Then, I shall discuss criminal procedure at the Sheriff Court. 
Next, I will offer a brief description of the paths to becoming a lawyer in 
Scotland. Finally, I will discuss how one can become a Judge, and in particular a 
Sheriff, within this field. 
 
5.2.1. Criminal Courts in Scotland and the Sheriff 
Court 
 
There are currently three criminal courts in Scotland: the High Court of 
Justiciary (HC), the Sheriff Court, and the Justice of the Peace Court (JoP). The 
basic corpus of Criminal Procedure in Scotland can be found in ‘The Criminal 
Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995’ (CP-1995 Act) and the ‘The Criminal Procedure 
Rules 1996’. The High Court deals with the most serious offences such as 
murder, rape or any offence that the prosecution – or in specific cases the 
Sheriff Court - think is serious enough to be tried by them. Trials are carried out 
before a single Judge and a jury of fifteen laypersons. As a consequence of this, 
the HC only deals with a relatively small number of cases. As the graphs 1 and 2 
show us the percentage of people convicted in this court is less than 1% of all 
the cases that are brought to the courts. The Sheriff Court is the busiest court in 
Scotland, and during the last ten years between 60-68% of convictions in 
Scotland were imposed by this court. Finally, the JoP deals with less serious 
crimes, such as speeding, careless driving and some cases of breach of the 
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peace. It is the second busiest court in Scotland, and during the last decade they 
have imposed annually around 31-34% of convictions. 
 
Graph (1) People convicted by type of court, 2007-08 to 2016-17 in numbers (Scottish 
Goverment, 2018a) 
 
 
Graph (2) People convicted by type of court, 2007-08 to 2016-17 in percentages (Scottish 
Goverment, 2018a) 
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As shown in diagram two below, while the High Court has the broader sentencing 
options, the JoP has more limited options and powers. It worth highlighting as 
Graph 1 and 2 show us that most of the convictions come from the Summary 
Sheriff Courts (which can impose custodial sentences up to a year) and the JoP. 
Together they account for the 94% of all the convictions imposed in the year 
2016-17. Thus, this shows the relevance of exploring the lower courts. 
 
Diagram (2) Sentencing Powers of the Scottish Criminal Courts (CP-1995 Act) 
 
 
5.2.2. The Criminal procedure at the Sheriff Court  
 
At the Sheriff Court, there are two different procedures to deal with offences. 
Solemn procedure, in which the Sheriff will sit during the trial with a jury of 
fifteen laypersons, and summary procedure, in which the Sheriff sits alone. As 
outlined in diagram 2, the different procedures limit the Sheriffs' sentencing 
powers in different ways. As noted above, solemn procedure is used for more 
serious offences, which in practice translates to fewer cases. In 2015-16, of all 
the Sheriff Court Criminal business only 7% were solemn cases.  
 
It worth noting that the Sheriff's sentencing powers have changed over the last 
twenty years. Until May 200410, under solemn procedure, the length of custodial 
sentences could not exceed three years. Also, until December 200711, under 
summary procedure custodial sentences were limited to a maximum of three 
months (or six months for re-offenders). Finally, the Court Reform (Scotland) Act 
2014 created the Sheriff Appeal Court, which now hears appeals from summary 
proceedings and bail decisions solemn proceedings.  
                                         
10 Section 13 Crime and Punishment (Scotland) Act 1997 
11 Section 45 Criminal Proceedings etc. (Reform) (Scotland) Act 2007 
High Court
•Custodial Sentence: 
Up to life.
•Supervision: Up to 3 
years.
•Unpaid Work: Up to 
300 hours.
•Fines: Unlimited
Sheriff Court
(Solemnn Procedure)
•Custodial Sentences: 
Up to 5 years.
•Supervision: Up to 3 
years.
•Unpaid Work: Up to 
300 hours.
•Fines: Unlimited.
Sheriff Court
(Summary Procedure)
•Custodial Sentences: 
Up to 12 months.
•Supervision: Up to 3 
years.
•Unpaid Work: Up to 
300 hours.
•Fines: Up to £10.000
Justice of the Peace 
Court
•Custodial Sentences: 
Up to 60 days of 
imprisonment
•Supervision: Up to 3 
years.
•Unpaid work: Up to 
100 hours.
•Fines: Up to £2500
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Concerning procedure, the prosecution first presents a document that outlines 
the charges against the accused. Under solemn procedure, this document 
contains a brief narration of the basic facts of the offence and is called an 
‘indictment’. Under summary procedure, the document is called a ‘complaint’, 
and it only contains the name of the offences. The accused might be summoned 
to the court, or appear from detention if he/she was arrested. At court, the 
prosecution reads the charges, and the accused has the opportunity to submit an 
early plea and accept the charges. If the accused does plead guilty, the case 
moves to the sentencing stage. If the accused submits a not guilty plea or makes 
no plea, the procedure moves forward to discuss if there are concerns that the 
accused might commit new offences or flee in the period leading up to the trial. 
If there are no such concerns, the Sheriff is likely simply to ordain the accused 
to appear in court. If there are concerns, the Sheriff is likely to either impose a 
bail order on the accused or place him/her on remand while awaiting the trial 
diet. Then the hearing will be adjourned, and a new hearing, very often an 
intermediary diet, will be set to deal with pre-trial matters. The accused can 
submit a guilty plea even during the trial diet. 
 
Under Scottish criminal procedure (see section 196 of the CP-1995 Act), an 
accused who pleads guilty will normally receive a ‘discounted’ sentence. The 
earlier the guilty plea is tendered, the greater the reduction in sentence is likely 
to be. In addition to this formal system of sentence discounting, the prosecution 
may negotiate informally with the accused’s lawyer to drop some charges in 
exchange for a guilty plea in others (or accept a guilty plea in relation to a lesser 
charge).  
 
In any case, whether the offender pleads guilty or is found guilty, before passing 
sentence the Sheriffs can, and very often do, defer a sentence for backgrounds 
reports. There are also several circumstances when the Sheriff must ask for 
CJSW-Reports. These include, for example, when the Sheriff is considering a 
custodial sentence but the offender has not been previously sentenced to 
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imprisonment12 or is aged over 16 and under 21.13 Likewise, if the Sheriff is 
considering imposing a CPO, they are also required to ask for a report to assess 
the suitability of the offender.14 In these cases, a new hearing is scheduled in 
order to provide sufficient time for the reports to be prepared. These rules 
apply to both solemn and summary procedure cases. 
 
As I will explain in more detail during the next chapter, whenever the Sheriff 
defers sentence, regardless of whether it is under summary or solemn 
procedure, all deferred cases are subsequently dealt with together in what is 
called the "Remand Court". Without prejudice of discussing this process in more 
detail in the following chapters, I am going to outline briefly how the sentencing 
diets play out. After the reports are prepared, and the procedure resumes, the 
Sheriff may or may not want the PF to provide a summary of the facts. 
Afterwards, the defence solicitor can present a plea in mitigation, in which, on 
behalf of their client, s/he can try to persuade the Sheriff to consider any 
mitigatory circumstances. As I will discuss in more detail in chapters seven and 
eight, the plea often involves suggesting that the Sheriff might impose a non-
custodial sentence. After the Sheriff has read the report, heard the PFs and the 
solicitors, s/he will be ready to impose a sentence. 
 
5.2.3. Becoming a Lawyer 
 
In the Scottish legal field, there is a clear division of juridical labour. On the one 
hand, you have legal scholars who pursue an academic path by the acquisition of 
educational titles which will secure them a specific position in the academic 
legal field. On the other, you have (real) lawyers who are required to pursue 
particular paths within a legal hierarchy that, to a certain extent, reproduces a 
social hierarchy among the dominated ‘fractions’ of the dominant class 
(Bourdieu, 1991a; 1986; 1979/1984). In this manner, the ‘entrance fee’ is 
different depending on the path that individuals want to -or can- follow. 
 
                                         
12 Section 204 CP-1995 Act 
13 Section 207 CP-1995 Act 
14 Section 227B CP-1995 Act 
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The Scottish legal practitioner field is divided between Solicitors and Advocates 
(and more recently, Solicitor-Advocates). Solicitors are the primary providers of 
legal services in the Scottish legal market. The main difference between 
Solicitors and Advocates is that Solicitors do not have rights of audience before 
the High Court. Consequently, if a case has to go to the High Court or the Court 
of Session (the highest civil court), the solicitor will have to hire the services of 
an Advocate to represent the client before the Court. Alternatively, the solicitor 
can try to get ‘higher rights of audience’; that is, to gain the right to appear at 
the High Court. However, becoming a solicitor-advocate requires undergoing a 
further qualification process. Overall, the requirements for becoming a solicitor 
or an advocate are onerous and the positions are not easily attained, especially 
by those from low income backgrounds. This does not mean that the composition 
of the legal field has not changed in the last decades, but such diversification 
that has taken place has not ended social stratification within the legal 
profession (Melville & Stephen, 2011).  
 
As in other common law jurisdictions - in contrast to civil law ones – the Scottish 
legal field is oriented to practice. While this seems to be obvious, it depicts a 
stark contrast with the civil law traditions that depends more on a 
‘Professorenrech’ (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 6). This is a legal tradition where 
academic legal ‘doctrine’ and concepts heavily influence legal practices. 
Probably one of the best examples of this difference is the fact that in English 
the theoretical study of the ‘law’ is called ‘jurisprudence’, which implies a 
subordination of theory to practice. On the contrary, in continental jurisdictions, 
legal scholars have a legal competency of determining the significance and 
meaning of the law or legal statutes. Thus, there is, to a certain extent, a 
subordination of practice to theory. The primacy of practice, in the Scottish 
field, makes legal experience a key qualification not only to progress in the legal 
profession but also as a virtue and a symbol of distinction and recognition. 
 
To become a lawyer in Scotland, you normally need to have a Scots law degree 
from one of the ten Scottish Universities that are accredited to provide the 
degree, which usually lasts four years. This degree is expected to comply with 
the syllabus prescribed by the Council of the Law Society of Scotland. 
Afterwards, applicants are required to obtain the ‘Diploma in Legal Practice’ 
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from one of the six Scottish Universities that are authorised to provide it, which 
lasts a further nine months.15 If the applicants have managed to pay the fees and 
obtained appropriate grades successfully, they are now required to apply for an 
entrance qualification issued by the Law Society of Scotland to certify that the 
applicant is a fit and proper person to enter into a traineeship. The applicant is 
expected to find a law firm where they can be trained under the supervision of a 
Scottish-qualified solicitor over a period of two years. Luckily for the applicants, 
the traineeship is paid (Law Society of Scotland, 2018). 
 
As I mentioned before, there are two different paths in the Scottish Legal Field. 
However, both of these require the applicants to obtain the qualifications I 
described above. The main difference is that after finishing the traineeship, 
applicants will be able to apply to become solicitors, whereas if they want to 
become advocates further steps are required. Among others things, they are 
required to undertake a further (unpaid) traineeship - called ‘pupillage’ or 
‘devilling’- for a period of eight or nine months (Faculty of Advocates, 2009). 
Another relevant aspect is how the field seems to be stratified by temporality. 
For example, to become a solicitor-advocate, a solicitor is required to have at 
least five years of court experience in the kind of court they are requiring rights 
of audience (Law Society of Scotland, 2018).  
 
Advocates can apply to be considered for the appointment as ‘Queen’s Counsel’ 
after thirteen years of practice (Judiciary of Scotland, 2014). As the Scottish 
Judiciary's guide for QC applicants describes it, ‘Queen’s Counsel is primarily a 
mark of distinction in advocacy’ (Judiciary of Scotland, 2017c, p. 1). These 
examples are a recognition of ‘legal ability and experience’, which translates 
into having a ‘high-quality practice based on demanding cases’ (Judiciary of 
Scotland, 2017c, p. 2). This means an institutional recognition of the 
accumulation of a legal capital through years of successful strategies and 
investments in shaping a specific professional path within the field.  
 
5.2.4. Becoming a Sheriff 
                                         
15 This requirement was introduced in January 1980 to ‘compensate for the perceived 
deficiencies in apprenticeships’ (Paterson, 1988, p. 88). 
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The statutory eligibility for the Sheriff's office can be found in the Courts Reform 
(Scotland) Act 2014. Section 14 (1) of the Act provides that an individual will 
qualify for the appointment if either that individual held judicial office 
immediately before applying or that person has been a solicitor or an advocate 
for at least ten years before the time of the application (Courts Reform 
(Scotland) Act 2014). 
 
As I mentioned earlier, this Act reshaped the sheriff court, introducing a new 
hierarchy of offices. Currently the judicial offices are: (a) Sheriff Principal, (b) 
Sheriff, (c) Summary Sheriff, (d) Part-Time Sheriff, (e) Part-Time Summary 
Sheriff (s.14(2)). This Act also allows Sheriff Principals to reappoint retired 
sheriffs that have not yet reached the age of seventy-five (s.13) as Sheriffs, 
Summary Sheriffs or Part-Time Sheriffs. The Act also introduces the Sheriff 
Appeal Court, which further reshapes the sheriff judicial offices. All the Sheriff 
Principals, by the sole fact of being such, hold office as Appeal Sheriffs (s.49) 
and the Act also allows the appointment of Sheriffs - with at least 5 years of 
experience being a Sheriff - as Appeal Sheriffs. However, this appointment does 
not mean that they cease to be a Sheriff but rather they will ‘continue to act in 
that capacity’ (s.50).  Until the commencement of the 2014 Act, the only 
Sheriffs’ offices that existed were Sheriff Principals, Sheriffs and Part-Time 
Sheriffs (Sheriff Courts (Scotland) Act 1971).  
 
Concerning the appointment procedure itself, after devolution and in 
accordance with section 95(4) of the Scotland Act 1998, Sheriffs are appointed 
by the First Minister of Scotland after consultation with the Lord President. In 
2002, in order ‘to create a more open and accessible system’ (Judicial 
Appointments Board for Scotland, 2016) the Judicial Appointment Board for 
Scotland was introduced on an administrative basis. In 2008, to ensure its 
independence, the Board was given a statutory basis by the Judiciary and Courts 
(Scotland) Act 2008. The aim of the Board is to make recommendations of 
suitable applicants to the Scottish Ministers; it does not itself appoint any 
candidates. As I will discuss later in chapter nine, several of my participants 
were appointed long before the commencement of the 2014 Act.   
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5.3 Some statistics on criminal procedure 
 
In this final sub-section, I am going to briefly discuss the statistics concerning 
two aspects of the Scottish sentencing field: The available data on the most used 
disposals and the length of the custodial sentences. 
 
5.3.1. The most used disposals 
 
While Scottish Judges have several different disposals available, most of their 
decisions can be reduced to four disposals: custodial sentences (14%), 
community sentences (20%), fines (49%) and admonitions (16%) (Scottish 
Goverment, 2018a). These figures apply to the criminal justice system as a 
whole, but I requested data for the Sheriff Courts alone from the Scottish 
Government Statistical unit, which they provided. I used this data to outline 
graphs (3), (4), (5) and (6) below. 
 
In graph 3, the evolution of each of the four disposals between 2007-2008 and 
2016-2017 can be seen. While custody has remained at around 13-15% of all the 
disposals passed every year, the fall in the use of financial penalties has been 
mirrored by an increase in community sentences and admonitions. 
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Graph (3) Number of imposed convictions at Sheriff Courts level by type of disposals, 
2007-08 to 2016-17 
 
 
 
Graph (4) Percentage of imposed convictions at Sheriff Courts level by type of disposals, 
2007-08 to 2016-17 
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Firstly, I took the different number of disposals imposed in a given year as seen 
in graph 3 above. Then, to compare and contrast, I calculated percentages for 
each separate disposal in that year. Finally, I used those percentages to produce 
graph 4 above.  The main issue with using just the number of disposals imposed 
every year is that the total number of cases brought to court each year has been 
falling. In this regard, graph 4 offers us a better illustration of how sentencing 
practices have varied in the last decade. I discussed with the Sheriffs in which 
cases they used each of the different disposals and why and I report my findings 
in this respect in chapter 8. 
 
5.3.2. The length of the custodial sentences 
 
A final point that is relevant is the evolution of the length of custodial 
sentences. In this particular case, I opted to use the available data since 1999-00 
because I wondered if the statistics would reflect the changes in the sentencing 
powers of the Sheriff Courts. As noted earlier, the maximum sentence permitted 
under Sheriff Court solemn procedure increased (in May 2004) from three years 
to five years imprisonment and the maximum sentence permitted under Sheriff 
Court summary procedure increased (in December 2007) from three/six months 
to twelve months imprisonment. It worth noting that if an individual was 
sentenced for several different offences, the custodial sentence recorded would 
be the sum of the different offences, which may distort the records. 
 
From the graph alone it is hard to tell if the increased sentencing powers under 
solemn procedure did impact on the length of sentences. However, the 
increased sentencing powers at summary level is accompanied by a decline in 
the use of short custodial sentences of up to three months. This is interesting 
because this trend began even before the introduction of the presumption 
against short sentences. During the same period, the length of sentences over six 
months and up to three years starts rising. Moreover, custodial sentences 
between three to six months start rising as sentences up to three months 
decline. This might be because Sheriffs started to sentence more harshly, but 
equally it might be because the prosecution started to bring more serious cases 
under summary procedure that would have previously been prosecuted under 
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solemn procedure. In any case, around 2011 when CPOs and the presumption 
against short custodial sentences were introduced, custodial sentences of up to 
three months declined but sentences of between three and six months and of 
between 6 months and 12 months increased. 
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Graph (5) Number of custodial sentences imposed at Sheriff Courts level by length of the sentence, 1999-00 to 2016-17
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Graph (6) Percentages of custodial sentences imposed at Sheriff Courts level by length of the sentence, 1999-00 to 2016-17
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5.4. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I have tried to explain several contextual aspects that inform my 
research. Firstly, in section one, I noted that despite Scotland being a small 
nation and part of the UK, it has a unique legal identity. In section two I 
explored the different particularities of the Scottish Legal Field which set the 
context for my research study. This section was divided into four sub-sections. 
Firstly, I explained the structure of the criminal courts in Scotland. This section 
established the relevance of the Sheriff Courts in Scotland which, despite being 
a lower court, deal with 60% of criminal business. This is one of the reasons why 
I decided to focus on these courts. Then, I outlined the basics of Scottish 
criminal procedure, which set the normative context of the practices I observed. 
Subsections three and four provided a brief insight into the particularities of the 
division of the legal labour in Scotland. This entailed a brief analysis of how you 
become a lawyer and how you become a Sheriff. In this regard, as I will explore 
in chapter nine, I am going to discuss how this stratification of legal labour has a 
direct impact on the trajectories of Sheriffs. Finally, section three provided 
descriptive statistics on the most frequently used disposals and the length of 
custodial sentences. This informed by decision to focus on the use of only four 
types of disposal – custodial sentences, community sentences, fines and 
admonitions – as these account for the vast majority of disposals used in criminal 
cases in the Sheriff Courts. 
 
In the next chapter, the first of three findings chapters, I will present the results 
of my study of practice. To do so, in chapter six I am going to describe the 
temporal and spatial dimensions of sentencing. In chapter seven, I examine how 
the Sheriffs perceive the other penal actors involved in the sentencing process. 
Finally, in chapter eight I explore the practical rationales behind the use of 
different penal sanctions imposed by the Sheriffs. 
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CHAPTER 6: Sentencing: Scenes, Sets and 
Schedules’ 
 
Each court I visited had similar organisational procedures that determined the 
‘where’ and the ‘when’ that judges occupy in carrying out their decision-
making. Through non-participant observation and relying on shadowing methods I 
was able to witness first-hand how sentencing takes place in time and place. The 
first aspect I noticed was that it is not possible to reduce these practices to the 
Sheriffs’ decision-making, to remove these practices from their milieu. As a 
consequence of this, we need to explore them, taking into account their 
material dimensions and their local contexts  (Flemming, et al., 1992; Ulmer, 
1997; Ulmer & Johnson, 2004; Mack & Anleu, 2007; Young, 2012). Despite the 
fact that the temporal and spatial dimensions of practices are undoubtedly 
different aspects, they are intertwined in their phenomenological manifestation. 
Sentencing practices must be carried out in the appropriate place and at a 
specific moment. These material dimensions of practices are often forgotten or 
neglected, at least in some scholarly understandings of sentencing that reduce it 
to the mere allocation of a sanction. 
 
In this chapter, I am first going to describe and explore the spatial dimension of 
practice, the place or places where it is carried out and what these contexts can 
tell us about sentencing. I will then move on to explore the temporalities of 
practice, and how the Sheriffs’ perception of their decision-making process can 
shed some light on our understanding of it. In brief, this first findings chapter 
aims to set the ‘where’ and ‘when’ of sentencing, and thus provide a first 
introduction to the analysis of sentencing as a practice. 
 
6.1. Place or places for practice?  
 
To a certain extent, sentencing seems situated in both visible and hidden places. 
The ritual performance that takes place in the courtrooms seems only to 
increase the perception that there is a ‘black box’; that is, there are aspects of 
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practices that are private and, because of that, obscure. In this section I am 
going to explore the notion of the ‘places’ of sentencing. 
 
6.1.1. Courtrooms 
 
The courtroom is the most obvious place of sentencing practices. It is 
quintessentially the ‘locus’ where the debate concerning the individualisation of 
punishment and the decisions that go hand in hand with it are taken. Moreover, 
it is the place where, at an appropriate time, the legal rituals are performed. It 
is the space within which the penal actors, with their gowns and outfits, carry 
out the legal practices that will determine the fate of the accused. 
 
Every time I visited a court either the Sheriff or a Sheriff Clerk mentioned when 
it was built. In some cases, it was a plaque which provided me with such 
information. Most of the buildings I visited were old and had been constructed in 
the late 18th or early 19th century. Regarding the internal distributions of the 
courtrooms, I saw different variations of the same theme, even in the same 
courts. The main idea seems to be that everything in the room must converge 
upon the bench of the Judge, or rather everything seems to be organized around 
the Judge in order to make their duty easier. The Judge’s bench is elevated over 
the rest of the participants. This not only reflects the authority that judges have 
in the courtroom, it also allows them to control with their gaze everything that 
happens within the court. 
 
Just in front of the bench there is a table at which the clerk, prosecutor and 
solicitor or advocates sit. The clerk always sits in front of the Judge, but since 
the table is at a lower position s/he does not block the view that the Sheriff has 
of the room. They also sit with their back to the judge, and look to the rest of 
the participants in the same way the Judge does, but below them. In some 
procedures, s/he tells the accused and the public what the Sheriff had ruled, 
seemingly fulfilling a role as a ‘court crier’, which is sometimes odd because 
s/he often has to repeat what has just been said by the Judge. The prosecutors 
and the accused’s solicitor or advocate sit on each side of the table, 
perpendicular to but turned to face the judge. 
  120 
 
 
At the left side of the Judge are the seats that are designated for juries, 
although when the courtroom is not used for solemn procedures, which is most 
of the time, you may find them empty. In front of the judge, and after the table 
where the lawyers sit, is ‘the dock’, the place where the accused is meant to 
sit. The dock is a very strange place. Some courts have a glass screen that 
separates the accused from the public, but the glass often disrupts the ability of 
the public to hear what is said in the other part of the court. However, the front 
part of the dock is completely open, there is neither glass nor cage; nevertheless 
it is a very symbolic cage. 
 
In many cases, the accused waits for their turn in the public gallery, and hence, 
when they are called they go into the dock, the whole act of getting into that 
space, puts them in the middle of the room under the eyes of everyone and 
makes them a (usually) silent part of the theatrical performance of justice. In 
some courts, this place is connected to stairs that lead to the ‘depths’ of the 
court, where the accused on remand or those just sentenced to custody are 
kept. Since there is no cage, there is always a police officer sitting silent and 
close to the accused in the dock in order to keep the accused and the public 
under surveillance. 
 
Finally, at side of the room opposite to the bench, behind the dock, we find the 
public galleries. While theoretically the Sheriff court is public, meaning that 
anyone can go there and observe the procedures, it is somehow clear that the 
courtrooms are no longer designed for that. This is more evident in the new 
courtrooms or in larger city courts, where you can find very small courtrooms 
where the space for the public galleries has been reduced to a degree where it 
only allows the accused and other formal participants like interpreters or 
witnesses to sit. Furthermore, probably the only times that the public galleries 
get crowded is during the selection of the jury. For this reason, it seems to me 
that the new courts have several smaller courtrooms and one or two larger 
rooms for special occasions or trials. 
 
6.1.2. A space for the ritual performances of the law? 
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This physical space creates the set and scene in which the ritual of justice takes 
places. This is a bureaucratic ritual which has a symbolic dimension in which 
each of the penal agents have a role. Symbolically they embody a social 
function: to punish those who have broken the law. In a Durkheimian reading, 
one can argue that the prosecutor, the solicitor and the Judge are the 
embodiment of the rationalizations of punishment. I am confident that we can 
use Foucault, Elias or even Žižek to explore the symbolic dimension of the legal 
ritual further. However, I want to highlight how the sacredness of the ritual 
inevitably clashes with the mundane bureaucracy that criminal business 
requires. In the case of summary procedure this certainly creates a tension 
between the bureaucracy and the symbolic dimension. The larger the volume of 
criminal business, the bigger the managerial pressure to deal with all the cases, 
and the more that the ‘ritual’ becomes eroded by the mundane requirements of 
bureaucratic practice.  
 
However, at first glance the legal rituals at the summary court look like an 
audience-less performance. Despite the fact that justice is, or is supposed to be, 
public, the practice of justice seems to be extremely secretive. It is not only the 
fact that the acoustics in the court are bad, but furthermore, lawyers do not 
explain what is going on to the public or the accused. This is somehow 
paradoxical because criminal procedures are rituals that are performed because 
they embody a public function but they are exerted for the most part without 
public audience or attention. Moreover, as I have said, even though the 
courtrooms can accommodate the public, and the hearings are indeed public, in 
practice they are not intended for having an audience. Ultimately, the 
communication with the community is carried out via local journalists who 
attend the hearings looking for headlines and news for their media outlets. 
 
It was not until I was able to observe a solemn procedure trial that I was able to 
understand the purposes of the performances. During trial hearings at the High 
Court and under solemn procedure at the Sheriff Court, the audience of the 
legal performances is undoubtedly the jury, and - more symbolically - through 
them, the real audience is the whole community. In other words, one can argue 
that the legal ritual and its performance is ordained to be a communicative 
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expression of the punitive power wielded by the prosecution and the Judge ‘over 
the head’ of the accused. In other words, there are two potential audiences for 
sentencing practices: the offender - the one who gets punished - and the 
community - the place where the offence took place. 
 
Nevertheless, most criminal business dealt with by the Sheriff Court is summary 
cases, and in most of these cases - as Sheriffs mentioned and I observed - the 
accused pled guilty; thus no trial was required. Therefore, the legal ritual can 
still retain its communicative dimension, mainly through the process of 
uncertainty that begins with the guilty plea and ends at the sentencing diet. 
However, as argued earlier, the pressure of the business erodes the ritual forms, 
imposing a rushed temporality, and thus, imposing a need for swiftness that 
collides with the unhurried rhythm of ritual, legal forms. Interestingly enough in 
almost all the Sheriff courts, the courtrooms are the space for both solemn and 
summary procedure, and thus the situs is the same. This fact that should 
encourage the reproduction of the ritualist legal forms is jeopardised by the 
volume of cases or ‘the list’. The main consequence of this is that the hearings 
at the RC seem to be performed excluding both the offender - who is there - and 
the public - if there is any. 
 
It is not that the procedures are too fast or mechanical, but rather that the 
whole procedure seems to require the presence of the accused without their 
understanding or participation in it. Hence, prosecutors, advocates and Judges 
discussed the case in front of the accused, many times in a low voice, not 
allowing the accused to understand what they are saying. Furthermore, if he 
actually can hear, the technical language used might be cryptic to him. In some 
courts the Judge rarely talks to the accused, and the only interaction that the 
accused has with the Judge is indirectly when the Sheriff Clerk tells him what 
the Judge has ruled. As a consequence of this, we have a public hearing without 
a public, which aims to communicate punishment while completely excluding 
the accused from the process. One might argue that it seems that Judges and 
lawyers perform their roles only for themselves, or most likely, that society 
requires the social and symbolic interaction but it does not require an actual, 
engaged audience. 
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6.1.3. Chambers and the other ‘places’ of sentencing 
 
You do not need to observe sentencing diets for too long to realise that much 
has happened ‘backstage’. In most, if not all, cases the Sheriff had prepared 
beforehand; s/he had read the reports. The question that arises immediately is: 
has the Sheriff already made their decision before coming to the hearing? Is 
there a ‘black box’ when it comes to sentencing? In the next chapter, I am going 
to discuss in detail how the Sheriffs make sense of the information provided to 
them. However, at this point I want to highlight that the ‘backstage’ of the 
sentencing diet is equally important to what happens ‘centre-stage’. 
 
The use of shadowing methods allowed me to interact with the Sheriffs in a 
more personal manner than would be permitted by interviews. Since I spent a 
working day with the Sheriffs, every time we came out of the courtroom we 
would head to the Judge's chambers. Their offices struck me as a very intimate 
space. However, this feeling may be elicited by my own experience as a former 
practitioner. During my time at the prosecution service, there were periods 
when I spent more time at my office working than in my home. Thus - while I 
may be accused of projecting my own experiences onto my participants - I felt 
that being allowed in their offices was, to a certain extent, to be permitted to 
enter into a personal space. 
 
This feeling was reinforced, because whenever the Sheriffs were in their 
chambers, they took off their wigs and gowns. This seemingly innocuous action 
had a significant symbolic charge. Whenever they were at the courtrooms, the 
Sheriffs performed their judicial role but in the chambers, as they dressed-
down, they stop ‘acting’. Each of them continued to be very formal, but they 
were no longer fulfilling the judicial role as they did at the court. This 
difference between the way Sheriffs conduct themselves at Court and in the 
Chambers is difficult to convey in words. However, it helps to illustrate the 
meaningful differences between the spaces; between the centre and backstage. 
What amused me was that sometimes a gown, a wig and a more theatrical 
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posture was enough to make me fail to recognise the person I interviewed just 
moments ago, now in the ‘role’ of Sheriff. 
 
There was, therefore, a contrast between the judicial performance I observed at 
court - with their full outfit and their unique enactment - and the cordial and 
friendly manners they adopted towards me when we interacted in the chambers. 
In this regard, they would either treat me as a foreign practitioner, a law 
student, or a mixture of both.  
 
I was aware that the more time I spent with the Sheriff's, the more comfortable 
they were with my presence and with the questions I posed. This, in turn, 
allowed me to observe them dealing with some of their more bureaucratic work, 
such as signing papers or dealing with police warrants. In a few cases I had to 
wait in another office while the Sheriff met a solicitor or a prosecutor 
concerning a case. More critically, in a few instances, I was able to discuss the 
cases with the Sheriffs before the hearing and see how they prepared for the RC. 
On one occasion one Sheriff invited me the day before the RC to be with them 
while they read the papers. 
 
Thus, within the constraints of my methods, I was able to observe the place 
where Sheriffs prepared themselves for the RC. This preparation often consisted 
of reading the papers and making notes - as I will discuss in the next chapter. 
Sometimes, it also involved asking another Sheriff their views on a complicated 
case. Chambers were also a social space in which the Sheriff could talk with the 
court social worker concerning a report or trying to get an offender a place in a 
particular programme. On some occasions, if the pressure of the business caught 
up with the Sheriff, they confided to me that they took some of the papers home 
to read them there. Thus, from the perspective of an observer that only had 
access to the hearings, you could grasp that the Sheriff prepared for it. In the 
Chambers was usually where this happened, and thus, it was the place for the 
‘black box’ of sentencing. I am going to discuss the details of these preparations 
in the next chapter. 
 
6.1.4. Courts and their Communities 
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Another ‘place’ or ‘locus’ relevant for sentencing is the local realities of the 
court jurisdictions. In this dimension, ‘place’ means the social-geographic 
features of the communities that are encompassed by the jurisdictions 
boundaries. For example, the population density, the socio-economic 
composition of the area or if they are predominantly urban or rural entities. 
In this regard, since my fieldwork involved visiting fourteen different courts; this 
meant travelling to an equal number of cities and towns all around Scotland. 
Then, in every court I visited, I listened to a large number of offences that 
occurred within the jurisdiction. These narratives, I realised, required me to 
contextualise them within the landscapes and communities that I observed on 
my way to the court.  
 
In a certain way, I recognised that I had to look at these cities and towns with 
the same forensic gaze I use to observe the communities under my jurisdiction 
when I was at the prosecution service. Those streets, those people, those places 
and the social spaces within which were the background of the stories I heard in 
court. The communities that Sheriffs had in mind during our conversation of 
their practices; where both the victims and offenders, belonged. Therefore, 
understanding the Sheriffs' perception of their jurisdictions, the context where 
their court was located, became critical. 
 
This knowledge of the jurisdiction which is the consequence of the resident 
Sheriffs being in the same court for several years also provides a unique 
knowledge of the individuals that live in that community. Although, as 
(Sheriff#1) explained, you do not know ‘...all of the community obviously, but 
the people that I deal with obviously I know them, I know the backgrounds’. This 
is particularly revealing because not only by reading a charge, but also reading a 
name, in some cases, a Judge may have an idea of who committed the offence, 
his or her background and what could or should be done. As two Sheriffs that 
have spent several years in his court explained: 
 
‘...I do sometimes wonder if I know individuals too well. Whether it’s better or not… 
I personally think it’s a strength, I think it is better. I think it means that I can deal 
with cases more appropriately (...) The idea that a local resident Sheriff can be 
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truly independent in the academic sense, intellectual sense, is unrealistic. It’s 
always been the case that certain individuals, certain families will always come 
back again and again, and at a trial the Sheriff will know that the individual there 
has a string of convictions. So that’s always been a fact of life. And at review 
hearings I may see an individual more than once, I’ll get to know them quite well 
through their reports and through talking to them we discuss quite personal issues 
(...) On one or two occasions I have recused myself because I felt I know too much 
about an individual or I think I’ll become too close to them. And I don’t doubt my 
own ability to remain impartial but I might ask a colleague to deal with the trial and 
not me. I think that’s only happened a handful of times, two or three times at 
most.’ (Sheriff#5) 
 
‘…this morning very many of these people who appeared I know from past 
experience, I’ve read reports, I know their mums. So of course that builds in to the 
knowledge bank that we bring to bear in sentencing. But I also know what matters 
to the community. I’m not going to distort my sentencing because of that, but of 
course that’s another factor that I would bring to bear. So I think there are so many 
strands that have to be brought together in imposing any sentence on anybody. 
These are additional strands, I have that knowledge. I think it’s beneficial. It has to 
be beneficial because [it is] sentencing an individual for an individual crime against 
a background of everything they bring with them. So the more I know about the 
circumstances in which a crime was committed, including what the public attitude 
or concerns are locally, yes, of course.’ (Sheriff#7) 
 
The two quotes above reveal to us how complex the practice for a Sheriff in 
medium and small communities can be in the long term. This also suggests, how 
the fact of reading the papers cannot be understood in isolation from the wider 
knowledge that a Sheriff has of their jurisdiction. This suggests that sentencing 
has to be contextualized by what experienced Sheriffs gain (and perhaps lose) 
from their time on the local bench.  
 
What all these quotes tell us is how being on the bench, with the knowledge of 
the jurisdiction that this provides, very quickly sets a background for the 
studying of the papers, and by extension, for the way the cases are dealt with. 
This is not only limited to the knowledge of the most common offences, nor to 
getting to know repeat offenders. These experiences provide them with 
practical knowledge that allows them to create mental categories to help 
classify new offenders and offences. That said, none of this helps us to 
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understand the rationale behind their decisions. Even so, this is a start to 
helping us analyse practice as it happens rather than as it is theorized. 
 
6.2 . Time, tempo and the ‘non-complex’ complexity 
 
As discussed in chapter three, time and the temporal dimension are a critical 
analytical element for the Bourdieusian analysis of practice. Bourdieu 
(1997/2000) warns us that the scholastic situation of the researcher ‘implies, by 
definition, a particularly free relationship to what is normally called time’ (p. 
206), which may make us forget the unique temporality of human practices. It is 
a mistake to forget that sentencing is not the mere allocation of sanction in the 
abstract; to think that a mock sentencing exercise at a law school can retain, 
without no differences, the temporal and contextual dimensions of real practice.  
 
If the courtroom is the place for practice, the sentencing hearings can only take 
place within that space and at specific moments. There is a ‘time’ for 
sentencing, and thus the court officers and the Sheriffs have to manage a court 
schedule, deploy time-management strategies to allow them to deal with the 
business without disruptions and within acceptable or tolerable timeframes. In 
this section, I am going to explore the different dimensions of time at the Sheriff 
Court. 
 
6.2.1. The temporal disruption of the remand court 
 
The Remand Court (RC) can only begin with the entrance of the Sheriff into the 
court which is always preceded by the cry of ‘all rise’ or ‘court rise’. To say that 
the arrival of the Sheriff marks the beginning of the RC may seem obvious. 
However, there were situations that I observed that impacted on the availability 
of the Sheriff to start the RC at the usual time. For example, on the only two 
occasions when I could not make it into the Sheriff Court (SC) on time because of 
public transport disruption, the court too was affected. In the first situation, the 
Sheriff was already in Court and decided to push back the beginning of the RC. 
Otherwise, several accused would not have been able to make it on time. In the 
second case the Sheriff was also late because of the disruption, and hence the 
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court could not start because s/he was not there. When I managed to arrive 
there, a Sheriff Clerk informed me of this situation, and also told me that the 
Sheriff had just arrived, but he could not see me because he needed to read the 
papers before the court. Since it was a busy court, and it could not start before 
half past eleven, the RC did not finish until half past seven at night. 
 
In a third court, although I arrived at the court early, again I was not able to talk 
with the Sheriff before the RC because s/he had not had time to read the 
reports. In this case, the disruption was the consequence of the Sheriff being 
taken away to deal with hearings at a different court, which ended too late and 
did not allow them to prepare adequately. In this case, the hearing started just 
half an hour late. 
 
These particular situations we are describing, which were uncommon but not 
exceptional, lead us to important questions about the court’s time management. 
Perhaps, it is in those situations where the court routines and their time-
management fails that we can better observe the ‘seams’ or the limits of those 
practices. The core aspect of this issue is the level of preparation that a Sheriff 
is required to undertake before dealing with Sentencing Diets. As discussed 
above, there is a backstage for sentencing, and thus within this ‘place’ the 
Sheriffs have to find a ‘time’ for reading the papers and reports of the cases 
that are going to be discussed during the hearings. 
 
These examples of infrequent problems show us the pressure of the business and 
the delicate nature of the court’s time management to deal with it. Also, they 
highlight how a disruption at a specific moment of the routine, impacts not only 
that practice but also puts pressure on others’ routines. This is the effect of how 
the different judicial practices seem to be stitched and sewn by a thread of 
time. In other words, the court and the judge have to allocate specific 
timeframes to deal with the judicial business on a daily basis. At the Sheriff 
courts, this means assigning particular days to deal with civil, family law and 
criminal cases. This routine depends on the skill of the Sheriff and the other 
penal agents to perform their role at court within the timeframes they have.  
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If these timeframes are disrupted, then it is not just one practice that is 
affected, it may impact negatively on other routines. For example, in the second 
case, the disruption meant not only a delay in starting the RC but also that it 
finished quite late, affecting the time the Sheriff had to prepare for the next 
day’s civil court. In the third case, conversely it was a different judicial practice 
that took too much of the Sheriff’s time that had an impact on the time that the 
Sheriff had to prepare for the RC. 
 
Overall, the disruption allowed me to understand the temporal dimension with 
its limits and the tensions in the way that the courts and the Sheriffs try to 
manage their time to deal with the business. To a certain degree, it reminded 
me of my own experiences at the Chilean prosecution service and of the fact 
that within large penal institutions - at least those that have to deal with a large 
amount of business - bureaucratic time management seems always to be fragile 
and reactive. 
 
6.2.2. The temporality of sentencing decision-making 
 
In the last section I described situations where external issues disrupted the 
Sheriffs, the court routines and time management.  In this section, I will focus 
on the Sheriffs’ own perception of the temporal dimension of sentencing. The 
first thing I noticed - while talking with the Sheriffs about this issue - was how 
rich and layered the complexity of their perception of the temporality of 
sentencing was. Nevertheless, the most straightforward approach to their 
perception of sentencing decision-making is summarised in the following quote. 
 
‘Making decisions and having to make decisions quickly and clearly is the biggest 
challenge of the job and the biggest difference that I’ve realised. Not to just make a 
request to the court from one point of view, but as the Sheriff I have to hear both 
sides and make a decision that’s got reasons behind it. So making decisions has been 
the biggest change to doing the job from seeing the job. And when I say making the 
decisions that also means justifying it when there are appeals that come in (...) 
making decisions and being able to justify them, and also being able to remind 
myself why I made that decision perhaps one or two weeks later is very important.’ 
(Sheriff#10) 
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(Sheriff#10)'s account depicts a pressure for quick decision-making. It is worth 
noting that this account refers to the decision that is carried out inside the 
courtroom and thus, this refers to the rapid nature of the hearings as well. It is 
also worth noting how this perception invokes both a fast-paced process but one 
that requires the Sheriff to provide a decision that has ‘got reasons behind it’. 
However, while discussing the differences between floating sheriffs and resident 
sheriffs, another dimension of this temporality appeared. 
 
 ‘…this is one of the problems with Sheriffs who have to go round different courts, 
you get very little time to read cases. So you just turn up at court, read them very 
quickly, go into court, sentence them, come away again and you have nothing more 
to do with it. Whereas when you are resident somewhere you get much more of an 
opportunity to read things, to think about things, to talk to colleagues about it, to 
talk to the social workers. For example, if a floating Sheriff or an outside Sheriff had 
come in and read Peter’s (not actual name) reports they might have thought ‘well, 
he’s just a nuisance, we’ll send him to jail’. Whereas, well, you’ve just heard, 
we’re going to try to get him onto the X Programme. We’re going to try and get him 
doing something. And I think your experience as a Sheriff in all aspects of the work 
means that I think you take a much more holistic approach to sentencing. You 
become more aware of the effect that your sentence has on people.’ (Sheriff#3) 
 
(Sheriff#3)'s account seems to make a case for the difference in the sentencing 
practice of floating sheriffs compared to resident sheriffs, and one of the things 
that makes this difference is time. The latter have more ‘time’ to prepare and 
study the phases than the former. (Sheriff#10) reminds us that, nonetheless, this 
‘more available’ time still requires the skill of being able to make quick 
decisions. This further suggests that there is more to the practice than ‘quick 
decision-making’. Moreover, (Sheriff#10) seems to capture two different 
temporal levels of sentencing practice: on one hand the fast-paced time when 
the decision is taken, but on the other hand, if the sentence is appealed, the 
reflexive moment of defending it. 
 
In a strict sense, the second part, dealing with appeals, is also a variable that 
reveals the complexity of the quick decision-making described above. As 
summarised by (Sheriff#9) ‘knowing what the Appeal Court will tolerate’ is a 
crucial part of judicial practice, in Bourdieu’s sense knowing how to play the 
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‘game’. Furthermore, as (Sheriff#11) explained, ‘there’s no point in me imposing 
that sentence as a general rule if you know you’re going to be appealed’. Hence, 
the appeal court’s views on sentencing are a relevant variable to balance when a 
(quick) decision has to be made – both in order to avoid an appeal and, if that 
fails, to ensure the High Court upholds your decision. The Sheriffs know they 
have a capital, a reputation, which, if they play it right, may make the High 
Court more prone to trust their instincts in cases where they adopt unusual 
(harsher) decisions.  
 
Thus, the difficulty that (Sheriff#10) mentions is not just a fact of making a 
decision with the information that is provided to them but also to be able to 
make a good decision; in other words, a decision that not only had a rationale 
but also can be defended if it gets appealed. This pressure helps us to 
understand the preparation the Sheriff requires to be able to sentence within 
the timeframes that they are given. The question that emerges here is, does this 
pressure mean that the Sheriffs take a sentencing decision before going to the 
hearing?  
 
‘I don’t make a decision before I go into court but I generally know if it’s going to be 
custody. But quite often I’ve not seen the papers until I go onto the bench. I don’t 
always read. I only dealt with about thirty cases today. I had read the two 
indictments, obviously, and there were four criminal justice social work reports and 
I had read them. But some of the cases that I dealt with today, I have not seen the 
papers until they were handed up to me. Because I don’t need to. I mean, putting it 
bluntly, it’s not exactly rocket science, this job. This is not a hard job.’(Sheriff#16) 
 
This was a very honest depiction of the sentencing process of (Sheriff#16). If one 
wants to know if the Sheriffs make a decision before the hearing, 
methodologically, the question that remains would be: Is there a way to 
triangulate this information without relying on what the participants tell us? In 
this respect, the shadowing method became critical, since I was often able to be 
with the Sheriffs before the RC and to discuss with them their preliminary views 
concerning some cases. I saw some of them taking notes, and outlining potential 
sanctions. This, as (Sheriff#10) stated above, was to be able to justify the 
decision later if appealed. Thus, I was also able to observe how during the 
hearings, sometimes several times, the Sheriffs departed from the draft decision 
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they had prepared in the Chambers and imposed a different sentence or 
tweaked the one they had considered. Thus, from my observation, I could 
corroborate that to a great extent the Sheriff did not make the decision 
beforehand.  
 
(Sheriff#16) acknowledges that it is necessary to have specific preparations, at 
least in more serious cases (indictments) or in the ones in which a report has 
been requested. Again, the context that is described alludes to the time 
constraints and the pressure of the business. Likewise, this Sheriff mentioned 
how in some cases s/he was only able to see the papers when they were handed 
to her/him. This was also something that I could observe in several courts. The 
consequence was paradoxical, there was a need to prepare, but the papers only 
arrived the day before or on the same day as the hearing. This pressure meant 
that Sheriffs had to prepare in the evening or night before the RC or the same 
day before the start of it. 
 
Another relevant aspect of (Sheriff#16)’s explanation of sentencing is his/her 
phrase that sentencing is not ‘rocket science’. However, at the same time when 
I talked with other Sheriffs and invited them to deconstruct and explain their 
own sentencing practices, the verbalization of all the different variables that 
they have to take into account in order to ‘get the sentence right’, as another 
Sheriff explained to me, made them describe it as hard or nuanced: 
 
‘We all said the most difficult thing in the job is sentencing. And particularly at our 
level because when you have this conversation with your senior colleagues in the 
High Court they sympathise with us and say ‘yeah, it must be quite difficult because 
there are so many different sentencing options’. And so much fine-tuning that you 
need to do. Whereas in the High Court they say ‘typically for us it’s not a matter of 
what type of sentence, it’s just how many years’. That puts it crudely, but it makes 
the point that by the time someone’s in the High Court the chances of that person 
getting anything but a custodial sentence is fairly limited. Whereas in the Sheriff 
Court I think the latest figures show that something like 13% of offenders have a 
custodial sentence imposed on them, which means 87% are some other kind of 
sentence.’ (Sheriff#6) 
 
 ‘…when I was appointed a temporary Sheriff the only examination of your fitness 
was you had an interview with a Sheriff Principal, and clearly it wasn’t the Sheriff 
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Principal that you normally appear before. And I went up to X and had an interview 
with Sheriff Principal X at a point. And he said ‘well, of course a lot of your practice 
is civil, how do you feel about crime?’ (…) So I said ‘I’m not too bothered about 
that, and trials. What does bother me a wee bit is sentencing’ And he said ‘no, 
you’re quite right. Any fool can try a case but getting the right sentence, that’s the 
trick.’ And sentencing is a far more difficult, far more nuanced task than I think 
people realise. And certainly my view with regard to matters has changed, not 
hugely but there are changes. And it constantly is tweaking. And of course to some 
extent it’s not just tweaked by your own views but also it’s tweaked by what you 
think you can get away with with the Appeal Court.’ (Sheriff#12) 
 
There are important issues to highlight here. Firstly, is necessary to remember 
that the time of the practice is different to the time of (self) reflection. In other 
words, the temporality of the practice is reframed under the reflexive gaze. The 
complexity of the variables they take into account during sentencing does not 
change the fact that they are quick decision-makers. That's precisely the 
question; how do they manage all these complex variables and equally arrive at 
consistent decisions that have a practical rationale? This means that even if 
Judges describe to us what they do, they only convey a self-reflexive account of 
that process. They cannot convey to us this particular ‘feel for the game’ - that 
allows them to reach decisions with ease nor can they communicate through this 
kind of reflexive exercise the temporality of the practice. 
 
6.2.3. The contradictory temporalities of sentencing 
 
During my first interviews, inspired by the empirical work by Tombs (2004) and 
the theoretical work of Tata (2007), I tried to explore if the Sheriff perceived 
their sentencing process as ‘intuitive and based on experience’ (Tombs, 2004, p. 
42) or they considered to be a more complex structured process akin to 
‘craftwork’ using Tata's (2007) terminology.  
 
However, through my observation and shadowing, I quickly realised that these 
questions, and the responses that they elicited, were not able to grasp practice 
itself. Moreover, these themes seemed to hide practice, instead of revealing it. 
The Sheriffs’ answers did display an attempt to reconcile the seemingly 
‘contradictory’ temporalities of sentencing. As discussed in the previous section, 
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they do not have much time to prepare for the RC, and they have to be able to 
take decisions quickly. Furthermore, they have to be able to get the sentence 
right, which means being able to satisfy the standards of the appeal court if 
challenged. We are also told that sentencing is nuanced and complex. However, 
from a different perspective, and in comparison with the floating Sheriffs, the 
resident Sheriffs have time to prepare, to use the local resources if required. It 
is noticeable that Sheriffs on the bench can navigate the complexities of 
sentencing with ease. As (Sheriff#16) said, sentencing is not ‘rocket science’. 
 
It is worth noting that a given practice can be challenging and at the same time 
easy to carry out by an individual with specific proficiencies and experience. 
However, this poses the question of what makes those individuals more 
competent than others? And which knowledge or skills make them proficient? 
This is where the discussion shed some light on the question of intuition or 
structured processes. The following quotes capture this paradox of a 'non-
complex' complex practice: 
  
‘It’s more intuitive, I think. I have a method in the sense that I will go through the 
procedure of reading the report, the complaint, and the previous convictions, and 
getting as much of all the circumstances as I can out of that. And that’ll maybe start 
giving me a vague indication of where I should be going. But I don’t think it’s any 
more scientific than that. When I say it’s intuitive, these things are filtered through 
experience of similar cases that you’ve dealt with, similar cases that you’ve seen, 
and similar cases you’ve heard of. So it’s not as if I’m just coming to it (…) But the 
decision is not entirely intuitive, well, it is but it is filtered through this question of 
experience and guidance I’ve received in other cases from the High Court. Of course 
you take that into account. Appeal cases that I’ve seen, dealing with cases like that. 
Cases that I read when I’m preparing and I wonder what the appropriate range of 
sentences will be then I will research in the sentencing manual the day before, and 
there’s one or two that I’ve done that in; researched the range of cases.’ (Sheriff#4) 
 
 ‘…the art of being a judge is one that brings in different elements of creativity, the 
more scientific side, and also simply that sense of judgement that comes from the 
core of your being as you as a sentient, rational authority placed by society in the 
position of exercising power over other people’s lives. And ultimately it comes down 
to a question of judgement, what feels right, and sometimes you make decisions and 
although you can give reasons and do give reasons sometimes it is a matter of feel, 
of judgement, as to the right thing to do. And indeed if it wasn’t that way, if you 
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had to start and think and reason every single decision out you’d be working every 
night until midnight. You have to make a number of decisions quite quickly, for 
better or for worse.’ (Sheriff#6) 
 
The contradictions we mentioned earlier, and the complex process that 
these quotes try to reconcile, are not necessarily an obstacle for the 
understanding of sentencing. As discussed in chapter three, it is not 
unusual that practitioners may not be able to convey the rationales of their 
practice. Nevertheless, these quotes let us grasp, at least in a negative 
sense, the unique temporality of practice. In other words, what these 
descriptions of practice fail to convey is the temporality of the action of 
sentencing. However, the contradictory accounts, each of them true within 
the dimension they are describing, consistently offer us the image of a 
complicated process which is enacted, in part, under specific rules, 
following particular rationales, and yet also in part through an intuitive 
process. These depictions seem to be consistent with Bourdieu's theory of 
practice - as discussed in chapter three. The Sheriff's ease, or intuition, 
which is not arbitrary and seems to follow specific rules or rationales, 
suggest that there is a particular habitus, a mental schema that allows 
them to carry out these complex decisions quickly. In the following 
chapters, I am going to explore different aspects of sentencing practice 
that will help us to shed light on this issue. 
 
6.3. The multiples places and temporalities of 
Sentencing 
 
In this chapter, I have aimed to explain the ‘where’ and ‘when’ of practice. 
While these two dimensions are inseparable from real practice, the analytical 
and pedagogical exercise of exploring them alone provides us with a good 
introduction to the study of sentencing. It shows us how practice cannot be 
understood outside its spatial and temporal dimensions. This also allows an 
understanding of how both aspects are part of what constitutes this particular 
kind of decision-making. They reveal to us that sentencing - as a practice - is a 
social activity which cannot be reduced to the mere scholarly definition of 
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‘allocation of a sanction’. Another important aspect of this analysis is that there 
is not just one space nor time for practice but multiples ones. There is a 
multiplicity of actions which precede sentencing decision-making and make it 
possible. In the following chapter, I am going to explore how these other places 
and moments interweave between each other. Through this exploration, I am 
aiming to outline the habitus and field that can help us to understand the 
rationale of practice. 
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CHAPTER 7: Sentencing: Actors and Roles 
 
During the sentencing process Sheriffs are provided with different kinds of 
information about the offence or the offender that they have to analyse and 
make sense of. There are four types of information that the Sheriffs receive: the 
‘papers’, which contain the basic information about the case; the CJSW-Report 
provided by the SWs; the facts of the case offered by the PFs; and the PiM by 
the solicitors. In this chapter, I am going to examine the information they gather 
from these very different sources and how they make sense of it. In addition, 
concerning the information that is provided by penal actors, I am going to 
explore how the professional relationships with the SWs, PFs or solicitors may 
alter the way that Sheriffs use or understand the information provided by those 
agents.  
 
The chapter is split into two sections. In the first, I explore the use of the 
papers. In the second, I explore the relationship of the Sheriffs with the penal 
actors that interplay in the sentencing process: SWs, PFs and Solicitors. 
 
7.1. Preparation for the RC: Studying the ‘papers’ 
 
During my observation of the RC, it was evident that even if the Sheriff did not 
know the facts of the offence, it was expected that s/he would already know 
the CJSW-Reports and some other details of the case. This implicitly meant that 
it was also expected that the Sheriff would have prepared themselves for 
dealing with the case beforehand. However, the way that the solicitors 
conducted themselves during their pleas in mitigation also implied that the 
Sheriff may not have prepared for the case in Chambers.  
 
The effect of this contradiction over the S.Diets was paradoxical. It could be said 
that for the solicitors the Sheriffs were some kind of ‘Schrödinger’s Judge’: they 
had to assume that the Sheriff both knows and does not know the case. 
Nevertheless, all my participants told me they prepare for the RC. The most 
common response can be summarized in the following quote: 
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‘You can’t do a remand court without preparing properly. If you were to just step on 
the bench and try and do a RC from scratch, which I’ve had to do and I know others 
have had to do, it’s awful, it takes all day.’(Sheriff#11) 
 
While I was expecting Sheriffs' preparations may differ from one to another, 
through my observation, shadowing and the interviews, I realised that all my 
participants prepared for the RC in similar ways. As one Sheriff put it: 
 
‘I turn to the charge, I look at the charge, I look at the PCs, [previous convictions] I 
look at the date of when the plea was tendered, when in the process, what about 
the procedure? Have any warrants been granted? Has there been delay? Has there 
been repeated trial diets? And if so, why? Is it because of some delay on the part of 
the defence, is the Crown to blame? Factor all that in. Having done that, I would 
then look at the report, I’ll read the report, and I’ll highlight any issues that I have 
in the report with a question mark, these are things I want to discuss with the 
Crown or with the defence agent to get a clearer picture. And that’s it. I actually 
have an idea when I’m going in of where I’m heading, that doesn’t mean that’s 
necessarily where I’ll go. But I’ll have a general idea.’ (Sheriff#7) 
 
Even though this particular Sheriff described this account as a ‘functional’ 
depiction of the process, it was very revealing. This part of the process may be 
more relevant than it seems at first glance. For starters, the ‘papers’ contain 
the charge(s), the indictment in the case of the Sol.Ps, the accused’s criminal 
record, the records of all the diets in that case, and the CJSW-Report. In the 
event of an accused with more than one case, some Sheriff Courts accumulate or 
‘roll up’ different complaints together. Also, the papers are not just records or 
information on a case, but rather they could be seen as the physical legal 
manifestation of the case.  
 
It is worth mentioning that one Sheriff invited me the day before the RC to allow 
me to be present during the preparation of the next day’s cases, another 
allowed me to shadow them for three days. Hence, I was able to observe how 
they studied the papers. I was also able to see what the papers contained, and 
read several CJSW-Reports. In others cases, I was with the Sheriff at chambers 
when a CJSW-Report arrived belatedly. Thus I observed how the Judge had to 
read it quickly - take some notes - and finish his/her preparation for the 
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hearings that were going to start or will have to resume within minutes. Again, 
the themes here were time pressures and the capacity - a legal habitus - that 
allowed them to outline a sentencing draft or make decisions quickly. As a 
consequence of this, I argue that this preparation allows us to note that 
sentencing practice in the courtroom does not take place in a vacuum. It does 
not emerge from nothing, but rather it is already framed by the study of the 
‘papers’. Moreover, these accounts seem to describe a structural routine which 
appears to be imposed on individual Sheriffs. For these reasons, the study of the 
papers is a critical part of sentencing decision-making: 
 
‘…actually the way I do it now, I get these papers first and then the reports come in 
gradually. So I’ve already seen the charge, already seen the record and when they 
pled. And I may, depending upon the record and the charge, have already formed a 
provisional view with regard [to] the sentence without seeing the report. And then 
the report comes in and it will either confirm that’s the likelihood or not.’ 
(Sheriff#12) 
 
‘I generally look at the complaint. I work out what they’ve pled to, when they pled. 
I work out whether they have failed to appear at any stage. I look at their record 
and then I look to see whether they’ve previously been sentenced to custody, or 
whether they’re presently on any court orders for community service or Community 
Payback Orders. I then look at the charges themselves. I have a look at the report 
then, if there is one. I find it helpful as you go through that process, you begin to 
have some idea of the sentencing direction and what might be imposed (…) I do 
actually always, from my own management point of view, have a sentence down as 
to the ballpark as to what I’m thinking about. But of course I don’t allow myself to 
automatically impose that without taking account of either the facts if I haven’t 
heard them, or what is said on behalf of the accused.’ (Sheriff#15) 
 
The Sheriff’s study of the ‘data’ contained in these documents implies that 
there is a practical knowledge which allows them to know which data to gather, 
and how to interpret and make sense of it. And critically it is a legal competency 
that allows them - with very little but specific information – to narrow down the 
possible applicable disposals, and outline a draft of sentencing for the given 
case. Hence, practice seems to be more structured that it appears at first 
glance. Although the routine neither imposes nor determines the way Sheriffs 
make sense of the data, it structures and manages the Judges' and the courts' 
time spent dealing with cases. 
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As a consequence of this - and continuing the analysis developed in the last 
chapter - this legal competency that Bourdieu calls Habitus, needs to be 
contextualised in its temporal dimension. The business pressures force the 
Sheriffs to study the papers, and to gather and weigh the data over a short 
period of time. Therefore, this legal competency acquires a practical dimension 
aiming to ease the preparation for the RC through the use of the habitus.  
 
The fragmentary units of information contained in the papers do not provide any 
narrative or meaning by themselves. However, the three Sheriffs quoted above 
offer detailed accounts of which kind of data they are gathering. It is important 
to bear in mind that the papers contain only clusters of information, such as: (1) 
the charge, the kind of offence, without knowing the facts; (2) the details of the 
offender, age, sex and if they have a criminal record, before reading the report; 
(3) if the accused is ordained, on bail or remand; (4) a chronology of the case, 
which records the date of the offence, when the accused was arrested, charged 
and if they plead guilty or not, and when. As outsiders, we can tell that this data 
is relevant, but we can hardly tell how it could affect the sentencing outcome. 
This is so because we lack the legal habitus that constructs meaning within 
them. Even if we have legal knowledge, trying to predict the outcome of a 
sentence, without knowing the jurisdiction or the Judge, may be tricky: even for 
solicitors. 
 
The data gathered is used by the Sheriffs to narrow down the potential scenarios 
that they may have to deal with, in the same fashion as a local doctor – a 
General Practitioner -- carrying out a differential diagnosis. By imposing pre-
established categories or frameworks to the data, they are able to make sense 
of that offence, to draft not only a possible sanction but also to draft a potential 
narrative of how that offence and its offender should be legally understood. This 
is to say that the sentencing process can be perceived as a practice where the 
Judge has to put together clusters of information, from different sources, and 
make sense of them. But this construction of (legal) meaning is still incomplete. 
As I am going to discuss in detail in the following sections, the facts of the 
offence, the CJSWR and the PiM are the critical data that help the Sheriff to 
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move from a draft of a sentence towards a narrative of the nature of the offence 
and the offender. These narratives help the Judge to determine the ‘right’ 
sentence.  
 
However, in order to obtain the maximum information from reading only the 
charge, you would need not simply to have legal knowledge, but also to know 
the legal practice of that particular jurisdiction, and more so, know the crime 
patterns of that locality. For example: 
 
‘I am relatively new, and very quickly, not even just recently, very quickly one sees 
similar kinds of case, similar people in similar circumstances, similar themes in 
terms of the problems that they are facing and experiencing, similar crossover 
between the family court here. So yes. But having said all of that those were themes 
and issues which were familiar to me from my previous role as a PF over many 
years. So they’re not surprising to me in this role, I’ve seen these similar kinds of 
cases in a different context before.’ (Sheriff#2) 
 
‘…you get to know your area better, you get to know the particular problems that 
arise in that area, you get to know the trouble-spots. You get to know the particular 
illegal activities that tend to take place there. So in this area, drugs is a big problem 
and so is associated violence, sometimes very severe violence; attempted murder 
and murder. That’s at the top end. And then lower down you tend to see a lot of 
offences involving disorder and petty assault, and most of it is associated with 
consumption of alcohol, and to a lesser extent consumption of drugs, and of course 
taking both.’ (Sheriff#6) 
 
In the first quote we can see how the past experience of a recently appointed 
Sheriff is brought into the current practice, helping to make sense of cases in a 
given locality. As discussed in chapter five, Sheriffs are expected to bring their 
professional trajectories as an experience that can make them better Sheriffs. I 
am going to explore this in more detail in chapter nine. The second quote 
reflects a different aspect of how sentencing is contextualised. It is implied in 
this description, that sentencing practice is not static, it can evolve through the 
acquisition of a better understanding of the local contexts. Although, indirectly 
this aspect of practice reveals an iterative relationship between the Sheriff, 
his/her sentencing practice and their local community. Communities are not 
static, and thus knowing a community also involves acknowledging its changes. 
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As a consequence of this, the influence of the local contexts may suggest a 
constant shaping and re-shaping of practice. 
 
7.2. The Role of Social Workers, Procurator Fiscals and 
Solicitors 
 
The sentencing process requires that different penal actors provide the Sheriffs 
with reports or specific information that helps them in their decision-making. 
SWs provides the CJSW-Reports, PFs information concerning the facts of the 
offence or the offender and the solicitors a PiM. In this section, I am going to 
explore both how the Sheriffs perceived these actors and the value or utility of 
the information provided by them. 
 
It is worth noting that as much as the SWs, PFs and Solicitors’ role is to inform 
the Sheriff, in practice each of them weave the data into narratives. In other 
words, they also seem to be trying to persuade the Sheriff to frame the offence 
and the offender within specific narratives. These narratives are the by-product 
of these legal agents’ own practices, shaped by their institutional and individual 
roles within the criminal justice system. This does not mean that they ‘invent’ 
the data; rather, they interpret, construe and shape the facts to find meaning – 
and this calls into play their institutional roles or purposes.  
 
Sheriffs are well aware of these considerations, even if they never articulate 
them. They know that they are the ones to make the sentencing decision, and 
they engage with the other legal agents and their narratives with caution and 
prudence. What I could observe inside and outside court, by shadowing the 
Sheriffs, was that these accounts are quite influential in the ‘craft’ of the 
sentence. However, my perception of these interactions is that, in most cases, 
the way that Sheriffs use these narratives does not match the expectations that 
their authors may have. Moreover, regardless of when the legal agents provide 
their input, the sentencing process seems to require the Sheriff to balance all of 
them together, as (Sheriff#3) explains: 
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‘What you need from the Crown is a very clear narrative of what has happened (…) 
From the defence point of view what are the mitigating factors? What prompted 
your client to do this? (…) So you’re trying to build up a picture, an entire picture. 
And from the social work department, if they’re doing a report, I like them… and 
the reporters here are excellent, SWs here are excellent, I want to know what is this 
person’s attitude to the offence? Because very often what happens is the solicitor 
will say ‘Oh, he’s very sorry and wishes it hadn’t happened.’ But when the SWs 
probes them you discover that well, he’s maybe not so sorry because he kind of 
thinks that victim might have deserved that because ‘after all she was shouting at 
me and she was abusing me so I…’ So I want to know all of that because that gives 
me greater insight into his mind-set.’ (Sheriff# 3) 
 
In the next three subsections I am going to explore the Sheriff's views of these 
legal agents and how they use the data, narratives or information they provide 
to them. The analysis of these views is complemented with the data I obtained 
though my observation and shadowing. 
 
7.2.1.  Procurators Fiscal and the Facts 
 
Whenever I asked the Sheriffs about their views on the PF's work, within the 
context of the sentencing diet, all the criticism was oriented not to the quality 
of the data that they provided, but rather the way in which it was conveyed. 
This was not a challenge to the veracity of PFs as a source of information, or to 
the narrative they provided, but rather a criticism of their performance before 
the court. The other set of criticisms is not about the PFs themselves but rather 
about Crown prosecution policies that affect the business brought to the court. 
However, I am not going to explore them in this section. 
 
In brief, the ‘role’ of PFs in the sentencing process is subordinated to the 
moment they provide the narrative of facts to the Sheriff. (Sheriff#2) explained 
this to me, and I was able to corroborate that this arrangement was similar in 
every Court I visited, except where there was only one Sheriff: 
 
‘I know in some courts in the past at least it would be practice for the accused to 
plead guilty and if reports were required the report would be obtained and then it 
would go to a court like today, but the Sheriff who presided over that court might 
not have dealt with those cases previously. And so he would then read the report 
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like I’ve done today, but when he goes onto the bench they would hear the 
circumstances from the PF before sentence. I don’t need to hear the circumstances 
because I hear them at the point that I call for the report. So I’ve already heard 
about these cases, and now I’ve got my report and the final part is I need to hear 
from the solicitors about their mitigation. Because they may want to draw out 
aspects of the report or…’ (Sheriff#2)  
 
As mentioned above, I was surprised by the fact that the information provided 
by the PFs was received in a similar fashion to how they deal with the 
information contained in the papers, as ‘raw data’. I suspect this is so because 
of the way that the Scottish legal system is structured. A key aspect of Western 
criminal systems is that once you have a conviction or a guilty plea ‘the facts’ 
that support the charges are fixed, and cannot be subject to any further 
discussion. However, at least in the Chilean system the judges seem to be very 
critical of the prosecution narrative. Overall, I observed that the Scottish 
Sheriffs trusted the narratives provided by the PFs. Also, I could observe that 
there were professional relationships that could be closer or more distant. 
 
From a critical point of view, this trust may provide the PF, individually, with a 
lot of influence over sentencing practice. This is to say that the way they 
construct and provide the narrative to the Sheriffs can make the difference 
between a custodial and a community sentence. However, this potential 
influence is watered down, at least at the Sum.P, by the volume of business. As I 
could observe in the different Sheriff Courts, the PF never provided a pre-
crafted narrative of the facts of Sum.P cases. Not only that, but on several 
occasions, when they were required to offer the facts, some of them struggled 
to try to find the relevant information in the file that contained the complaint. 
The more the PF struggled, the longer the hearing was slowed down. Moreover, 
an unskilled PF could affect the whole rhythm of the RC, making it ‘longer’ than 
the Sheriff would have expected. As a matter of fact, any criticism from the 
Sheriffs to individual PFs was, very often if not always, aimed at this aspect of 
their performance in the court. 
 
‘…poor Miss/Mr X got dumped with the court this morning, she had no preparation 
time at all, knew nothing about the cases. Some of them she might remember 
because she’s appeared in them before but others she will remember nothing about 
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(...) She is bad at reading the facts. I think that’s possibly the worst (...) she’s 
actually quite effective in many other respects but she’s awful at that. You have to 
also understand that the information that the police give to the Crown is set out in a 
particular way and it’s very difficult sometimes to put it across. Some people have 
that gift and some don’t, and she very definitely doesn’t. So the Crown quite often 
don’t know what buttons to push, they’re kind of reading it out as they go along, 
and little lights may come on in their brain about certain phrases and that’s why 
they come out with them. And quite often what comes out is pretty disjointed and I 
quite often quiz them in the middle of it, ‘hang on a minute, which person is this? 
Who is that?’ and so on...’ (Sheriff#11) 
 
The first thing we need to highlight about this quote is how sympathetic and 
empathetic the Sheriff is with the PF. However, this attitude cannot be 
generalised to every relationship between Sheriffs and PFs. Instead, this quote is 
an example of how penal actors of different institutions have to learn to work 
with each other. Moreover, what is implicit, I argue, is that these relationships, 
for good or ill, will have an impact on the way Sheriffs react to the information 
provided by those actors. Conversely, Sheriffs can develop more distant 
relationships when they evaluate negatively other legal agents’ performances. 
During my fieldwork this happened particularly with solicitors, which I am going 
to explore later in this chapter.  
 
The situation described above also revealed that other legal agents' 
performances can disrupt sentencing. It shows how, if they fail to play the game 
properly, they hinder the flow of practice. At the core of these situations lies 
the temporal dimension of practice that I discussed in the last chapter. This 
seems to support the impression I got from my fieldwork regarding noticing that 
PFs showed a different level of preparation when they were dealing with Sol.Ps 
than when they deal with Sum.Ps.  
 
However, this does not mean that the PFs, as individuals, are not influential. For 
starters, and even though this was not part of my research, I was able to observe 
some plea bargaining. When I asked a Sheriff about this, (Sheriff#16) explained: 
 
‘I don’t know if it’s correct or not. It is horse trading, isn’t it? It’s just to get a deal. 
People plead guilty to something that they’ve done, they plead not guilty to 
something that they’ve done, but that plea will be accepted just to get a deal. That 
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happens all the time. Sometimes I am surprised at the deals that are taken, but I 
simply deal with what’s been pled to, and I completely ignore what else was there. 
It’s quite easy to do that. It’s just the same way if I’ve got somebody in court on 
trial and I know because I recognise him that he’s got three pages of previous 
convictions, I completely ignore that when I’m deciding whether he’s guilty or not.’ 
(Sheriff#16) 
 
While this ‘horse trading’ was not an aspect I was aiming to explore in my 
research, by the end of my fieldwork, I realised how relevant it was for 
sentencing practice. This practice undoubtedly has to have an impact on the way 
that the facts are narrated and how the offence is framed. However, since most 
of the cases I observed were from the RC, and thus, were cases where the 
accused had already pled guilty, I could not explore the impact of this practice 
on sentencing in more depth. Nevertheless, I raise the issue here because it 
needs to be addressed, or at least acknowledged.  
 
Another situation that showed me how influential the PFs could be, emerged 
during my shadowing of (Sheriff#2). While discussing the cases of the day s/he 
explained that: 
 
 ‘…the third case is one which involved another threatening and abusive behaviour16 
in very different circumstances where a man approached a child in the street on two 
separate occasions. And on the first occasion invited her to go back to his house. 
And on the other occasion he didn’t get so far as to say very much but he engaged in 
a conversation and the child’s mother came and intervened and that was that. So 
that was a case of threatening behaviour. Very different circumstances because the 
inferences in that case are all drawn from the circumstances, and he also has a very 
significant record which involved other offences against children in the past…’ 
(Sheriff#2)  
 
Later that day when the case was called, the Sheriff asked the PF to provide the 
facts of the prior offences that may have been related to the present offence. 
However, the PF who attended the court that day was not the one who had 
appeared at the trial, and s/he had no such information. The issue that I was 
able to grasp was that during the trial the PF had contextualised the current 
                                         
16 Section 38 (1) of the Criminal Justice and Licensing (Scotland) Act 2010. 
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offence -the fact that the accused had talked with a child - with these past 
convictions. However, the criminal records that the Sheriff had did not contain 
any information about the facts of the offences. 
 
The Sheriff was visibly upset because of this. S/he adjourned the case for later 
that day, and called the PF to her/his Chambers. I was asked to wait outside of 
Chambers, in the hall, during that conversation. When the PF left, the Sheriff 
explained to me, off the record, that the main issue was that s/he had been told 
that some of the past convictions were of a similar nature, and also, they had 
been deemed to have a sexual nature. However, without any source to 
corroborate that information, s/he explained, s/he could not take that into 
account at the moment of sentencing.  
 
In any case, by the time the case was recalled, the PF informed the court that 
s/he had been unable to provide the information required by the Sheriff. The 
Sheriff complained about that decision but stated that since the prosecution had 
been unable to produce such evidence, s/he would exclude that information. 
S/he spared the accused from a custodial sentence, but imposed a weighty 
community sentence with supervision, unpaid work, a ban on talking with the 
victims or their family and on walking close to where they lived. The community 
sentence, in this case, seemed to me harsher than a short custodial sentence. 
Indeed, the lengthy period of supervision, stringent conditions and unpaid work 
may set up the accused to fail. However, it made sense, in a context where the 
primary concern was public protection. For that purpose, this disposal seemed 
more appropriate than a custodial sentence.  
 
As I mentioned earlier, this case seems to outline the issue of trust and how 
what PFs say in court may influence the Sheriffs’ sentencing approach towards a 
case. The argument that we have tried to build here is how the perception that 
the Sheriff had towards a legal agent may make them more receptive to the 
information provided by that particular agent, and through this, also more 
willing to hear and be persuaded. In the case we have just explored, part of the 
Judge’s prior experience was working for the Crown. I am not arguing that this is 
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the only variable in play here, but it is relevant to note it. We are going to 
further explore and develop this argument in the following sections. 
 
7.2.2.  SWs and the CJSW-Reports 
 
The Sheriffs in my sample value the input provided by SWs and their reports. In 
addition, I was able to observe that - in most of the Sum.P. cases - the CJSW-
Report played a pivotal role during the PiM and the sentencing diet as a whole.  
 
 ‘I think they [SW] must be under tremendous pressure because you’re calling for 
reports really in most cases now. And then when you put people on orders that’s a 
huge commitment for the social work department to take on. I do think it’s always 
been of a high standard, actually, the social work department, and what they give 
to the courts. Has it improved? I think probably. I think maybe better training now. 
And they are really dedicated, I find SWs will really do the very best they can for 
you, and it makes our job easier where they will highlight in a report what they 
think might be suitable and what would maybe work.’(Sheriff#1) 
 
However, despite their mostly positive evaluation of SWs’ work, (Sheriff#3) 
made me realize that this was more nuanced than I expected:  
 
‘I know certain Sheriffs who would never think of speaking to the SW, having the SW 
in, or having the SW tell me what he thinks a solution is. Some Sheriffs would take 
the view that that’s dreadful, that social work is not there to tell me what to do. I 
don’t have that attitude. X knows a great deal more about what’s going on out there 
than I do. He knows more about these courses and about accommodation and what 
we can achieve for somebody than I do. So I have no hesitation in asking him to 
come in and say ‘well, what do you think? What will we do?’ (Sheriff#3) 
 
The value of SWs’ work may recognised in general, but there are still differences 
in the way that Sheriffs work with them. The tension that (Sheriff#3) described 
seems to be grounded in the ‘ownership of sentencing’ that Judges zealously 
protect (Tata, et al., 2008). The suspicion may be that SWs’ sentencing 
suggestions are trying to shape the exercise of Sheriffs’ discretion or, 
furthermore, that SWs claim to ‘know better’ than the Judges what should be 
done. The issue seems to emerge from the need to make a distinction between 
SWs providing a Sheriff with information that will help them to decide what is 
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best and the expectation that Sheriffs must follow what is suggested by SWs 
because it is the right thing to do. This distinction seems to be crystal-clear in 
theory but rather blurry in practice. This tension can be perceived in the 
response that (Sheriff#5) provide on this topic:  
 
‘… occasionally I’ll pick up the phone and speak to the SW. If there’s something in 
the report that I’m not clear about or for example I might have it in mind to make 
some sort of community-based order but I’m not sure whether the individual will 
cope with it or I’m concerned that I might be setting up to fail then I might pick up 
the phone and just have a word with the SW and discuss it. So I don’t do that a lot, 
and very often I will pick up the phone, they know me and we see each other quite 
frequently in court or at a review hearing (…) I may also say that I don’t always do 
this but if what the SW tells me affects my thinking about the case then I’ll tell the 
defence and I’ll say to them in court ‘I should let you know that I’ve spoken to the 
SW about this’ and I’ll tell them what’s been discussed so there’s no suggestion that 
there’s been some kind of collusion between me and the SW about sentencing’ 
(Sheriff#5) 
 
(Sheriff#5) is still wary that a more collaborative approach with SW may 
jeopardise their judicial independence. In any case, these examples seem to 
suggest that the relationship between Sheriffs and SWs is evolving, but there are 
still tensions. (Sheriff#16) was an extreme example of these tensions, s/he even 
questioned the usefulness of the reports for their decision-making. 
 
‘if I need a report then I’ll read the report. But generally I only get a report because 
I need a report to allow me to do what I‘ve probably decided subject to any 
submissions that are made that I’m going to do anyway. For example if I have a 
serious assault charge before me and the person has either never been in custody 
before, or has never offended before (...) You cannot sentence somebody to custody 
without a report, if they haven’t been in custody before or if they’re under twenty 
one, or quite often if it’s been a long, long time since they’ve been in custody you 
would say ‘okay, I’ll get a report.’ (…) If I’m being honest there’s nothing very much 
in them, most of it is a load of rubbish. But I need to get one. I find their structure 
awful, they’re repetitive, the grammar is appalling, the spelling quite often is not 
very good. They work to a template so they just say the same things over and over 
again.’ (Sheriff#16) 
 
Therefore, the ‘professional’ and ‘personal’ relationships between the Sheriffs 
and the legal agents that provide them with information are a key aspect to 
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explore in order to understand how the Judges weigh the relevance of such 
information. And it would be fair to say that they are respected, but individually 
it is a kind of respect that has to be earned, and it is not automatically given. As 
a Sheriff explained:   
 
‘I have a court SW who I have enormous faith in, s/he’s so experienced, so sensible, 
so willing, so committed. I also have participated in training days with social work. 
We now have new people coming in so I can’t say I know them, but I have 
historically met most of them. I also read an awful lot of reports so I get a feel. We 
have a lot of young ones just now. I would place less reliance on what they’re saying 
or recommending, but that’s rare. Experience comes quickly to them because 
they’re very, very busy.’ (Sheriff#7) 
 
Moreover, (Sheriff#8) explained that the relationship with the court staff and 
the legal agents ‘depends on your personality,’ hence you would expect that 
every Sheriff had, to an extent, a different approach. However, because of the 
hierarchy and structures of the courts, it seems also to depend on how the 
individual Sheriff understands their role as a Judge. This involves understanding 
the role not only regarding sentencing but also concerning the management of 
the Sheriff Court. (Sheriff#8) had his/her own views on this:  
 
 ‘I think it’s important that we’re all seen as part of the constitution of the court. 
We’re all part of it, not just the Sheriff; the Sheriff is only one cog. It takes 
everyone to make it work. And if we all get on well together, great. We will 
disagree, and I will do things that they will not want me to do, but that’s life.’ 
(Sheriff#8) 
 
This quote does not state anything new, that the relationship between the SWs 
and Sheriffs, seems to be a by-product of personal and professional 
relationships. However, these quotes seem to suggest that the SWs have to prove 
themselves through the quality of their reports. This finding seems to mirror 
previous research in how both SWs and Sheriffs perceive each other, and thus 
the tensions that exist within their professional relationship (Halliday, et al., 
2009; Tata, et al., 2008; McNeill, et al., 2009). 
 
However, this begs the question of what makes the SWs credible? I would suggest 
that there are two areas where SWs have to prove themselves useful and 
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proficient. One of them, which my sample of Sheriffs valued positively, was 
related to their knowledge, not of the case or the offender, but of the social and 
penal welfare network available in the jurisdiction. Within this kind of lore, if 
the SWs prove their proficiency, the Sheriffs did not challenge them; they 
recognised their expertise. This is a less ‘controversial’ skill that the Sheriffs 
expect them to have, and which has a lot to do with the way that any 
community sentence is weaved in practice.  
 
The other aspect, which I think is the more critical one, is the set of suggestions 
that the SWs make at the end of the CJSW-Report.  The way that the reports are 
currently structured tries to avoid any mistrust of SWs suggestions by making 
them analyse the accused’s suitability for several disposals or CPO requirements, 
instead of offering only one-size-fits-all ‘advice’ on what should be done. This 
avoids the tensions we discussed above. However, by reading the suggestions, it 
is clear which of the requirements or disposals the SW may find more 
appropriate to the case. It is not straightforward, but it can easily be ‘read 
between the lines’. This particular aspect of the report seems to be critical in 
the judgments that the Sheriffs make about the SWs capacity to offer ‘realistic’ 
assessment of the cases. For example, (Sheriff#7) talked about ‘naïve SWs’, 
(Sheriff#10) talked about how ‘Social Workers are always optimistic’. These 
quotes suggest, a contrario sensu, that an ‘experienced’ SW should be able to 
provide ‘realistic’ suggestions. The problem is what does this ‘realism’ mean? 
 
If we deconstruct the reports, we find a lot of information about the offender’s 
life, their perception of the offence they committed, a risk assessment and an 
evaluation of their needs. However, the reports are not a ‘neutral’ collection of 
raw data; this information has been already processed beforehand by the SW.  
Hence, I would argue that, inevitably, the suggestions that the SW makes in the 
report are the consequence of the narrative that they create to contextualise 
the accused before the Judge. If we follow this argument, this means that the 
Sheriff may disagree with the narrative provided by the SW because it is too 
optimistic or does not reflect the seriousness of the offence or his criminal 
career. Moreover, as (Sheriff#10) explains: 
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 ‘my only comment is that they take comments from an accused at face value. They 
might say, for example, he looks after his grandmother who has dementia. Now, 
that may not be very true. It may be true that the grandmother has dementia, but it 
may not be true that he looks after her. So sometimes the accused, as I’m sure is 
true around the world, will say and seize any fact that might be sympathetic to 
them or might help them. And if they mention that to a SW and then it’s expanded 
on and it has a paragraph in a report then the defence lawyer will say ‘look at page 
four of the report, he looks after his grandmother.’ And before you know it a slight 
comment has become some fact that may or may not be true. And it maybe doesn’t 
match. So sometimes I think the reports can be unquestioning of the information, 
but I’ve found in my time here, I’ve been here two years, that the reports are more 
realistic.’(Sheriff#10) 
 
Therefore, even if the SWs are not ‘naive’, they could be misled if they are 
provided with false information. Thus, the Sheriffs expect that a ‘seasoned’ SW 
should be able to identify what is true or false, or at least, should be careful 
with which information is brought to the report and how it is conveyed in it. 
Conversely, these quotes imply that Sheriffs perceive young SWs as more prone 
to be gullible, and thus more easily deceived by the accused. Therefore, SWs 
must be able to prove to the Sheriffs that they can be ‘critical’, not easily 
misguided, with the information that they are provided.  
 
The other level of discrepancy is not about the SWs’ narratives, but rather about 
the suggestions they make. The Sheriffs use the reports, but they might use 
them to justify an entirely different decision to the one the SWs thought to be 
adequate for that accused. This is to say that the utilisation of the reports, 
sometimes, is less about Sheriffs not using them at all, and more about 
expectations of what should be done. This means that a Sheriff may agree with 
the narrative provided by the SWs, while at the same time taking the view that a 
different disposal is appropriate.  
 
Having said this, and as I am going to explore in more detail in the next section, 
even if the credibility of the SWs is challenged, the solicitors base their PiM 
largely on these reports. This means that the narratives, and also the 
suggestions, proposed by the SW, come into a dialogue with the Sheriffs and the 
solicitors during the sentencing diet. Hence, the more influential aspect of the 
report is the narrative content of it rather than the suggestions. Even if the 
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Sheriff does not agree with the narrative, they still have to deal with the report, 
mostly because the solicitors use it, and also because it may be used as an 
argument for an appeal. 
 
7.2.3. Solicitors and the Plea in Mitigation 
 
One of the most interesting aspects of the ‘plea in mitigation’ is the pervasive 
presence of the CJSWRs, at least in the Sum.P. As I mentioned before, when a 
case is deferred for the preparation of background reports, it is expected that 
both the Sheriffs and the solicitors read the CJSWR before the hearing. The SWs’ 
omnipresence is the consequence of solicitors grounding their pleas on the 
reports, and as authors, the SWs fix the debate over what is said, or not, in the 
report. Thus, this subverts the perception that the plea is a dialogue, of some 
sort, between the Sheriff and the Solicitor. Rather, it is a dialogue between the 
Sheriff, Solicitors and the SWs, even if the latter are usually only present in their 
reports. 
 
During my observations, I noticed that several solicitors read parts of the report 
to the Sheriffs during the plea. Since most if not all my participants read the 
reports before the hearing, or at least prepared for the RC in some way, it 
seemed natural to ask them if it was helpful for them that the solicitor read to 
them passages of reports. Sheriffs #15 offered a plausible explanation of the 
rationale behind this practice.  
 
 ‘…I suppose you’ve got to allow them to say something on behalf of their client. 
And if you cut them off and say ‘well, don’t address me on the report’ I think that 
would be too harsh and you would be subject to criticism. I think you’ve got to allow 
them to highlight certain parts of the report. In my experience they don’t read out 
the whole of the report, they maybe emphasise parts of it that are favourable to the 
accused. So I think that’s a natural and expected thing, and I think it’s quite 
appropriate for them to highlight things. They don’t repeat it verbatim, the whole 
of the report.’ (Sheriff#15) 
 
However, other Sheriffs were more critical of this practice. For example, 
(Sheriff#4), in a dismissive tone, said: ‘It’s a style of advocacy, isn’t it? It’s not 
particularly helpful. It can be if they want to highlight a particular piece of the 
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report but often it isn’t. Often it’s just repetitive.’ Moreover, Sheriffs #3 and 
#13 offered a yet harsher criticism: 
 
‘I hate that. I’ll say to them ‘I’ve read that.’ If they start to do that I’ll say to the 
agent ‘I’ve read the report, I don’t need you to read it to me again. Just go to the 
points that you want to make.’ And they tend to do that here. You’ll find today 
there will be very, very few long pleas. They’ll get to the point quite quickly.’ 
(Sheriff#3) 
 
‘Well, not reading the report is an important thing. If they just read the report I 
think that they’ve not actually done their job properly. Their job is to tell me 
beyond what is on the report why it is that a particular type of sentence would be 
appropriate.’ (Sheriff#13) 
 
Nevertheless, part of this criticism only makes sense on the assumption that the 
Sheriffs have read the report and paid attention to the same aspects that the 
solicitor wants to stress. However, as I explained before, I was able to observe a 
few situations where the Sheriffs were not able to read the papers beforehand. 
In other cases, I was able to witness how some Sheriffs had an in-depth 
knowledge of the background of an individual offender or case beyond those that 
a report could provide. Taking these considerations into account, (Sheriff#5) 
offered a very interesting response. This particular Judge was one of the Sheriffs 
who knew the background of some offenders very well, and still, he said: 
 
‘I think they know what I’m looking for. They know that I’ve read the report, and if I 
haven’t, sometimes I don’t have the opportunity to read the report, I might get it 
late. Usually I read them at home the evening before but sometimes I might have an 
engagement that would stop me doing the work at night, so I’ll tell them, I’ll say 
‘I’ve only had a brief read at this’ so I’ll ask them to draw my attention to any 
particular points that they think are important (…) They usually check with me, 
they’ll say something like ‘I take it that Your Lord/Ladyship has had an opportunity 
of reading the report’ and then they’ll pick highlights, like ‘I draw your attention to 
the comment at page six that explains that he recently lost his mother and it’s 
affected his mental health.’ So they will do that but they don’t laboriously go 
through the report, and if they did I would stop them.’ (Sheriff#5) 
 
These quotes made me think that if I were in the solicitor's shoes, I would have 
no chance of predicting whether the Sheriff was able to read and study the 
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reports thoroughly before going to the RC. I also came to understand, with the 
explanations provided by these Sheriffs, that from a practitioner point of view, 
the reports allowed the solicitors to offers mitigatory narratives without needing 
to prove them. In other words, by using the reports to ground their pleas, they 
were avoiding the Sheriff rejecting the plea on the ground of it being a 
mitigatory account without any basis or proof. However, all these accounts seem 
to suggest that Sheriffs expect, or need, ‘something’ beyond a mitigatory 
narrative based on what the reports say. 
 
‘…a good solicitor is one who has taken the time, care, and trouble, not only to read 
the report but then to analyse that in terms of the expected factors which are likely 
to influence this particular judge in this particular case […] The worst type is not 
the person who is just ignorant and says ‘it says this on page three, says this on page 
four, and here’s the rubbish explanation.’ The worst type of pleader is the one who 
spends a lot of time and effort advancing a completely unstateable proposition. A 
good example of this was last week, a man up on Section 38, so a breach of the 
peace, involving his partner and a hammer. And for some reason, it’s beyond me, I 
don’t know why, a Summary Sheriff had heard the plea and had deferred sentence 
for good behaviour. For a hammer. And they had a record as well. And so when they 
appeared before me, what I’d been urged to do was admonish the person. And that 
was a completely unstateable plea, because there’s no way that anyone is going to 
admonish a man who is charge with waving a hammer in the face of his partner, 
and, oh, he’s got a record’ (Sheriff#6) 
 
This narrative of the ‘good’ and the ‘bad’ solicitor; of the good, the mediocre 
and the worst type of ‘pleader’ not only reflects the Sheriffs’ perceptions of 
solicitors, but it also reveals their sentencing practices. The main point here is 
the value of what the pleader does; the fact that the evaluation of the solicitor's 
performance is measured by its usefulness for the sentencer. It is not that the 
solicitor's role binds the Sheriffs nor that Judges are unable to sentence if a ‘bad 
quality’ plea was submitted but rather that they acknowledge that a good 
solicitor can improve their sentencing decision-making. 
 
Before becoming a Judge, (Sheriff#6) had been a solicitor and then went to the 
Bar, becoming an advocate, hence this Sheriff had experience in courts at all 
levels. During my shadowing, I perceived that this particular professional 
background made this Judge very critical of the solicitors' performances in court, 
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which provided an insight into the role of solicitors in sentencing. Hence, for 
(Sheriff#6), a good submission: 
 
‘… will be something like ‘of course we recognise the seriousness of that, he has 
given this explanation. Now, Your Lord/Ladyship may well regard that explanation 
with some scepticism and I can well understand that, and I can well understand Your 
Lord/Ladyship being of the view that possession of weapons in public is a very 
serious matter, and I’ve advised my client that [a] custodial sentence is quite 
likely.’ And so you’ve shown just by opening up in that way that you are on the 
same planet as the sentencer. You’re saying in more or less clear terms ‘I am 
working with you on the sentencing process and I’m not going to waste your time, I 
know your starting point because I know the law, I know sentencing patterns, and I 
know you. So I’m not going to waste your time but what I’m going to say from here 
on is going to be of benefit to you so listen up, My Lord/Lady.’ (…) And then what a 
good solicitor will then, after having introduced that, start to tell you all the 
reasons why it is that whilst you couldn’t be criticised for sending this man to the 
jail there is an alternative and you need to consider the alternative as a matter of 
fairness and as a matter of law. ‘He’s done this, he’s done that, look at the work. 
Six months ago you would never have got him anywhere near an employment 
agency. We can tell that because if you look at the old reports, this is what it says. 
There’s been a turnaround. That’s been one important factor. There’s another 
important factor here, his children. He’s now got another child and he’s engaged in 
a relationship. I can tell you, I have met the partner and I met the partner on the 
second occasion I engaged my client in relation to this hearing.’ And all that tells 
me, A, he knows his client, B, he knows the case, C, he’s being careful about it. And 
so the reaction of the sentencer is he has taken time, care, and trouble to produce 
this submission unconsciously or otherwise one thinks ‘I’m going to pay even more 
attention than I might normally to the particular sentence that I want to impose’ 
(Sheriff#6) 
 
The questions of solicitors’ performance allow us to explore what Sheriffs expect 
from PiMs. Interestingly enough, the theme of ‘realism’ appears indirectly here. 
The notion that the Solicitor must recognise the seriousness of their client's 
situation rather than tone it down. This implies that solicitors cannot be the 
mouthpiece of the client; that the client's views on their cases cannot replace 
the solicitors' professional opinion. Furthermore, it suggests that the key to 
persuading a Sheriff does not lie in a plea in mitigation that aims to offer a 
mellowed narrative of the offence but rather in one that recognises its 
seriousness but provides a plausible alternative to imprisonment. 
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Furthermore, in (Sheriff#6)'s account the realist approach by the solicitor seems 
to establish a minimum ground of trust; by not toning down the offence, the 
solicitor is presenting him/herself as a valid interlocutor, not one who would try 
to fool the Judge. Hence, ‘good solicitors’ should be able to recognise this 
requirement and adapt their performances, both in terms of formal style and 
content, to convey this and overall, to prove themselves worthy of contributing 
to the Sheriff’s sentencing process.  
 
While (Sheriff 6)’s quote above is ostensibly about the ideal ‘Plea in Mitigation’, 
it also implies that the relationship between the Sheriff and solicitors is a long-
term one. This suggests that the trust relationship between Sheriffs and those 
solicitors that appear before them has to be developed over time and is not 
reduced to how they perform in one case. In other words, the solicitor who can 
consistently prove himself to offer a realistic assessment of his cases, through a 
process of building up legal capital, will be the one that will be trusted, and 
therefore, listened to. 
 
More to the point, the content of the plea seems to be more important than the 
style. According to (Sheriff#6) ‘good’ Solicitors must prove they know their 
client. Does this suggest that they have to provide a narrative that goes beyond 
the report? Not necessarily, it means that, at the very least, they have to offer a 
narrative articulated enough to demonstrate proper knowledge of the accused 
and the causes of their offences. This raised an issue that was not part of my 
research but clearly had a huge impact on what I was analysing: the capacity of 
PFs and Solicitors to have enough time to prepare themselves for the Sum.P. 
From my observations, it was clear that both of them prepared thoroughly for 
Sol.P cases but struggled with Sum.P. In the particular situation of solicitors, this 
idea of a ‘good solicitor’ is hindered by the cuts to Legal Aid, which indirectly 
put more pressure on the Judge's workload: 
 
‘I thought the lawyers would always tell you what the law is and you then just 
decided. It’s not like that, there are a lot of cases where you have to go away and 
look up the law. And that’s got more as time has gone on because there’s cutbacks 
in legal aid and lawyers can’t afford to employ assistants anymore. So there’s less 
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preparation going on in a lot of the cases that we get which means it’s on to the 
judge to do a lot more preparation and research work himself or herself.’ (Sheriff#4) 
 
‘Legal Aid is a huge difficulty and there is a huge bureaucracy of Legal Aid (…) It’s 
not enough for the lawyer to say ‘I now have Legal Aid’ that doesn’t allow them to 
do everything that they need to do, to get a medical report, to get other reports to 
carry out certain enquiries and I think that that is underestimated. And I think many 
Sheriffs may not realise that if they’ve not done that work themselves, because they 
think that the reason for a case to go off, to be delayed, is simply for not a very 
valid reason, or because a lawyer has not filled in a form. But Legal Aid, I think a lot 
of the work there is carried out in offices and behind the scenes. I know that 
because I did that kind of work myself, I don’t think that’s obvious and I think 
solicitors do a very good job of hiding that’ (Sheriff#10) 
 
As (Sheriff#10) noted, not all Sheriffs will be able to understand what lies behind 
the scenes of solicitors’ performances, either because they never were one or 
because they may be out of touch with what practice entails now. During my 
observation of the PiM, I perceived that these differences in judicial attitudes 
towards solicitors had a noticeable impact on the dialogical dynamics of the 
hearings. While all Sheriffs listened to the pleas attentively, the Judges that 
were less critical, or more empathic, with solicitor’s practices were more prone 
to engage in a constructive dialogue of sorts. In contrast, the Sheriffs that during 
the interviews were revealed to have a more critical opinion of solicitors seemed 
to participate less in a dialogical exchange, but instead limited themselves to 
listening to what was said, and asking questions to clarify the solicitor's 
submission.  
 
Overall, regardless of the attitudes towards solicitors and to what extent the PiM 
influenced the final decisions, my perception was that the Sheriffs' sentencing 
decision was never ‘set in stone’ before the hearing. Even in the cases where 
the solicitor's submissions seemed to fail to persuade the Sheriffs, the Sheriffs 
always seemed to use these submissions to tweak their decisions. It also seemed 
to me that Sheriffs used the PiM to weigh up the chance of the solicitor 
appealing their decision. In other words, even if the Sheriff was not persuaded, 
they still needed to use the submission to tailor their decision in a way that 
would reduce the chances of appeal.  
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What, then, does the ‘process of persuasion’ entail? (Sheriff#6) again offered me 
an insight into how s/he perceived that aspect of practice. 
 
 ‘Mr X has made some superb submissions to me where I have gone into court and 
I’ve made my notes down here and I’m just going ‘two years, two and a half years.’ 
And I’ve come out and I haven’t sent him to the jail because I’ve been persuaded by 
the submission that there is actually an alternative and he’s drawn my attention to 
things which although obviously I knew them, he’s put them in a different light, he’s 
woven together the different factors so as to lead to a different conclusion. In other 
words, the solicitor who has taken the time, care, and trouble, and who has the 
ability to improve their court-craft, and to put their court-craft at the disposal of 
their client is likely on the whole to get a better result than anyone else […] They 
are not wasting your time but they are saying ‘there are more ways than one to look 
at this, and we’d like you to look at it this way.’ So it is the process of persuasion, 
and that’s ultimately what a pleader is trying to do, trying to persuade you, lead 
you to a particular end. Not many people can do that very well (…) So many 
decisions are just quite obvious. But there’s that grey area in the middle, especially 
where there are complex facts to do with the case or to do with the person, or 
both, where you’ve then got material to play with and there is room for different 
competing views as to the right way forwards.’ (Sheriff#6) 
 
This notion of convincing a Sheriff that there is a credible and realistic 
alternative way to deal with the case seems to be at odds with the idea of cases 
where there is ‘no alternative’ to imprisonment. While it is true that the 
seriousness of the offence may lead a Sheriff to believe that there is no other 
option than imprisonment, as (Sheriff#6) tells us, a ‘good’ solicitor can offer a 
Sheriff an alternative narrative of the offence or the offender that may highlight 
a different way to deal with the case. 
 
Furthermore, to what extent is the Sheriff's perception of having no other 
alternative the by-product of the failure of the solicitor (or the SWs) to persuade 
them of the appropriateness of other options? The case narrated by (Sheriff#6) is 
an example of this: if the solicitor had failed to convince the Sheriff of his 
interpretation, the Sheriff would have imposed a prison sentence under the 
assumption that there was no alternative. Hence, the notions of ‘no 
alternatives’ and ‘grey areas’ may work both as ex-ante and ex-post assessments 
of what was done in a case. 
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As explored above, Sheriffs prepare the cases by drafting a possible decision 
before coming to the court. This means that ex-ante they try to narrow the 
options they may have. However, these notions of ‘no alternative’ or ‘grey 
areas’ also work ex-post. If a Solicitor persuades a Sheriff in the opposite 
direction to the one drafted, the Judge may reassess the case and use the 
category of ‘grey cases’ to describe it, even if initially the Sheriff believed that 
there was no alternative to prison. The opposite is also true, the failure of the 
Solicitor to offer a credible and realistic option may work as a self-fulfilling 
prophecy, reaffirming the notion of lack of options, even if the Sheriff had 
doubts before coming to the court. 
 
7.3. Outlining a sentencing practice  
 
In this chapter, through the exploration of the different sources of information 
provided to the Sheriffs, I have been able to offer a grounded glimpse of the 
sentencing process. Instead of attempting to reconstruct the mind of the 
Sheriffs, I focused on the mundane and bureaucratic stages with which they have 
to deal, the information they gather from those stages and the way they interact 
with the individuals who provide that information. In that way, I am not only 
describing the structural and visible part of the sentencing process but also 
highlighting the collective dimension of this process. Despite the fact that the 
Sheriffs is the one who has to decide, the complex interactions with the other 
penal agents offers a gaze of sentencing and the practices that form it as a 
collective and dialectical meaning-making of a narrative of the offence and the 
offender. As I am going to explore in the next chapter, these narratives need to 
be grounded and ultimately lead the Sheriff to pick only one among the different 
disposals available to them. 
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CHAPTER 8: Sentencing: Scripts and Sanctions 
 
In the previous chapters, I explored the place and temporality of judicial 
practice. I also examined the way that the Sheriffs prepare for the RC and how 
the information provided to them by the legal agents influences or shapes their 
decision-making process. In this chapter, I try to make sense of how the Judges 
explain the use of particular disposals for specific cases; how they translate the 
information they receive into narratives of the offence and the offender; and 
how these narratives prompt the use of disposals to pursue specific aims. 
 
One aspect that appeared in the previous chapters, and is going to be further 
developed here, is the fact that there is no one-size-fits-all disposal for all 
cases. However, it is suggested that there are ‘default’ disposals for some 
groups of offences or specific categories of offenders. That is to say, specific 
pre-established categories help Sheriffs to make their decision with ease.  
This offers an explanation as to how the Sheriffs, provided only with a charge or 
a group of charges, can determine some ‘default’ sanctions. However, from the 
data collected during my shadowing, I noticed that these only work as an 
operational starting point for the decision-making process or, if you prefer, as 
part of an ongoing dialectical process. The Judges, regardless of their sometimes 
critical perspectives on SWs and Solicitors, were willing to be persuaded if the 
arguments were compelling.  
 
As discussed in chapter five, the data provided to me by the Scottish 
Government Statistics Unit show that between 2007-2008 to 2016-2017 on 
average the proportion of sentences by type at the Sheriff court were: 20% 
Custodial Sentences; 25% Community sentences; 36% financial penalties; 18% 
admonitions and 1% of other sanctions. Thus, in this chapter, I am going to focus 
on these four different types of sanctions which together account for 99% of all 
the disposals that are imposed each year. Thus, in section one I am going to 
explore the use of the custodial sentence. Then, in section two, I am going to 
examine the use of the non-custodial sentences. First, I explore the use of CPOs; 
then I explore the CPOs Reviews briefly. Finally, I examine the use of fines and 
admonitions. 
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8.1. Custodial Sentences 
 
The first thing I noted while discussing this topic with the Sheriffs was their use 
of language. Sometimes Sheriffs said that there ‘was no alternative to the 
imposition of a custodial sentence’ (Sheriff#9); that sometimes there were 
situations ‘where you just have to impose a short custodial sentence’ 
(Sheriff#1); or that there will be offenders ‘and offences which merit nothing 
other than a custodial sentence’ (Sheriff#3). Thus, the rhetoric of the Sheriff 
while talking about custodial sentences was both conveying the notion of a ‘last 
resort’ but, as if this were inevitable, echoing the legal test contained in section 
204 of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 which states that no custodial 
sentence should be imposed unless the ‘court considers there is no other method 
of dealing’ with an individual. When I inquired about this particular use of 
language a Sheriff told me: 
 
 ‘I suppose there are situations where you feel compelled to, in that you feel there 
is no other proper choice. But in the summary court, and the Sheriff Court, there 
would always be another option, but it might be an option which… I can’t think of a 
situation where you would be compelled to but I think what you would often express 
is a feeling that you have no other proper option or you would fail in your duty if 
you didn’t.’ (Sheriff#2) 
 
This quote seems to hint that the rationale behind the imposition of custodial 
sentences goes beyond the scholarly debate on sentencing purposes, or at least 
that there is a more complex rationale than that. This is to say, that beyond the 
goals pursued by imposing any disposals this quote seems to reveal an underlying 
discourse of a judicial ‘duty’, a role of the Sheriff as a sentencer. Thus, to 
understand the use of any disposals in practice, there is a need to understand 
how Sheriffs articulate their role and try to fulfil their self-perceived duty 
through sentencing purposes. I will return to this issue in the following chapter. 
Having said this, we must consider in which cases a custodial sentence is 
appropriate. 
 
‘To me custody is more likely where the record tells you that custody is the only 
option because a person has simply not taken up the other opportunities, or if 
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there’s been extreme violence, for example with a weapon, or extreme violence 
that’s involved kicking to the head’ (Sheriff#10) 
 
Concerning the first set of cases, a more nuanced and complex scenario was 
found. It is not just about recidivism, but instead, failing to comply with the 
conditions of a CPO, and thus with being labelled as a non-complier. The second 
group of cases seem to be very straightforward, violent offences. I am going to 
explore each of them briefly. 
 
8.1.1. Regarding violent offences 
 
When I talked with my participants which kind of offences were very likely lead 
to a custodial sentence, the common response was ‘violent offences’. At first 
glance, it seems like an unproblematic criterion. However, then one wonders 
how violent can the offences prosecuted under Sum.P be? During my fieldwork, 
almost every Sheriff used a paradigmatic example to illustrate the kind of 
violence they have to deal with; an assault that involved the accused kicking the 
head of the victim.  
 
I was able to corroborate the pervasive nature of this offence because I was able 
to hear several complaints where the facts were, substantially, the same in 
almost every court I visited. Also, at least once, I could watch the dynamics of 
one of these assaults through CCTV footage that was exhibited during a hearing. 
Having said that, most of these offences started with a fist fight or a scuffle, 
between victim and offender, and finished with the victim falling to the ground. 
In that moment, the offender takes advantage of the defenceless victim, and 
kicks them in the head.   
 
Most of the Sheriffs were not comfortable knowing that these kinds of cases 
were being brought to Sum.P. by the PF’s office. I arrived at the view that at 
least part of this reaction was related to the fact that during their experience as 
Lawyers and part of their career as Sheriffs these kinds of cases were never 
brought to the Sheriff Court under Sum.P. Let us recall that - as discussed on 
chapter five - on the 10th of December of 2007 the maximum length of custodial 
sentences that a Sheriff could impose at Sum.P was raised from, three and six 
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months to twelve months. This change may have had two relevant impacts on 
the use of custodial sentences at the Sheriff Court. This change is relevant 
because it allowed the PF's office to bring more serious complaints to the Sum.P. 
On one hand, this subverted the legal habitus because it changed the ‘rules of 
the game’. In other words, this change altered the core practices to which the 
agents’ legal habitus were synced, thus requiring them to adapt to ‘new rules’. 
  
‘I remember as a solicitor we had a kind of working rule that said if you kick to the 
face its jail. That was the kind of working assumption. Or if a person uses a weapon 
then it’s jail. I’m quite surprised at the kicking to the head that it’s not solemn, it is 
summary (…) And I think those who have ever seen that on a town centre CCTV can 
be quite shocked when they see stamping or kicking in the head, and how casual it 
can be, like kicking a football almost, or stamping as if they’re trying to burst a 
balloon. It’s horrible to see.’ (Sheriff#10) 
 
‘I think there are cases which appear in the summary courts here which should not 
be appearing in the summary courts, they should be on indictment (…) I think there 
are some quite bad assaults that end up in summary complaints. I’ve got a case in X 
next week that I’ve got to sentence on which is the old Scottish crime of 
hamesucken17 (…) And this one that I’m dealing with is on a summary complaint, so 
the maximum sentence that I can impose is twelve months. And personally I’m of 
the view that it’s worth more than twelve months but my hands are tied because 
The Crown has put them on a summary complaint’ (Sheriff#16) 
 
These quotes above illustrates – indirectly - how the field has changed and thus 
by bringing more violent cases to the Sheriff Court, how the new offences have 
to be dealt with under Summary Complaint. It worth noting that if a Sheriff at 
Sol.P. thinks that their sentencing powers are inadequate given the 
circumstances of the case, s/he can remit the case to the HC so sentencing 
could be deal appropriately with broader sentencing powers18. However, Sheriffs 
cannot remit cases at Sum.P. which further explains (Sheriff#16)’s frustration.  
The indirect consequence of this is that, if you increase sentencing powers and 
bring more serious offences, the previous framework used to determine the 
seriousness of the offences is subverted. This means that the old ‘players’ have 
                                         
17 As explained to me by Sherif#16, it is an old Scots law offence which consists in breaking into 
the victim's house and assault him or her there. 
18 Section 195 of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 
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to try to create a new framework to judge the seriousness of the offences. Of 
course, this requires Sheriffs to tweak their legal habitus - which is now out of 
sync - until they find a satisfactory way to adapt their practices accordingly with 
the new strategies that the new ‘rules’ allow.  
 
Another issue of sentencing violent offences at SumP. is that even if you have 
adapted your practice to the fact that this kind of assault is brought under 
Sum.P., sentencing still requires a nuanced analysis of the circumstances of the 
case. This is particularly important because within a penal system, the 
seriousness of one offence is always determined with reference to the rest of 
the offences that are dealt with at the same level. (Sheriff#9) offered an 
interesting analysis of the ambiguity of these kind of offences.   
 
‘You see, that’s a consequence which may not be at all related to the gravity of the 
actual assault. I have known people, let’s take kicking to the head, to be kicked in 
the head and get up and walk away from it (...) On the other hand there was 
another occasion when I was a prosecutor and I was called out to a murder, it was 
being treated as a murder, eventually pled guilty to culpable homicide. Two 
brothers fell out and they’re both standing up, squaring up to each other, one of 
them kicks the other in the head and killed him with one kick because it tore an 
artery. So the consequence isn’t necessarily related to the extent of the violence, 
they both have to come into the calculation, they both have to be thought 
about.’(Sheriff#9) 
 
This quote reveals something interesting, once you adapt yourself to these new 
serious offences, you will still need to take into account the different ways that 
violence, and its consequences, can take form. However, if a custodial sentence 
is imposed on the basis that it was a serious offence, what is the sentencing 
purpose in such cases? How is the notion of ‘serious offences’ translated or 
operationalised in judicial practice?  For example, while talking about cusp 
cases, (Sheriff#12) offers an interesting insight: 
 
‘I think there are certain offences on summary complaint, because solemn stuff 
because it’s more serious you’re always likely to be imposing custody, it’s always a 
realistic option. But I think in the summary cases, and I often say this, if you look at 
the offence and you think ‘no, you can’t do that.’ I think if you pass that test, (…) 
what’s in mind is that behaviour shouldn’t be tolerated, and that behaviour should 
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be deterred. And I think people are influenced…. Let’s not get too carried away with 
our importance, but I think there is a degree that the word gets round. I know they 
say custody isn’t a deterrent, and I can understand where they’re coming from 
there, but if you ask anyone who comes into a criminal court and has been convicted 
of an offence what is the disposal they don’t want, 99% of the time, and that’s their 
liberty taken away. So to that end it has to be a deterrent. For these things I just 
think sometimes you’ve got to make the point’.(Sheriff#12) 
 
This notion of behaviours that should not be tolerated resonates as well in the 
following quote where I discussed with (Sheriff#1) a Sol.P case and his/her 
decision to impose a custodial sentence in that case. 
 
‘So this shopkeeper was shielding his young boy behind him while this man was like 
this with a knife over him. And it was just awful. And it fell away to trial and when 
he was convicted I sentenced him to five years imprisonment because he had a very 
bad record. But also that kind of case you would be sending somebody to prison. So 
violence like that, you’re conveying that that sort of violence is totally 
unacceptable in our society. People are entitled to get on with their work, go to 
work, without fearing that somebody is going to come in with a knife and assault 
them. So that is a clear message to society and to the accused that this behaviour 
will not be tolerated.’(Sheriff#1) 
 
Therefore, violence is not a criterion for seriousness because of its nature but 
instead because it is deemed as the paradigm of the kind of behaviours that 
cannot be tolerated. As a consequence of this, the seriousness of the offence is 
being treated as coterminous with intolerability. This is relevant because of the 
implicit assumption that passing something other than a custodial sentence 
implies tolerance of rather than punishment of the offence. 
 
8.1.2. Recidivism and Non-Compliers 
 
In this section, I am going to explore why the Sheriffs may impose a custodial 
sentence for offences that not seems to be serious, accordingly to what was 
discussed above. For instance, consider this quote: 
 
‘…another reason why you will impose custody is that the record of an accused, 
leave aside the offence, gives a pretty good indication that they will not comply 
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with a Community Payback Order. The record and maybe the content of the criminal 
justice social work report. Now, in those circumstances, if I think from the 
combination of the record and the criminal justice social work report someone is 
most unlikely to perform a Community Payback Order I’m not going to waste my 
time in imposing a CPO (…) You’re far better for everyone to say ‘no, this offence 
merits custody because of a combination of the circumstances, of the offence, your 
personal circumstances, and your inability to perform any community-based 
disposal’ (Sheriff#12)  
 
The boundaries of these groups of cases are hard to set. It is not solely about 
recidivism nor having old or recent criminal records. It seems to depend on how 
the narrative surrounding the offender and the nature of their offending 
behaviour is constructed. This seems to match Tombs and Jagger’s (2006) 
conclusions that Sheriffs categorise offenders as ‘redeemable’ or 
‘irredeemable’. However, while this notion appears to explain some cases, it 
seems too simplistic to capture all the nuances that I was able to observe.  
 
As I argued above, the ‘starting point’ in deciding a sentence for a serious 
offence, for example, an assault, will always be a custodial sentence.  
Nevertheless, after assessing the seriousness of the offence, I observed that 
Sheriffs move to a new ‘stage’ during the sentencing process and begins to 
consider the individual and particular circumstances surrounding the offence and 
the offender. As discussed in the last chapter we know that during this process 
sometimes a beneficial report and a good PiM may persuade the Sheriff that a 
different sanction could be more advisable in individual cases. However, that 
fact will not change that the ‘default’ option for those offences is custody. 
Conversely, offences that do not fall into the category of ‘most serious’ offences 
have a different starting point. Therefore, again the Sheriffs will have to sort 
out a hierarchy of offences. If the default for serious offences is custody, then 
for others it will be a CPO, a fine or an admonition. 
 
‘… [often]  you look at the case and it’s quite obvious what should happen, this 
person must go to jail, it’s obvious. It’s an attempted rape, fine, five years. There’s 
no alternative to that. A person on their third offence of carrying a knife in public, 
they have to go to the jail. On the other extreme, somebody who is a first offender 
and he’s accused of using a bad word in a street. You’re either going to admonish 
him or fine him a small amount. So many decisions are just quite obvious. But 
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there’s that grey area in the middle, especially where there are complex facts to do 
with the case or to do with the person, or both’. (Sheriff#6) 
 
Therefore, when dealing with less serious offences, the Sheriffs have to ask 
themselves how to deal with this particular offender signifying a shift from the 
perceived seriousness of the offence to an inquiry about the nature of the 
offender. As a result; recidivism, past criminal records and breach of previous 
community sentences become negative signs, which may support a negative 
narrative about the offender’s behaviour. It is worth noting that, because less 
serious offences are brought under Sum.P, this means that if a custodial 
sentence is passed it will be short, which further constrains the use of these 
disposals. 
 
In light of this, these negative indicators alone do not mean that a short 
custodial sentence is inevitable. Rather, they require a broader 
contextualization of the offender and their offending behaviour; a narrative, as I 
have suggested. Drug Testing Treatment Orders (DTTOs) offer an excellent 
example of this ambiguity because they are imposed on individuals who have 
long criminal records and/or a history of failure to comply. The noted difference 
is the cause of their behaviour which is identified in the narrative; a drug 
addiction.  These behaviours are often conceptualised as a mediating factor 
between the offence and the offender; thus the culpability of the offender for 
their offences is reduced.  
 
However, this does not excuse the offenders if they fail to comply with the 
DTTO. This introduces a tension in the reviews of the DTTOs because Sheriffs are 
told that setbacks are part of the recovery process, which subverts the 
traditional logic that failing to comply should be ‘punished’. Nevertheless, the 
question for the Sheriff then becomes, how many opportunities can be given to 
an individual? This is particularly critical because as (Sheriff#10) explains below, 
DTTOS are ‘expensive’ and thus if someone is not performing well they are 
taking away resources from others who might comply better. 
 
‘Once a person is on a DTTO it takes quite a lot for that to be cancelled, actually. 
And that’s precisely because they often have a bad record, they have a record of 
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non-compliance, they have other problems, there are ongoing difficulties. This 
man’s record before the DTTO was imposed was he pled guilty to possession of 
drugs. This is his record, what we have here, breach of order, so he breached a 
previous restriction of liberty order, offending while on bail (…) Dishonesty offences 
to feed his drug habit, yeah. And that’s it. But the man has quite a bad drug use 
problem. And at the moment what I see is that the order is not stopping that. And 
that’s a problem for him and for everybody else because if resources are used to 
give him the order then they’re being taken away from someone else who might 
really want the help. If he’s not ready for it and is not interested in making it work, 
then…’ (Sheriff#10) 
 
While there is a recognition of drug related offending, this Sheriff appears to 
struggle with setbacks in recovery or treatment and what they may imply 
regarding the allocation of limited resources. Here we find a relevant rationale 
that may lead a Sheriff to revoke a DTTO: its expensive nature. This is to say, 
the lack of compliance in this context is less a problem of a contempt for justice 
-- because the criminal records and history of the individuals is widely known -- 
and more a problem of the proper allocation of public resources due to setbacks 
of the process. However, if the failure to comply cannot be explained by a 
mental health problem or drug or alcohol addiction, then these narratives make 
the offender entirely responsible for their acts.  
 
‘The repeat offenders who have had a chance on a Community Payback Order before 
and haven’t taken that chance and have continued to offend, they’re likely to face 
a custodial sentence. And there are fairly significant numbers of them, people who 
I’ve tried to keep within the community. Because there has to be a point at which 
there’s a recognition by them and by the public that enough’s enough. You’ve got to 
have an ultimate penalty otherwise it won’t work.’ (Sheriff#3) 
 
Within this quote, using Tombs category of ‘irredeemable’ offenders, the stress 
is not on the offences, which in these cases are not serious. Instead the 
offender’s behaviour is explained through a narrative that construes their 
actions as reflecting contempt for the court. This lack of compliance seems to 
be serious as the Sheriffs feels that it jeopardises the authority and credibility of 
the court. 
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‘Now, the great difficulties Sheriffs have, I think, are the cases where there is an 
opportunity for a community-based sentence but the accused person just does not 
take it. And that creates problems because eventually something has to be done. If 
the Sheriff says ‘okay then, away you go and don’t do it again’ then that brings the 
whole system into disrepute. Why should anybody follow a court order if there is no 
consequence? (...) Now, because of the nature of the thefts in this case, inevitably 
it would be quite a short custodial sentence, and that is the dilemma because many 
criminologists say short custodial sentences don’t work, they don’t rehabilitate. But 
sometimes community sentences don’t work and don’t rehabilitate either.’ 
(Sheriff#10) 
 
‘But there are other cases where sheer persistence of offending, sometimes I will 
just give up and say ‘you’ve exhausted every possible community disposal. You’ve 
left me with no option but to send you to jail.’ Because there comes a point at 
which the credibility of the court order is called into question. If I keep giving 
somebody one chance after another to complete their Community Payback Order or 
their unpaid work there’s a risk that they and others in court will think if you don’t 
do it nothing happens, you just get sent to do it again.’ (Sheriff#5) 
 
During my fieldwork, I realised that several variables were at play here; 
however, I want to mention two which seem the most relevant across my 
interviewees. First, the perception that long-term recidivism of petty offences 
can be as disturbing for the community as one serious offence. 
 
‘… In the grand scheme of things [Section 38 offences] it’s not that serious, but if 
you were on the receiving end it would be a most unpleasant experience. And you 
can’t have people going around doing that to folk who are just minding their own 
business or doing their own job. (…) [For example] shoplifters, folk with significant 
records who shoplift, of course it’s a nuisance, of course at times you have to take a 
line with them, but folk who are going to the likes of Marks or Tesco and steal £50 
of goods and are caught, even if they’ve got a significant record and may have 
served custodial sentences, likely to have served custodial sentences, if they accept 
responsibility I won’t take their liberty away initially. I’ll defer to try and…. If when 
they are apprehended and they turn round and are abusive to the store staff or are 
violent to the store staff, no, sorry, not interested. That’s a person just doing their 
job, you’re trying to intimidate them from doing their job. I’m not having that. And 
because they will have a significant record, no, I don’t need a background report, 
I’m putting you away for that. I’m not having it.’ (Sheriff#12) 
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Thus, even when dealing with petty offences, the Sheriffs may feel that they 
need to balance the needs of the victim or the community and the needs of the 
offender. The second rationale operating behind using (short) custodial 
sentences on these offenders appears to be related to the reputation of the 
court. Therefore, what is ‘serious’ is not the offence itself but what the 
offender's behaviour means, in the long-term, for the system. Which says that 
there is an equivalence between violent offences, as the paradigm of serious 
offences, and being perceived as an individual that deliberately disrespects the 
court’s authority’. However, despite the imposition of a custodial sentence, the 
fact that the offence is not serious restricts the maximum length of the 
sentence, producing the contradiction described by (Sheriff#10) above.  
 
Furthermore, some Sheriffs try to make sense of the use of short custodial 
sentences in these cases by stating that a particular sentencing purpose is 
satisfied in such case. For example, Sheriff#1 explained that imposing them on 
shoplifters, when everything else has failed, at least provides a temporarily 
relief to shopkeepers, and hence, explains this as some sort of incapacitation.  
 
‘Or there are definitely cases when you would feel a prison sentence is absolutely 
necessary to protect the community, always with the mind set in the summary 
context that it’s for a relatively short period of time. So you’re not protecting the 
community forever. But for that period of time at least you are. But it could just be 
that it’s not because you need to protect the community, it’s because you feel 
there is little other option which has any likelihood of being complied with or 
working, and the offence always has to be sufficiently serious to merit that.’ 
#Sheriff2 
 
Overall, the Sheriffs are aware that to resort to a short custodial sentence is an 
unsatisfactory solution. However, they seem to feel that they have no other 
option. From this perspective, there are several questions that emerge: How 
many opportunities is an offender given before resorting to imprisonment? Or 
how long should the sentence be?  
 
Regarding the first issue, I could not observe a common practice. Whether a 
further chance is given to a non-complier – a ‘breacher’ – clearly depended on 
the offender’s past criminal record and background. It was also affected by the 
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different ways the Sheriffs construed the offender. Therefore, similar offences 
may lead to different outcomes either because of the individual’s background or 
depending on how many opportunities a Sheriff considers the offender deserves. 
 
If they decide that a custodial offence should be imposed, then another issue 
emerges: determining the length of the sentence. Three factors seem influential 
at this stage: since we are talking of Sum.P cases, the Sheriffs could not impose 
a custodial sentence over twelve months or, for some offences, nine months. 
They also have to take into account the fact and timing of any guilty plea – as 
noted in chapter five, a guilty plea normally attracts a discounted sentence.19 
Finally, it is necessary to consider the mandatory early release from 
imprisonment when the offender has served half of their sentence.20 These three 
legal factors constrain the Sheriffs if they want to impose a custodial sentence. 
In this regard, the third factor is the more problematic one. Legally Sheriffs 
should not take into account mandatory early releases. However, inevitably 
Sheriffs knows that any length of custodial sentence will be cut by half. All my 
participants but one told me that they did not consider this while sentencing. 
Instead, (Sheriff#8) told me: 
 
‘Well, I don’t think you’re meant to take into account, but subconsciously you must 
take into account because you know that if you give someone four months they’ll be 
out in weeks.’(Sheriff#8) 
 
Overall, these variables and the presumption against short-custodial sentences, 
have to be taken into account whenever a Sheriff wants to impose a custodial 
sentence at the Sum.P. This is to say that if, for whatever reason, a Sheriff 
wishes to impose a custodial sentence, these variables halve the length of any 
sentence that they impose. Thus, directly or indirectly, they have to take into 
account how they affect the sentence. Otherwise, the purpose that they seek 
with that disposal is subverted in practice. 
 
                                         
19 S. 196 Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 
20 Part I of Prisoners and Criminal Proceedings (Scotland) Act 1993 
  173 
 
 
8.1.3. Sentencing offenders with multiple cases 
 
Another complex set of practices emerged when the Sheriff has to sentence one 
individual for several cases. For example, an individual is charged with a petty 
offence, like shoplifting, the accused appears in Court and pled guilty. Then 
s/he is ordained to appear to the court at subsequent hearings and the sentence 
is deferred for background reports. Before the next diet, the individual commits 
a new petty offence and is charged and, again, pleads guilty. This time the 
accused is bailed and the sentence is deferred for further reports. Now, it is 
very likely that the same SW has to prepare reports for both offences. Thus the 
two cases are dealt with together; this saves time and resources. The accused 
may, or may not, commit further offences during this time. The relevant point 
here is that by the time that the reports are prepared, and the sentencing diet is 
scheduled, the Sheriff has to sentence the offender on several cases, which may, 
in turn, contain several charges. 
 
‘... I would have imposed a custodial sentence for that. But I would have saved 
these other two cases for later to give me the opportunity of imposing a community-
based disposal on his exit from prison, which is what I’m going to do subject to 
anything I hear in court.’  (Sheriff#5) 
 
‘if there are a number of offences I say we’ll keep one open, you come back before 
your release or immediately after your release and we’ll see if we can put 
something in place. For a person with perhaps three or four charges and if he’s 
going into custody I would consider doing that, definitely.’  (Sheriff#10) 
 
These practices challenge the perception that there is a binary ‘Prison/No 
Prison’ rhetoric in the Sheriffs Courts. It also moves us away from a simplistic 
‘just deserts’ approach to sentencing. As I explored above, it seems that some 
Sheriffs feel that there are some cases that deserve no less than a custodial 
sentence. From some of these Sheriffs' perspective, they are both satisfying a 
punitive and deterrent role. But it seems that they also aim to provide 
rehabilitative support as well as and after custody. The Sheriffs who use 
supervision in this way explained that they are not using it for public protection, 
but instead are using it to provide post-imprisonment support. It is very 
important to note that, when the Sheriffs do this at Sum.P they are creating 
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some sort of ‘supervised release order’ which is not available for people serving 
short custodial sentences at the Sum.P.  
 
However, the same kind of practice could be understood and justified altogether 
differently by others Sheriffs. 
 
‘So what I ended up doing was balancing it all out. I gave him thirteen months, I 
think, and I kept one back so that when he comes out, I’ve deferred it for six 
months so if you take account of the backdating, six months should be about the 
time he comes out. So we can look at putting some kind of arrangements in place so 
that the citizens locally are protected from him and this gives him a chance not to 
offend. It’s just trying to be realistic about it.’ (Sheriff#11) 
 
(Sheriff#11)’s rationale is different. S/he putting the individual on supervision as 
a way to ensure some public protection. What is important to highlight here is 
how two different justifications nonetheless seem to converge in the same 
practice. Thus, it may be the case that for the individual on the receiving end of 
this practices the Sheriff's intention may be irrelevant.  
 
Also, these practices pose the question of what is their impact on those 
individuals who are targeted by them. One can argue that regardless of the 
intentions of the Sheriffs, these practices may lead to net-widening; a measure 
that is aimed at help or protection may be setting some individuals to fail. As 
McNeill (2018) has recently discussed, while some individuals may be able to use 
that support as intended, and manage to stop re-offending, others may not. As 
several Sheriffs explained to me, beyond dealing with new offences or breach of 
CPOs conditions, they have little information on how the sentences play out. 
This is a critical point because, beyond sentencing, it is the quality of the 
supervision and support provided by the SWs which plays an important role 
transforming the Sheriffs' intentions into a reality that can either support 
individuals or keep them under surveillance to prevent reoffending. That said, as 
I will discuss later in this chapter, the CPOs reviews are changing this aspect. 
 
What appears to operate here is the Sheriff's perception that imprisonment will 
not stop reoffending. It is a punishment, and it may satisfy retributive or 
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deterrent purposes, but it may indeed fail to help some offenders with ‘chaotic 
lives.’ Hence in cases when imprisonment is used to draw a line, to show the 
offender that there are consequences to their acts, the holding back of a case to 
allow the later imposition of a community sentence reflects that they recognise 
that what needs to be done is something else. 
 
While not all Sheriffs were working with this rationale, I noticed that most of 
them developed practices along these lines. In a sense, the rationale behind 
these approaches is a practical logic that does not easily fits the scholarly 
definitions of sentencing purposes. Thus, we can try to put a label on them such 
as ‘rehabilitation’ or ‘incapacitation measure’, but this seems unsatisfactory 
because we would be imposing our biases and subjectivities to what we have 
observed and thus ignoring that they may obey to a rationale of its own.  The 
other option is to accept that they contain a logic of practice which should be 
understood in its context, as being influenced by the scholarly sentencing 
purposes but never an application of them in a strict sense. Overall, the 
practical aim is clear: use the disposals to stop reoffending in one way or 
another. 
 
Moreover, another important issue that arises from these practices is that they 
affect the way that the Sheriffs construe the offender. If the same Sheriff piles 
up different complaints, it is very likely that the narrative of who the offender is 
and the nature of their offences is going to be the by-product of all their recent 
offences considered as one. This means that despite the fact that the Sheriff will 
have to decide every case, I was able to observe, at least once, that the Sheriff 
may be of the view that a holistic response is required. This means, for example, 
the imposition of a short-custodial sentence in one case, leaving two cases 
‘open’; one for imposing supervision after imprisonment, with another leading to 
admonition. 
  
In these cases, the short-custodial sentence is not imposed because that 
particular complaint was too serious, but rather because it was a reaction to the 
accused's offending spree. Now, it is clear to me that these approaches make 
sense within the framework that I have described. However, the problem is that 
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some offenders move around, and therefore the offending spree may be 
distributed in different sheriff courts, which are very likely to deal with each 
case differently, despite being aware of their record or the existence of 
complaints in other courts. Thus, there is a question of fairness that has to be 
solved here. 
 
8.2. Non-custodial sentences 
 
It is too simplistic to reduce penal sanctions into a dichotomy of custodial versus 
non-custodial sentences. While it is true that, currently, imprisonment seems to 
be the harshest measure that the criminal justice system can take against an 
individual, this does not mean that the remaining sanctions do not have ‘punitive 
bite’. Moreover, depending on the individual, a short custodial sentence may 
seem to some people as a lesser punishment than a CPO with a long period of 
supervision paired with unpaid work and conduct requirements.  
 
If our goal as a society is to reduce the use of imprisonment, it is very easy to 
ignore the differences between the other penal sanctions and to put them all in 
the same bag and label them as ‘alternative’ sanctions. This raises several 
problems; the fact that ‘non-custodial’ sentences are perceived as less punitive 
than imprisonment does not mean that they are all the same sort or severity of 
punishment. For example, supervision may impose coercive surveillance and 
treatment requirements, and if the individual fails to comply, may lead to a 
breach and further punishment; restriction of liberty orders (ROLOs) are a 
compulsory limitation on an individual’s freedom of movement; unpaid work 
deprives individuals of time, mostly through forcing them to work on someone 
else’s behalf. Fines deprive individuals of monetary means. All the different 
penal sanctions involve a certain degree of deprivation of fundamental rights, 
each one in a particular way that may have a greater or lesser impact, 
depending on the individual’s circumstances. 
 
During the judicial practices that I observed, I noticed that the Sheriffs 
recognised the differences between and unique characteristics of non-custodial 
sanctions. Thus, they used different sanctions to achieve particular goals 
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according to the perceived seriousness of the offence and (or) according to 
specific offender's background. As I stated above, when we move away from 
serious offences, the accused's background becomes the critical aspect that 
determines the sentence s/he receives. Hence, I am going to continue exploring 
how this explains the use of the non-custodial sentences. 
 
The discussion of the use of Community Sentences is ‘the other side’ of the 
debate for the use of short-custodial sentences for non-compliers. As I stated 
before, one of the questions was where to draw the line; when to give another 
chance; and when to impose imprisonment. Furthermore, there is another 
‘border’ for community sentences: The kind of cases where a fine or deferred 
sentence for good behaviour are also suitable options. 
 
The discussion of the use of custodial sentences above has also outlined how 
among non-custodial sanctions there is a flexible hierarchy. At least, as 
(Sheriff#6) explained, there are some offences in which the default starting 
point is a fine or an admonition. In the core of the ‘system’ remains the notion 
of seriousness. However, I noticed that every Sheriff articulated the hierarchy of 
non-custodial disposals differently. 
 
8.2.1. Community sanctions 
 
In the strict sense, for the purposes of this chapter, when I talk about 
community sentences I am mainly talking about: CPOs with supervision and/or 
unpaid work requirements, ROLOs and DTTOs. Beyond the ‘community’ aspect, 
all of them involve subjecting the offender to surveillance and control by State 
agents. The degree of disruption to the lives of individuals varies according to 
the particular aims and structure of the sanction. Therefore, there are two 
interesting questions I am going to explore together: How do Sheriffs perceive 
the different degrees of punitiveness? And, does this produce some sort of 
hierarchy among the different disposals?  
 
Now, while it is true that, under the current legislation, both supervision and 
unpaid work are requirements of the CPOs, most of my sample of Sheriffs 
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discussed them as sanctions in their own right. Instead of mentioning how they 
tailored CPOs, they explained why they used supervision, unpaid work or another 
requirement in isolation or combination. In other words, despite the change in 
the law in 2010, they talked about CPOs as a legal reform that did not change 
their practice noticeably, but at the same time, they recognised that it allowed 
them to sentence in a more flexible way. Thus, instead of talking about the 
CPOs as a single penal sanction that can be tailored in one way or another, they 
talk about it as a legal framework for a variety of sanctions. The main 
consequence of this is that supervision and unpaid work retain their own identity 
as sentencing ‘tools’; because of their perceived effects and purposes they are 
seen as stand-alone or as complementing each other. 
 
The perceived purposes of supervision determine its perceived punitiveness. For 
example, when I discussed the different elements of CPOs with some Sheriffs, 
several of them told me that they do not see supervision as a punitive sanction. 
For example, when I asked Sheriffs if supervision had a punitive component, the 
answer was:  
 
‘No. The purpose of that is to address with the offender why they’re offending and 
to see what changes can be brought about in their lives through sometimes 
education, and then other times through simple guidance and getting access to the 
right support so that those offences don’t happen in the future, or if they do happen 
they’re much less frequent. So I see that as being a protective measure. I think I 
used that word a couple of times. And on the whole a supportive measure. But it’s 
compulsory so it’s not as if they can just opt in or opt out as they wish’ (Sheriff#13) 
 
‘…there are really two types of order; there are the purely remedial ones, 
supervision, program requirement, mental health treatment requirement, and you 
just make the order that’s needed to give that treatment’ (Sheriff#9) 
 
Thus, while Sheriffs recognise that supervision is compulsory, they do not 
perceive it as a disposal that seeks to punish the individual. That said, this lack 
of perceived punitiveness does not mean that they think they have to use it as 
the bottom-tier sanction. There seems to be a concern for the appropriate 
allocation of public funds, and finally, it also depends on whether the SW 
believes they can work with that person. Nevertheless, there is not an obvious 
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hierarchy between unpaid work and supervision. For starters, the fact that 
supervision is not perceived as punitive, while unpaid work is, has a very 
straightforward consequence for the application of sentencing discounts for 
those who plead guilty.  
  
‘… supervision is something I don’t discount. I don’t think you can discount 
supervision. Supervision you’re fixing the period of the point of view of what’s going 
to benefit everyone and what’s going to work. It would make a nonsense of it if I 
then discounted it. (…) supervision isn’t a punitive element, the unpaid work is a 
punitive element. The supervision isn’t a punitive element in my view. Supervision is 
trying to achieve something else.’ (Sheriff#4) 
 
‘The unpaid work is usually an element of punishment. Sometimes it’s not only 
punishment but it offers a discipline. It’s something to get the person into a routine, 
a work habit. But more often than not it’s an element of punishment. So again I 
structure the order very much according to the individual’ (Sheriff#5) 
 
Since supervision and unpaid work are perceived in such different ways, the 
practice of combining them becomes relevant. The goal is to create, per the 
addition of unpaid work, a more severe or harsh penal sanction, without 
sacrificing the ‘protective’ or ‘remedial’ purposes of supervision. 
 
‘I might take the view that the only thing that’s required is a period of unpaid work 
as a sort of penalty and a discipline to mark the offence. But very often I’ll couple 
that with supervision because there might be an alcohol problem or sometimes an 
attitude problem about offending that could be addressed by supervision. Difficult 
to generalise, I think it depends very much on the individuals. And it depends on 
what might be available in the way of resources to address the issue.’ (Sheriff#5) 
 
These examples seem to suggest that whenever the Sheriffs decided to impose a 
CPOs they do so through a process of individualization of punishment. In other 
words, they first seem to determine the characteristics of the offender and then 
try to combine the different CPOs requirements to fit the individual 
particularities of the offender and the offence. This assessment also involves a 
prognosis of offender chances to comply with these requirements. For example, 
when discussing the uses and limitations of ROLOs (Sheriff#12) explained: 
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‘Well, I would be inclined to say to you for youngsters, for folk who are in their 
teens, early twenties, generally the folk that we’re dealing with, won’t comply 
because they just can’t order their lives. For older folk I don’t think it’s a penalty. If 
I was told ‘you’re going to have to stay in between eight in the evening and eight in 
the morning’ I could do that. So I don’t think it’s a penalty. It’s something which I 
know is there but I very rarely impose it. Whereas unpaid work, that is an 
inconvenience to someone.’ (Sheriff#12) 
 
However, this individualization of the sanctions is subjected to several 
limitations: the disposals that are available in one jurisdiction, the nature and 
limitation of those disposals and the resources that a Sheriff believes should be 
allocated for a given case. The latter is more explicit in the use of DTTOs where 
all the Sheriff are conscious that these interventions are expensive and there are 
limited spaces, but it is not the only case. As we move away from the central 
belt Sheriffs have to deal with more issues in terms of resources and viability of 
disposals: 
 
‘the problem is that the local council requires to provide people who will supervise 
the work that is there to be done. And currently, and in my time here, that is a 
problem. So that means that it is difficult to supervise, it is difficult for people to 
get regular unpaid work, and it is very difficult for the work to be done within the 
specified period of time because under one hundred hours they are meant to do that 
work within three months. It never happens. Never happens because the 
government resources would require to be there to ensure that that was done. It’s a 
big problem in X because they have got many, many people who are on these 
community payback schemes. So you have to have resources, you have to have 
supervision, I think we are lacking in resources, and we lack the necessary 
supervisors. That’s a governmental problem. We are told ‘do not send people to 
jail.’ We give them an alternative but that alternative is not being marshalled 
properly and rigidly. Which means that if I say to someone today ‘Community 
Payback Order’, they may not start that for some months, and then it will take a 
long, long time for that to be finished.’ (Sheriff#8) 
 
‘CPOs cost a lot of money. In this area they don’t have enough supervisors to 
supervise the unpaid work. So you might say you’ll do 200 hours within six months, 
no chance. They come back to you and say ‘can we have a three month extension? 
Can we have another three month extension?’ It’s not worth it. The government 
talks a lot but they don’t put the money into things.’ (Sheriff#16) 
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Thus, the sentencing purposes that could be pursued by a Sheriff have been 
restricted by these constraints. Sentencing purposes are also shaped by trying to 
balance the harm that the offence caused to the victims and/or the community 
on the one hand, and the attempt to help the accused to stop reoffending on the 
other. 
 
‘if someone comes up to you and swears at you and shouts at you and is abusive to 
you, and perhaps makes some sort of derogatory remark (…) that it is most 
unpleasant and for you, like me, you’d be unsettled by it. It’s not a pleasant 
experience. And to be maybe punched or something like that. In the scheme of 
things, however, in the criminal justice system it’s the lower end. So what you’re 
trying to do is to balance the effect on the victim but at the same time giving 
someone who probably hasn’t had much teaching so far as what the appropriate 
norms of behaviour are a chance to do something, or at least stop behaving in that 
sort of way.’ (Sheriff#12) 
 
The effect of the offence, but also the impact of the sanction on the 
community -- which may be used to offer some sort of public protection -- 
adds a layer of complexity to the sentencing process. Sheriffs have to 
balance the appropriate amount of ‘punishment’ required in the 
community sentence, along with the requirements that might be of more 
help for the accused according to their needs.  
 
However, the presumption against short-term sentences up to three 
months, and the highly likely possibility that this will be raised up to one 
year in the near future, has led some Sheriffs to craft high tariff CPOs. This 
use of the CPOs could be characterised as a mechanism of "social defence" 
in which the harsh requirements of the community sentences transform it 
into a sanction that aims to incapacitate the offender within the 
community. If the offender fails to comply, s/he will be imprisoned; if s/he 
complies the offender will be under constant surveillance. Furthermore, 
the harsher the conditions, the higher the chances that the Sheriff, 
consciously or not, may be setting the offender up to fail. I discussed an 
example of this in the chapter seven (see section 7.2.1). However, let us 
say one final thing about this. The use of high tariff CPOs poses questions 
about proportionality, particularly because if the alternative to this 
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combined sanction is a short custodial sentence, we may reach the point 
where imprisonment is less harsh than the community sentence. 
 
8.2.2. CPO Reviews 
 
Since my focus was on sentencing practices, I did not expect that CPO reviews 
would be a crucial aspect of my examination of how the Sheriffs understand 
their role as sentencers. However, the RC observation of how the Sheriffs were 
handling the reviews, and later, our discussion on which goals they were trying 
to achieve, revealed a lot about how they perceived their function beyond the 
allocation of sanctions. For starters, it is important to stress that despite the 
fact that Section 227X of the CJL-2010 Act introduces provision for Sheriffs to 
order CPOs Reviews, it does not tell Sheriffs how they should be carried out. 
Section 227X (4) states: ‘A progress review is to be carried out in such manner as 
the court carrying out the review may determine.’ The practical consequence of 
this is that every Sheriff articulated the reviews so as to fit their practices and 
understandings of their role as sentencers. 
 
For example, (Sheriff#5) saw the reviews as a way to offer positive support for 
the individuals that were undergoing CPOs. Instead of framing this support as 
control or surveillance, this Sheriff adopted a positive approach, similar to what 
Anderson (2016) (calls ‘bearing witness to desistance’. In other words, this is an 
approach that reveals a Sheriff that understands sentencing not just as a 
mechanism for tackling reoffending but rather as a means to try to give 
individuals opportunities and ‘tools’ to help them to change their lives. 
 
‘I don’t like to use words like compliance and obedience and so forth. I try to get to 
a point of discussing with people along the lines of saying ‘you can’t change what’s 
happened in the past, you can affect the future. If you’re serious about wanting to 
change then I’m here to support you and you’ve got a team round you who will 
support you.’ So I try and get away as much as possible from the language of 
criminal justice, and much more focus on discussing good things that have 
happened, people’s strengths, their assets. I love asking questions like ‘what are 
you good at? Tell me something good that’s happened since I saw you last.’ (…)  But 
yes, I take it more often than not as an opportunity to do a pep talk, to try and help 
individuals focus their thinking on the journey. I use that metaphor. Quite often I’ll 
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say ‘just imagine where you want to be in five years’ time if everything goes well.’ 
(…) And you can trace that right back to the start of the journey right there in the 
room, and sometimes it works. Some people take it seriously. (…) But sometimes an 
individual is not engaging. And rather than saying ‘you’re not complying. You must 
comply otherwise you’ll go to jail,’ I’m more likely to say ‘look, I can’t force you to 
do this order but if you don’t do it I’d be very unhappy to see you lose the 
opportunity. You’re going to paint yourself into a corner, you might give the court 
no option but to take a more severe approach, and I’d be very unhappy to see that 
happen.’ So I don’t threaten them. In fact, I very often say to them ‘look, this is not 
meant to be a slow route to prison. I’m trying hard to keep you out of prison, and so 
are these people, we need you to help as well.’ So I’m very conscious of the 
language I use at these hearings. I think about it quite carefully. And always try and 
use positive language, focus on people’s abilities, their assets, and talk about what 
they can do.’(Sheriff#5) 
 
From all of my participants (Sheriff#5) was the paradigm of this approach; s/he 
made arrangements to hold the reviews as privately as s/he could. The rationale 
behind the arrangements is that because sensitive aspects are discussed openly, 
some Sheriffs are of the view that this should be held without the public. 
 
Other Sheriffs carry out the reviews in open court which provides a place for 
brief but interesting interactions between the Sheriff and the offender. During 
the sentencing process, the Sheriffs rarely addresses the accused directly, or if 
s/he does the accused is supposed to listen not to talk back. However, during 
the reviews, some Sheriffs engage in a brief dialogue with the accused over their 
performance or struggles to comply. One particular exchange struck me when I 
was shadowing (Sheriff#9). The day before the hearing the Sheriff allowed me to 
observe him/her while preparing for the cases. S/he mentioned one case where 
s/he was worried about a person who was struggling to comply. S/he believed 
that the person was inevitably going to fail. Nevertheless, the next day, when 
the hearing started instead of talking about his/her concerns, the Sheriff said to 
the person that s/he was aware of their efforts to comply. The face of the 
person brightened; s/he thanked the Sheriff for this recognition and promised 
that s/he would continue complying.  
 
In their own way, (Sheriff#9) recognised the need to support the struggles of 
some individuals to stop reoffending. However, others Sheriffs have a different 
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view of reviews. (Sheriff#6) seems to offer a lengthy explanation of this entirely 
different approach paradigmatically: 
 
‘If you impose a Community Payback Order, that’s as an alternative to imprisonment 
usually. So if you are doubtful as to whether or not that order is going to work then I 
will often fix a review. (…) if the person has a record or if he’s of a particular 
character and I think he’s not going to perform the alternative then I will often set a 
review in four to six weeks’ time and I’ll say to him ‘there will be a review, if I find 
in four to six weeks’ time you haven’t been performing then I will revoke the order 
and I will send you to jail.’ So I believe in, wherever I can, certainty of approach. 
Because I think that if you give the impression that they will be allowed to breach 
the order and get away with it then for many offenders that’s exactly what they’ll 
do. And what I’ve found quite successful over the years is the approach which is a 
very blunt and robust approach, you might see me do this today, and I’ll just say to 
them ‘I will give you a Community Payback Order, I have my doubts as to whether 
you’ll comply. We’ll come back in six weeks’ time, I will get an update and a report. 
Unless the report is absolutely perfect I will revoke the order, you will go to jail, do 
you understand?’ And leave it at that. And when they come back then I will do as I 
say. (…) So in other words I’m adopting, quite consciously, I think, a very tough old-
fashioned school teacher type approach. Or very strict parent type approach. And 
this is not rocket science at all, there’s very little rocket science in any of this. So 
I’m saying to them ‘I’ve got my eyes on you, I’m a tough cookie, I can do things to 
you that you won’t like. You comply, you won’t get a problem from me. If you don’t 
comply you will have big problems.’ And so it’s rough and tough.’ (Sheriff#6) 
 
(Sheriff#6) contrasted dramatically with (Sheriff#5)'s approach. If for the latter, 
the role is conceptualised as offering support, for the former the role is 
performed through a ‘tough, old-fashioned school’ to ensure that people will 
comply. This approach seems to be more concerned with deterring individuals 
from committing offences rather than with the individual themselves.  
 
Overall, the Sheriff's different attitudes and approaches to CPO reviews allowed 
me to see how they arrange the reviews in line with their sentencing styles. 
Moreover, implicit in these particular practices was the question of the role of a 
sentence. Do Sheriffs have to actively support offenders to stop reoffending or is 
their duty limited to ensuring that the law is enforced? (Sheriff#5) and #6’s 
approaches provide us with completely different ways to respond to these 
questions. 
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8.2.3. Fines and Admonitions 
  
As I stated before, fines and admonitions are the lower end of penal sanctions at 
the Sheriff Court, leaving aside absolute discharges. The criminal proceedings 
records tell us that these disposals combined are around the 60% of the all the 
disposals passed annually (Scottish Goverment, 2017). 
 
There is a certain degree of hierarchy between supervision and deferred 
sentences in good behaviour. The latter works as a way to ask people to behave 
during a few months; if they comply then they are admonished. This ‘suspended 
sentence’ of sorts21 works as a kind of minimum intervention. All that is required 
is not to re-offend. Thus this works as a bottom-tier disposal for people who 
have no criminal records or are convicted of petty offences. Conversely, CPOs 
are aimed at people who already have records or have committed a more serious 
offence or requires a more intensive support.  
 
‘I use them [admonitions] after I’ve deferred for good behaviour. So I usually say to 
somebody who has not got a record, or a very small record, ‘I’m deferring sentence 
for good behaviour, and when you return if you’ve been on good behaviour I will 
admonish you.’ So it’s an incentive for them to be of good behaviour, and the 
offense is minor enough that if he can prove that he can keep up good behaviour for 
a certain amount of time then that’s served its purpose, it’s stopped them offending 
for six months. And it’s somebody you probably wouldn’t expect to ever come back 
again anyway’ (Sheriff#1) 
 
‘And very often I might defer sentence in relatively minor offenses in a summary 
case, and if you defer sentence for six months if they have been of good behaviour I 
generally will admonish them then. Some cases, however, are such that the nature 
of it is such that admonition might not be appropriate, and they may be fined, for 
instance. There are some cases where you might defer sentence for somebody to be 
able to do unpaid work, either because they’ve got full hours, not at the moment, 
or that their physical status is such that they can’t do it, they’re injured or ill, but 
in six months’ time they may be able to. You might put it forward for that purpose. 
But generally if it’s deferred sentence for good behaviour there probably is more 
                                         
21 Technically, it is not a suspended sentence. It is a suspension of sentencing.  
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expectation they’ll be admonished, and probably statistically they will 
be.’(Sheriff#15) 
 
It is interesting how (Sheriff#15) seems to establish a hierarchy between 
admonitions and fines. It is not hard to see why: While the former simply asks 
the offender to abstain from committing further offences, the fines involves a 
‘penal bite’. However, while fines are still the most used disposals, according to 
the criminal proceedings statistics throughout the last few years, their use has 
dropped drastically. The introduction of CPOs and in particular the use of unpaid 
work appears to be responsible for this trend. Sheriffs have replaced the 
implementation of fines with unpaid work in order to punish the accused who 
may be unemployed or ‘living on benefits’.  
 
‘…since they’ve brought in unpaid work as an alternative to a fine I tend to use that 
quite a lot because a lot of the people who appear here are on benefits and struggle 
to pay a fine, quite honestly. Also in domestic abuse cases, if I can use that as an 
example, I’d be very reluctant ever to fine because very often the people are still 
together. And if you’re fining you’re hurting the victim as much as hurting the 
criminal, because you’re hitting the family pocket. So I would tend to use unpaid 
work as an alternative there rather than a fine as well.’ (Sheriff#4) 
 
‘The point is that most of the people that are appearing don’t have any money or 
they’re on benefits. And the benefits are calculated as a minimum amount to live 
on. So if you take money from them for fines, either they’re not going to pay it or if 
they do pay it they’re going to be short of money. So I’m sometimes reluctant to 
impose a fine. (…) Road traffic matters almost invariably are fines, even if 
somebody’s on benefits. It’s almost invariably a fine because a custodial sentence or 
anything else is inappropriate.’ (Sheriff#5) 
 
To a certain extent, these practices seems to equate these fines with unpaid 
work; instead of imposing a monetary penalty, working time is taken away from 
them. Therefore, time and money are equated in this context. However, if an 
individual has the means; they may pay and then their sanction is done, while 
the breach of unpaid work would mean further trouble for the individual. 
 
8.3. Conclusions  
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In this chapter, I have continued the examination of the Sheriffs’ sentencing 
practice. If in the last chapter I focused on the way they deal with the 
information provided to them for their decision making, in this chapter I have 
focused on the decision-making itself. The exploration of why and when the 
Sheriffs use a custodial sentence, a CPOs, a fine or an admonition has allowed us 
to glean the practical rationale behind this decision. This study allowed us to 
note how different Sheriffs adopts different styles which implies a specific 
understanding of their role. In the next chapter, I am going to shift the focus 
towards the legal habitus that can help us to understand the development of the 
Sheriffs’ sentencing styles and the way they articulate their perception of their 
role as sentencers. 
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CHAPTER 9: Or ‘Becoming and Being a Sheriff’ 
 
In the Scottish Legal system – as explained in chapter five - we can observe how 
practitioners are appointed as Sheriffs because of the ‘legal experience’ they 
have accumulated through several years of practice. The unique structural 
configuration of this specific legal field means that practitioners, regardless of 
the positions they occupy in the field, possess a specific legal habitus and 
capital. Thus, I am going to explore how legal experiences shape both the 
habitus and capital of my participants as practitioners.   
 
This chapter is divided into four sections: Firstly, I am going to explore the 
career trajectories of some sheriffs, to illustrate the diversity of the background 
of solicitors or advocates that are appointed as sheriffs. In the second section, I 
discuss the responses of my participants in explaining why they decided to 
become a Sheriff. Thirdly, I will explore how their perceptions of the judicial 
role changed from being a lawyer to becoming a Judge. Finally, I discuss their 
articulation of the sentencing role. 
 
9.1. Legal Experience 
 
As discussed in chapter five, the Scottish legal field is split between solicitors, 
solicitor-advocates and advocates. Each of these different types of legal 
practitioner requires the acquisition of specific competencies and allows them to 
exert particular functions in the field. Before the introduction of ‘solicitor-
advocates’ in 1994, there was a sharp division of juridical labour: Solicitors could 
only appear at lower courts and Advocates had the rights of audience for 
appearing at the High Court. Thus, at first glance, it seems easy to simplify the 
analysis of the legal habitus possessed by the Sheriffs into these two categories. 
For example, and discussed in chapter seven, in relation to the Sheriffs’ 
perception of solicitors’ performances, the Sheriffs who used to be advocates 
were more critical of these performances than the Sheriffs who used to be 
solicitors. This, in turn, seems to affect the way that Sheriffs examine and value 
the information provided by solicitors that appears before them. However, 
through the on- and off-the-record conversations I had with the Sheriffs about 
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their lives and trajectories, I realised how rich, diverse and unique the paths 
that they had followed were. Paths that – ultimately - led them to being 
appointed.  
 
In my sample, eight of the participants had previously been solicitors and eight 
had previously been advocates. However, this objective distinction proved to be 
of little analytical use. As I mentioned above, it did help to understand some 
individual differences among Sheriffs, but it was impossible to attempt to 
outline a common trajectory for solicitors or advocates. Within each sub-group, 
my participants’ backgrounds were very different from one another. If there is 
any common feature among their legal trajectories, it is the richness of their 
diverse experiences in the years before being appointed. Consequently, only 
during the last part of my analysis did I come to understand more in depth what 
(Sheriff#10) told me. S/he explained to me that only after working with a 
solicitor who had become a Sheriff had s/he ‘realised that the route to becoming 
a Sheriff was open to people from many different areas’. 
 
The uniqueness of the different trajectories introduced an obstacle. Since some 
of their career paths have very particular landmarks, analysing them may lead, 
directly or indirectly, to making my participants identifiable. To get around this 
issue, and to be able to provide examples of legal trajectories, I decided to use 
the brief biographies of recently appointed Sheriffs featured on the website of 
the Judiciary of Scotland. I am aware that this option to protect the anonymity 
of my participants entails a limitation: these examples will only account for 
more recent appointments. However, I am using them to help me exemplify and 
explain, indirectly, the differences that I found in my sample. While it is not 
perfect, I can do so because the patterns I found in my original sample, and the 
findings I present in this section, were similar. 
 
I used the ‘Google’ search function within the website www.scotland-
judiciary.org.uk. The keywords used were ‘sheriffs appointed’. In order to 
further protect the identity of my participants, I searched for any related news 
published on the website after the 1st January 2017. This was in order to use 
biographies of Sheriffs appointed after I finished my fieldwork, thus avoiding any 
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possible indirect identification of my participants. The news provided brief 
biographies of the new Sheriffs that I am going to discuss below.  Through this 
exercise, I was able to extract the biographies of ten Sheriff that were 
appointed between the 1st January 2017 and the 21st May 2018. All of them 
started their career qualifying as solicitors. However, four of them became 
solicitor-advocates. Only one of them came to the Bar and became an advocate, 
s/he also was appointed Queen's Counsel before being appointed to the ‘shrieval 
bench’.22 
 
There are three aspects that are worth mentioning here. Firstly, taking into 
account the biographies of my participants and the appointed Sheriffs I found 
published online, I noticed that most of the advocates had been solicitors for 
extended periods before coming to the Bar. Thus, they became advocates 
‘relatively late’ in their careers, which affected the kind of positions that they 
may be able to attain within the field. The trajectories of the Senators of the 
College of Justice23 offer an interesting contrast in this respect. Most of them 
became Advocates early in their career (Judiciary of Scotland, 2018a), and thus 
their trajectories allowed them to accumulate a specific kind of capital for an 
extended period. I am going to come back to this topic in the next subsection. 
 
The second aspect is to highlight how the different trajectories among 
individuals who qualified as solicitors illustrate our depiction of the Scottish 
legal field. As we will see below, some solicitors invest time in improving their 
position as a solicitor or attain new positions as solicitor-advocates or advocates. 
Overall, this shows us how actors who share the same legal habitus can move 
through the field, accumulating specific kinds of capital, and attaining new roles 
and positions. 
 
Finally, it is worth noting that the sample of ten Sheriffs whose biographies I 
obtained from the website of the Judiciary of Scotland have some 
particularities. Of the ten Sheriffs, seven had a background in the criminal 
                                         
22 This expression is another way to say that the individual was appointed a Sheriff.  
23 They are the judges who hear cases in the highest courts in Scotland, the High Court/Court of 
Session 
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justice system. Six of them spent part of or their entire careers at the Crown 
Office and Procurator Fiscal Service (COPFS). One of the sheriffs was the local 
head of one of the branches of the Public Defence Solicitor's office (PDSO). This 
was not the case in my research sample; my participants' backgrounds were 
evenly distributed among three categories: mostly criminal, mostly civil and 
ones with mixed or more nuanced legal trajectories. 
Having said this, let's compare the trajectories of two solicitors who were 
recently appointed as Sheriffs.24 
 
‘[Ms A.] is a graduate of the University of Strathclyde and has a LLM in Human 
Rights, jointly from the Universities of Glasgow and Strathclyde. Prior to her 
traineeship Ms [A.] undertook an internship in South Africa in a community law 
centre. Following a traineeship with [WL] Solicitors she was retained as assistant. In 
1999 Ms [A] was Assistant and thereafter Partner with [X.] before becoming Chief 
Solicitor with [Y] National Park Authority.  Between 2006 and May 2016, Ms [M.] was 
a partner in private practice, latterly with [Z] solicitors.  She latterly sat as a 
member of the Parades Commission in Northern Ireland and a Judge for the First 
Tier Tribunal, Immigration and Asylum Chamber. Ms [A.] is currently a Summary 
Sheriff in Glasgow Sheriff Court as well as a Judge for the First Tier Tribunal, Social 
Security Entitlement.’ (Judiciary of Scotland, 2017a) 
 
‘Mr [B] is a graduate of the University of Strathclyde and obtained a LLM in European 
Law from the College of Europe. Following a traineeship with [X], Mr [B.] became a 
Procurator Fiscal Depute in 2004. He was promoted to Senior Procurator Fiscal 
Depute in 2008, including a period as Acting Head of the Wildlife & Environmental 
Crime Unit 2014. Mr [B.] was a part-time tutor at the University of Strathclyde, in 
Public Law between 2005 and 2007 and in European Union Law between 2005 and 
2015.’ (Judiciary of Scotland, 2017b) 
 
I selected these two biographies to exemplify the diversity of paths that can 
lead legal actors to be appointed Sheriffs. Thus, it is not enough to state that 
individuals have accumulated capital just by being solicitors; instead, these 
paths reflect different investments and progressions within the field. The 
particular investments made by individuals are significant because - we need to 
remember - Sheriffs are expected to be able to deal with civil, family and 
                                         
24 While these records are public, I still decided to anonymise the names of the Sheriffs and the 
names of private institutions. 
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criminal law alike. Thus, their biographies inevitably reveal to us that, 
depending on in which legal area they had specialised, they can have completely 
different strengths and weaknesses. More critically, their past legal experiences 
will influence their approach to the judicial role, and thus, help us to explain 
their different styles. 
 
Another interesting aspect of these biographies is how lawyers seek to improve 
their legal careers beyond the specificities of legal practice. For example, they 
managed to attain positions that went beyond purely ‘court practice’. For 
example, one sheriff was ‘first tier judge of the Immigration and Asylum 
Chamber Tribunals’, another was ‘convener of the Criminal Law Committee of 
the Law Society of Scotland’ (Judiciary of Scotland, 2017b), another was a ‘first 
tier judge of the Social Entitlement Chamber tribunal’ (Judiciary of Scotland, 
2018c). Either way, by investing their capital in attaining roles in judicial-like 
institutions or being members of boards or committees for civil societies, their 
experiences were enriched beyond court practice. Some other lawyers had 
positions as tutors or part-time Teaching Fellows in Law Schools at 
undergraduate or diploma level. Let's consider the following trajectories of two 
solicitor-advocates. 
 
‘[Mr C.] is a graduate of the University of Edinburgh. Following a traineeship with 
the (COPFS), Mr [C.] became a Procurator Fiscal Depute in 1997. Mr [C.] was then 
appointed District Procurator Fiscal, first for the Sheriff Court District of [X.] and 
then for the Sheriff Court District of [Y.]. In 2009 he was appointed Deputy Head of 
the High Court Division and in 2014 became Head of the Health and Safety Division, 
both specialist posts within COPFS. Since July 2017 he has been Assistant Procurator 
Fiscal.’ (Judiciary of Scotland, 2017a) 
 
‘[Ms D.], from Clydebank, graduated from the University of Aberdeen in 1983 and 
began her legal career as a COPFS trainee. Following time as a Procurator Fiscal she 
worked in London as a commercial solicitor with a large City law firm before 
returning to Aberdeen. She was an Associate in local firm [X] before setting up her 
own practice specialising in employment law and personal injury. She qualified as a 
Solicitor Advocate in 2005. She was appointed as part time Senior Teaching Fellow in 
employment law at the University of Aberdeen in 2010. She served as the local 
representative on the Law Society of Scotland from 1995 to 2000. Ms [D.] is 
currently a Summary Sheriff in Aberdeen.’ (Judiciary of Scotland, 2017a) 
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These two biographies have similar starting points. Both trajectories started 
with a traineeship with COPFS, which led them to be appointed PFs. However, 
whereas Mr. C decided to remain and invest in a career at COPFS, Ms D. moved 
away and followed a more varied path. Nevertheless, in both of their career 
paths, we can see an attempt to go beyond court practices. Mr C., within COPFS, 
attained specialist posts, whereas Ms D. invested in a part-time career teaching 
law and also as a representative of the Law Society Scotland. Overall, the 
diversity of their backgrounds seems to suggest that one important way to 
accumulate legal capital during their careers was investing in positions and roles 
that enhanced their legal experience beyond court practice. 
 
Given the formal hierarchical structure of the juridical field, from what I could 
observe and from what my participants told me, it seemed that High Court 
practice is regarded as a higher form of practice than that within lower courts. 
Let's remember how critical advocate-sheriffs were of solicitors’ performance, 
as discussed in chapter seven. This aspect is implicit in the core difference 
between solicitors and advocates, and it helps us to understand why solicitors 
may want to reinforce or improve their position in the field by acquiring 
additional competencies or roles beyond lower court practice. However, what 
matters for this analysis is the diversity of the legal experiences attained by the 
agents during their legal careers, not the social perception of them. This is to 
say, what is relevant is to observe the richness of individual experiences, and 
how different they are from one another. Also, because of this, it is important to 
note the time spans of these backgrounds, some of them encompass fifteen, 
twenty or even thirty years of individual history in the field before being 
appointed. Therefore, what these paths tell us, beyond their uniqueness, is how 
important and influential these forms of experience are to the new Sheriffs’ 
conception of what ‘law in action’ is. Consequently, they help us to understand 
why they have been appointed - because of the wealth of their accumulated 
capital in the field - but moreover, how these experiences are expected to make 
them good sheriffs, and therefore, how their legal trajectories are expected to 
make them good judges. 
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9.2. Why become a Sheriff 
 
Before the introduction of the Judicial Appointment Board for Scotland in 2002 – 
as explained in chapter five - as Sheriff#1 explained to me, ‘you didn’t apply to 
become a Sheriff in those days. You were selected by the Lord Advocate’. 
Several of my participants mentioned that this meant that, very often, the Lord 
Advocate recommended the appointment of lawyers who were known to them or 
suggested to them. It was implied by some of my participants that, back then, 
advocates had a better chance of being appointed as a sheriff than solicitors. 
(Sheriff#14) told me that at least until the 1970s ‘you could only be a Sheriff if 
you were an advocate’. Thus, it is fair to say that the appointment of solicitors 
as sheriffs has become more common throughout the last few decades. In any 
case, with the introduction of the Board in 2002 the field was reframed.  
 
While exploring this topic with my participants, I obtained different responses 
from those Sheriffs who were solicitors and those who were advocates. Let's 
remember that in my sample two Sheriffs were QCs, six were advocates, one 
was a Solicitor-advocate and seven were solicitors. Overall, both solicitors and 
advocates talked about becoming a Sheriff in terms of a new stage in their 
career paths. (Sheriff#2) and #7, borrowing from a comparison with the French 
Judicial system, offered interesting analysis of how and when you can decide to 
become a Sheriff within the Scottish system. 
 
‘[The Scottish field] It’s not like the continental where you can actively pursue from 
the outset a career in the judiciary (…) So I suppose from the outset you can aspire 
to become a Sheriff but it’s not actually a career path that you follow from the 
outset because it’s a thing which traditionally is done later in your career and after 
you have considerable experience as a solicitor or an advocate. So, yes, I suppose 
that’s right when I was a student I would have thought ‘oh, that would be good’ but 
it’s not something that you’re actively following early in your career in the way that 
you would in France, for example.’ (Sheriff#2)  
 
‘…there are basic rules in terms of how much experience as a lawyer one needs 
before one can apply to become a judge. We take the view that it’s for a chosen 
few who have experience. Although I wonder if we are at the beginning of a more 
career-based judicial system (…) It’s not the same thing because [in France] you go 
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straight from university and learn to be judges, where we don’t do that. We learn to 
be lawyers.’ (Sheriff#7) 
 
These explanations captured, to some extent, the different experiences my 
participants described to me. Becoming a Sheriff was a career path that would 
only ‘open’ if you had acquired enough legal capital and spent enough time in 
the field; thus, it is a position that is not immediately available for anyone at 
the beginning of their legal career, as it is in other jurisdictions like France. I 
noticed that there were differences in how solicitors and advocates described 
their personal experiences of this structural dynamic. Solicitors described 
becoming Sheriffs in terms of progression, a ‘step forward’ in their careers or a 
way to ‘crown’ them. Consequently, solicitors described being appointed to the 
shrieval office as a position they were more than able to fulfil accordingly to 
what is needed from that role. 
 
 ‘…the person that I worked for became a Sheriff, and I was quite impressed by that 
as an opportunity some way down the line. And as I became more experienced in 
court I was attracted by the idea of making decisions in the court (…) I often found 
that it was good to give that information to the court to see all points of view, and I 
think it suited the skills that I brought to my job. And in particular I thought that as 
a lawyer I was always able to see all sides of the argument. (…) I felt that that was 
something that I was able to do and as I developed my own experience I was more 
attracted to making that neutral decision and assessing all points of view. So that 
was really what led to it.’ (Sheriff#10) 
 
‘The honest answer to why did I become a Sheriff, because I was fed up appearing in 
front of Sheriffs who I didn’t think knew as much about what was going on as I did. 
(…) And I was appearing in front of Sheriffs who didn’t have a clue what was going 
on with these, because you would have a lot of Sheriffs who would have a 
background in criminal law, and they will all admit it, Sheriffs who have a 
background in civil law find it easier to adapt to criminal law than criminal Sheriffs 
do to adapt to civil law. And I was appearing in front of a significant number of 
Sheriffs who I was just thinking ‘well, I could do better than that. [Laughs] That was 
rubbish.’ So I thought ‘I’ve had enough of this.’ Which is why I applied. That is 
arrogance [Laughs].’ (Sheriff#3) 
 
However, advocates framed their appointments differently. Their narratives 
implied that becoming a Sheriff was not necessarily the most prestigious path 
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available for them to finish their career. However, they explained that this path 
offered them a better quality of life: 
 
‘…I had a successful practice but I had got married during that time and I had had a 
child during that time, and I found that I was working very long hours, day and 
night, and I think that I wanted a change from that constant pressure of running 
your own business. And the other major reason for choosing to apply to be a Sheriff 
was because I thought that the job would be more interesting than what I was 
doing…’ (Sheriff#6)  
 
‘… I was getting older, and when you’re at the Bar doing what I did you were 
working seven days a week every week. You might have had the odd Saturday off 
but you were working all the time. And as a self-employed person, of course, you’ve 
got no pension. And I just decided, it was a very difficult decision even to apply 
because I didn’t really want to do it. I wanted to stay on my feet. But when I got 
offered the job I just thought ‘just take it.’ (Sheriff#16) 
 
As stated earlier, in a strict sense, an individual can come to the Bar at any 
point in their careers, as long as they manage to fulfil the ‘entry requirements’. 
However, as I explained, coming to the Bar ‘too late’ in their legal careers may 
limit the possible positions that can be attained by them. Since the 
accumulation of legal experience is translated in an objective requirement of 
having a specific amount of time spent in the field, coming too ‘old’ to the Bar 
becomes a disadvantage when competing for certain positions or developing 
specific paths. As (Sheriff#9) explained:  
 
‘…many lawyers doing court work would aspire to the bench. I did not spend long 
enough in the High Court to have any reasonable prospects of being appointed to the 
Court of Session and High Court bench. I wasn’t there long enough to become a QC, 
and was too old to be able to have that time...’ (Sheriff#9) 
 
Likewise, taking into account the space of possible positions that are attainable 
for advocates, becoming a sheriff was not necessarily the best prospect for 
them. As (Sheriff#5) explained bluntly: 
 
‘…there was still a sort of notion back then, late 1990s, that being a Sheriff was a 
bit of an easy option. It was a job that an unsuccessful advocate could get if they 
weren’t doing well at the Bar. There was still some of that thinking…’ (Sheriff#5) 
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These responses appear to reinforce the relevance of the structural analysis of 
the field. It is interesting how the division of the juridical labour within the field 
seems to reproduce a stratification in it, which in turn, will determine the way 
they newly appointed Sheriffs approach the judicial office. As explored in 
chapter seven, this stratification has a direct impact on the way sheriffs interact 
with solicitors or advocates.  
 
9.3. A new position in the field: Getting the ‘sentence’ 
right 
 
Since Sheriffs are appointed from the pool of practitioners with at least fifteen 
years of experience, there is the implied assumption that their accumulated 
legal experience will be enough to carry out the judicial role from the outset. As 
(Sheriff#3) explained ‘…literally the minute you’re appointed you’re straight into 
court and you just have to pick it up and run with it’. This belief, I argue, is part 
of the legal habitus in the Scottish field; something that you not only just know 
but also take for granted, sometimes called ‘common sense’. Consequently, 
some of my participants believed that they were prepared to carry out their role 
from the outset; for example, (Sheriff#7) said: ‘Because I was an advocate I 
spent all my time in court so I probably had a better idea than many of how 
judges approach judging and how they put that into effect’. 
 
A long trajectory of standing in court – appearing regularly before judges - will 
inevitably provide you with practical knowledge of what a Judge's role is. 
However, it does not follow that you will be able to carry out the duty flawlessly 
from the outset. If you agree that theoretical legal knowledge about solving 
legal cases does not make a legal scholar a judge, this means you do not become 
one just because you have legal experience. In Chile, we have a proverb which 
says ‘Otra cosa es con Guitarra’, which can be translated as ‘It is one thing to 
observe how the guitar is played, playing it is a completely different thing’. This 
is to say that we can internalise how a judicial role should be exerted, but that 
does not mean we will be prepared from that sole fact to perform it ourselves. 
For example, consider this quote: 
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‘…if you are around the courts for as long as I have been, and in general many 
Sheriffs have been, through private practice, you know what is expected of you. Of 
course, it’s a bit of a culture change to be actually sitting on the bench and doing it 
(...) But it’s your wealth of knowledge throughout your career that brings you to 
know what to do. But, of course, it’s different at the beginning. It’s all new and it’s 
a bit strange. You actually making decisions on the bench. But once you get over 
that change of seat it’s not particularly difficult.’ (Sheriff#15) 
 
During the last three chapters, I have described how sentencing practice is 
embedded in a series of routines, relations, and interactions that make it more 
rigid and structured than it can seem at first glance. Thus, to a certain extent, 
the difference that Sheriffs face when they are appointed is the difference 
between theory and practice. In other words, the legal experiences of the 
Sheriffs provide them with a theoretical knowledge of the judicial role but not 
necessarily with a grasp of what the practice of that role entails. Thus, 
becoming a Sheriff involves adapting to the practicalities of the role - to its 
foreseen and unforeseen constraints, which in turn are going to influence the 
way they solve - or have to solve - some cases. 
 
‘Because it’s like I was telling you earlier, once you become resident somewhere 
you become much more involved in what’s going on out there, and I know what 
programs there are out there for people, I understand, I know where the housing 
office is, I know where the homeless place is. I know where the benefits office is. 
Sometimes it becomes a bit insular, a bit enclosed, because sometimes you forget 
there’s life beyond [X].’ (Sheriff#3) 
 
Consequently, there is a process of adaptation that the recently appointed 
sheriffs undergo to attune their legal habitus to their new position in the field. 
As (Sheriff#8) argued ‘if you have done something completely different up until 
you’re aged fifty-five and then on a Friday you become a Sheriff, and on a 
Monday you are presiding over a jury trial, it’s not easy’. Herzog-Evans (2013, p. 
44) calls this process of acculturation the ‘Zombie effect’ meaning a process of 
‘undergoing the process of acquiring’ their judicial identity. In other words, this 
process it is not only about having to catch-up with those areas of the law in 
which your knowledge is out of date but it also means having to face a series of 
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practical problems that the new position in the field requires you to solve. For 
example, let's consider how the perception of (Sheriff#1) changed: 
 
 ‘… there was more required of you than I probably thought was required of Sheriffs 
before I became one. I thought maybe it was quite a straightforward job. But once 
you’re doing it you realise how demanding it is. It’s very demanding. And I think also 
it can be upsetting at times. I think when you were either prosecuting or defence 
you would deal with some dreadful cases but you didn’t have the responsibility for 
the outcome, whereas the judge has that, the Sheriff. And I’m thinking of 
sentencing, it’s getting the sentence right. It can be quite distressing at times. I 
remember in one of these solemn cases three young men […] committed a dreadful 
attack on another man, and I had to send them to prison. And the night before, I 
knew I was going to have to send them to prison, I could hardly sleep because all I 
could think of was these boys being taken away in the prison van. And actually that 
night after I had sentenced them to prison I could just picture them getting their 
clothes taken off them and getting put into prison uniform. So that’s something I 
never really appreciated before I became a Sheriff, the demands it would have on 
you, and how things like that would upset you.’ (Sheriff#1) 
 
This response was particularly interesting because throughout my fieldwork, 
Sheriffs rarely referred to the emotional weight of sentencing. However, during 
my ‘shadowing’ this aspect of practice was pervasive. The emotional toll of the 
role was the ‘elephant in the room’. On the one hand, during the hearings, it 
was not uncommon for the human drama to unfold. Consequently, the 
mechanical or structured ritual was enveloped by something the accused said or 
did during the sentencing diet, like bursting into tears, shouting for mercy or 
interrupting the hearing to defend themselves. In one court, the Sheriff decided 
to leave the accused on remand. His first reaction was to cry, and suddenly 
assault the guards who were not able to restrain him. Two police officers who 
were there had to help them. While this happened, the Sheriff quickly left the 
courtroom, and the accused’s solicitor asked us - the few people that were in 
the public galleries - to leave the room, which we did. Later on, during the 
interview, the Sheriff did not say a word about it, and I did not mention it. It 
was as if tacitly we both knew that it was better not to talk about it. On the 
other hand, I was able to observe the ‘weight’ of sentencing decision-making. 
Interestingly, I noted that it was two-fold, not just about the consequences for 
the accused but also to deliver justice to the victims or the community. Thus, I 
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observed all of my participants, to a greater or a lesser extent, often 
questioning themselves if they had ‘got’ the sentence ‘right’. 
 
‘…You become more aware of the effect that your sentence has on people. It has an 
effect on the individual, it has an effect on their family, it can have an effect in 
domestic cases, your disposal will have an effect on the whole family. It can have an 
effect on the community. So you become much more aware of that. And I think that 
as you become more confident you realise ‘I understand there’s another way to deal 
with this. And I know where I’m going with this. And everybody might think I’m 
being a bit soft putting this person on a Community Payback Order, but I know 
that’s probably going to be harder for them but better overall for everybody 
because what I want to do is stop him offending.’ So you become less worried about 
what other people will think about your sentencing and you become more confident 
that you are doing what you think is the right thing to do, and having the courage to 
do that.’ (Sheriff#3) 
 
The Sheriffs’ concerns for ‘getting the sentence right’ was another aspect that 
was omnipresent during my fieldwork in one way or another. Contrary to what I 
was expecting to find, I realised that Sheriffs were always concerned with the 
fairness of what they were doing. On a formal level, the appeal court worked as 
a constraint on their decision-making: 
 
‘…sentencing is a far more difficult, far more nuanced task than I think people 
realise (…) And it constantly is tweaking. And of course to some extent it’s not just 
tweaked by your own views but also it’s tweaked by what you think you can get 
away with, with the Appeal Court. Because I might have a view and say ‘for this 
sentence you lose your liberty.’ But there’s no point in me imposing that sentence 
as a general rule if you know you’re going to be appealed, it’ll go to the Appeal 
Court and it’s going to be overturned. You have to take cognisance of the decisions 
that the Appeal Court are making. You may not agree with them but you have to 
largely follow them.’ (Sheriff#12) 
 
Thus, to a certain extent, their concern to allocate a fair sentence seemed to 
lead several of my participants to adopt a flexible approach to sentencing. As 
(Sheriff#12) put it, a ‘constant tweaking’ of their practice, which involves a 
reflexive gaze towards their past and current legal experience. Jamieson (2013) 
sees this attitude as an attribute of the ‘reflexive judge’; one that could be 
summarised by the following quote: 
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 ‘…those who are appointed to the full-time position will necessarily have quite a lot 
of experience of judges of various kinds and appearing before them. And (…) it is 
likely that they will have something of if not a role model, then at least examples, 
as you imply, of people who they would like to appear. And they have also probably 
more searingly ingrained in your brain examples of judges who they don’t want to 
be. Because there have been some truly awful judges out there. The difficulty is 
this, that psychologically of course one may acquire bad habits on the bench without 
knowing it. And one may acquire the habits even of bad judges without being fully 
aware that you’re doing it. So I think to become a good judge requires a conscious 
appreciation and a conscious reassessment, if not on a daily basis, certainly on a 
weekly basis, of who you are, what you’ve been doing, how well you did something 
on the bench and how badly you did things on the bench, and how you can do things 
better.’ (Sheriff#6) 
 
This ‘dynamic’ self-analysis elicited an interesting off-the-record dialogue with a 
Sheriff. The Sheriff and I spent the morning at court, where a custodial sentence 
was imposed. Later on, in chambers, the Judge asked me what I thought of that 
decision. I perceived that the Sheriff was concerned that the sanction could 
have been too severe. However, mechanically - my legal habitus kicking in - I 
explained that in Chile the sentence would have been longer, harsher. I doubt 
that my response was what the Sheriff was expecting. This spontaneous 
interaction struck me in two ways. For the first time, I realised - from the 
perspective of a former practitioner - how hard sentencing is. In Chile, the 
criminal code has a complete system of ‘sentencing rules’; thus, everything is 
regulated. Consequently, in my experience, Chilean practitioners do not feel the 
same weight while sentencing, we apply the rules. If the outcome ‘feels wrong’ 
or ‘unfair’, this is the consequence of the flaws of the law not of our individual 
decisions. Hence I could empathise with and understand the constant ‘tweaking’ 
or ‘self-analysis’ to which some Sheriffs referred. 
 
The second aspect that hit me was realising that - despite how Judges 
performed their role in court - in the chambers, they showed a vulnerability 
regarding an omnipresent doubt: did they get the sentence right? This doubt - 
that Sheriffs seemed to be resigned to experience sometimes - could not be 
reduced to their concerns around avoiding an appeal. As explored in chapter 
seven, Sheriffs engaged in a dialogical way with all the sources of information 
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that the other penal actors provided for them. However, the ultimate decision is 
theirs alone. 
 
 ‘The decision is mine at the end of the day. The Procurator Fiscal and the defence 
agent are there presenting the case as best as they can from their client’s point of 
view. I don’t really have anybody else. Yes, I’ve got colleagues I can bounce ideas 
off and say ‘would it be a ridiculous thing if I did A, B, or C in these circumstances?’ 
I can do that and get a response, and I think we all do that. But I can’t say to the 
colleague ‘what do I do here?’ That’s my job. So in that sense it’s solitary.’ 
(Sheriff#4) 
 
What is interesting is that, to a certain extent, the adaptation required for the 
newly appointed Sheriffs seems never to stop. Whether because of intellectual 
inquisitiveness or because the constant dynamic changes of the legal field force 
them, tweaking sentencing practices seems never to end. Nevertheless, I 
realised that this reflexive effort was always determined by the ‘position-taking’ 
that the sheriff had adopted concerning sentencing purposes. This is the final 
aspect I am going to explore in the next section. 
 
9.4. ‘My approach is just to make a decision’: Defining 
the sentencing role 
 
I have argued that recently appointed Sheriffs have to learn and adapt to the 
‘rhythm’ or ‘pace’ of work of their new position. However, even after they have 
internalised what ‘hands-on’ judicial work involves, this does not explain how 
they determine their ‘judicial style’; how they define their approach to the 
judicial role. For example, regarding sentencing, this requires them to 
determine their practical approach to the application of sentencing principles 
and purposes. On this particular aspect of their judicial role, all the Sheriffs I 
interviewed were acutely aware that, overall, different Sheriffs had different 
styles. As I have been arguing in this chapter, this may be an obvious 
consequence of the diverse and rich backgrounds of the lawyers that are 
selected for the role. It is important to remember that this is a system where 
lawyers are appointed because of their legal experience in the field through 
which they are expected to be able to carry out the judicial role from 
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appointment. Therefore, unsurprisingly, sheriffs with different legal backgrounds 
develop different sentencing styles. 
 
‘…all you can do is bring your own human experiences and experiences as a lawyer 
and experience of working within the criminal justice system and within the civil or 
justice system. All you can do is bring all of that to bear and balance everything. 
And that’s why you will get so many different sentencing options for Sheriffs. Sheriff 
[X] (…) and I tend to sentence the same way. We tend to think the same way. But 
Sheriff [Y] would approach it a different way. There’s no right and wrong answer to 
that, [s/he’s] just bringing a different perspective to it than I’m bringing to it. (…) 
And they couldn’t be criticised for that because that would be an acceptable 
sentence. I think you approach it differently.’ (Sheriff#3) 
 
I found the last part of this quote striking because it is often forgotten or taken 
for granted. If you can observe Sheriffs with different sentencing styles it is 
because sentencing itself, the penological aspect of it, allows it. In other words, 
given how broad sentencing principles and purposes are, different Sheriffs can 
apply different purposes and rationalities to similar cases. Their decisions will 
not be unreasonable so long as they are consistent within themselves; with what 
that principle demands. Consider the following quote: 
 
‘…as you know every judge has their own sentencing styles. And what one tends to 
see from the literature, as you know better than me, is you tend to get in 
experienced judges internal consistency so that if you look at any one judge he or 
she will always tend to sentence this sort of case in this sort of way, that sort of 
case in that sort of way, so there is a certain degree of predictability.’ (Sheriff#6) 
 
The question that emerges from this analysis is: can we try to understand what 
is behind these sentencing styles? Can the observation of practice shed some 
light on this ‘position-taking’? And what is the relation of these sentencing styles 
with the philosophy of punishment and the Sheriff’s understanding of the 
sentencing role?  The main issue of trying to understand this aspect of 
sentencing practices, as I have discussed above, is that if I asked the Sheriffs 
their views on sentencing purposes, they provided me with a ‘handbook’ 
response. However, this question elicited an interesting discussion with 
(Sheriff#16): 
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‘I’ve never really been quite sure what the purpose is. It’s public protection, it’s 
punishment, it’s an opportunity for retribution, it’s an opportunity for reform. I 
don’t know. That’s such a huge philosophical, difficult thing.’ (Sheriff#16)  
 
Despite this response, this particular Sheriff's sentencing practices were not 
arbitrary. His/her practice contained a penological logic of practice. The Sheriff 
further explained that ‘My approach is just to make a decision. Just this case has 
come before me, I have to make a decision. Just make a decision’. However, 
these two responses have to be contextualised with previous answers that this 
Sheriff provided. Earlier on - during the interview- we discussed if s/he shared 
the views of others Sheriffs - in small jurisdictions - of using harsher sentences as 
a deterrent, thus, trying to stop certain behaviours, the Sheriff said: 
 
 ‘It’s the crime that I’m sentencing on. The crime and the person (…) Sheriffs don’t 
actually impact. We don’t change people’s behaviour. And I can understand an 
argument for doing that, I’m not criticising any Sheriff.’ (Sheriff#16) 
 
(Sheriff#16)'s practice is quintessentially determined by what seems to be the 
‘obvious’ purpose of sentencing: To allocate a sanction. This response that may 
seem like a platitude requires a more nuanced analysis. Even though sentencing 
purposes are a theoretical construct, they reveal that there are several different 
ways to approach the act of sentencing. However, while it is tempting to label 
this Sheriff as retributivist, that would ignore the fact that this Judge does not 
label him/herself as such. In this regard, when the Sheriff says ‘It’s the crime 
that I’m sentencing on’ we need to try to understand this phrase in its practical 
context carefully. Through the observation of this Sheriff in court I realised 
her/his practices put the offence at the centre of their decision-making. The 
individual characteristics of the offender were only relevant if they were 
required to assess the suitability of the individual for a particular disposal. 
Therefore, within this model, as the old Latin phrase, goes, the Judge ‘Punitur 
quia peccatum est’ - the offender is punished because s/he has committed an 
offence.25 
                                         
25 This Latin phrase is often contrasted with ‘Punitur, ne peccetur’ which means that punishment 
is imposed to stop reoffending of that particular offender 
(rehabilitation/incapacitation/individual deterrence) or deter other people from committing 
offences (general deterrence). 
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(Sheriff#16)'s approach to sentencing helped me to better understand how 
several Sheriffs I interviewed articulated the logic of their practices. I was 
expecting to find a practical position-taking concerning the philosophy of 
punishment. This is to say, a personal position-taking influenced by their 
previous legal, political or religious experiences. Instead, I found something 
slightly different, but distinct nonetheless. The different sentencing styles seem 
to be linked to how the Sheriffs conceptualise their sentencing role. Their 
‘penological’ practice is related to the question of what their sentencing role as 
Sheriffs is, rather than being concerned with the purpose of punishment in the 
abstract. For example, as (Sheriff#3) put it while explaining the use of custodial 
sentences: ‘although you have discretion and although you have a role to play 
and this is your job, I have [a] duty to the public. We have a duty to the public, 
we’re serving a public role here in enforcing the law that this country has 
created.’ 
 
Consider the following answer of (Sheriff#5), who -- regarding sentencing 
practices -- is on opposite end of the spectrum to (Sheriff#16). 
 
 ‘I think I was very conscious from the outset that I didn’t really have a proper 
understanding of sentencing. I came from a mainly civil background as a lawyer (…) 
And I wanted to learn about that and to inform myself, and I did that by reading, 
but I also joined SASO, the Scottish Association for the Study of Offending (…) that 
has been invaluable (…) meeting police officers, social workers, prison officers, and 
talking about criminology, about criminals and sentencing. I am very consciously 
engaged with the criminal justice social workers, I started having meetings with 
them and just learning from them what they knew about addressing people’s needs. 
So there’s no doubt from the very beginning until now I’ve learned a huge amount. 
And my approach to not only sentencing but how I deal with people in court, both in 
the civil and the criminal courts, is influenced by that experience.’ (Sheriff#5)  
 
This Sheriff's path in finding the best way to exert their role, is, again, not 
articulated through the philosophy of punishment. Instead, the judge seeks out 
practitioners to understand the nature of sentencing, and therefore the nature 
of their role as a sentencer. This leads us to the most relevant aspect of this 
quote; the Sheriff states that s/he aimed to learn how to address ‘people’s 
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needs’. This phrase becomes a central aspect of this Sheriff's approach to 
sentencing in which the offender -- and the way of dealing with them as 
individuals -- becomes central. If (Sheriff#16) was an example of a role exerted 
according to the principle ‘Punitur quia peccatum est’, (Sheriff#5) is an example 
of an approach based in the principle of ‘Punitur, ne Peccetur’. This is probably 
best exemplified in the next quote: 
 
‘There are certain individuals that I simply won’t send to prison because they’ve got 
mental health problems or emotional problems and prison is simply not the answer. 
And inside myself, privately, I’m thinking ‘this person has a problem but I can’t 
solve it.’ And sending the person to prison is not a solution. Society has a 
responsibility to find an answer. And if this person keeps offending then eventually 
society will realise that the responsibility is the community’s to find a solution for 
some people. That’s getting a bit political and a bit philosophical, but it affects my 
thinking.’(Sheriff#5) 
 
As you may note in this quote, the Sheriff recognises that some offenders have 
problems s/he ‘can't solve’. (Sheriff#5) was very interested in - s/he is a 
promoter actually - of ‘problem-solving court’ approaches. However, instead of 
articulating this position regarding the philosophy of punishment, s/he 
explained: 
 
‘I think that as a lawyer you have to have the ability to form a view about a problem 
and to stand by it. Your whole training is about looking at a problem and deciding 
what the answer is and justifying that with reasons. So I suppose from the very start 
of my time as a lawyer I’ve approached it that way. And actually becoming a Sheriff 
I didn’t feel any great change. I found that I was applying the same reasoning, and 
as long as I’m happy with my reasoning then very often the decision speaks for 
itself. The reasoning leads you to a decision. So that hasn’t changed, and I don’t 
find it lonely at all.’ (Sheriff#5) 
 
Having said this, the argument I am trying to put forward is that despite 
the inevitable discussion on the philosophy of punishment linked to 
sentencing practices, the position taken by the Sheriffs is related to their 
practical understanding of what is required of their role. In a sense, both 
(Sheriff#16) and #5 are aware that they are ‘called’ to allocate sanctions. 
However, they do it differently because their legal experiences, their 
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professional trajectories, and their legal habitus have led them to adopt a 
different position towards how this role has to be exerted in practice. 
Nevertheless, these position-takings, however different they may be, are 
valid stances within the field. In other words, both ways of exercising the 
role lie within the boundaries of the acceptable ways in which the role can 
be performed. Where (Sheriff#16) believes that sanctions do not change 
offenders, (Sheriff#5) believes they can provide that opportunity. 
(Sheriff#16) therefore looks back at the crime; (Sheriff#5) looks forward to 
what punishment (or withholding punishment) may achieve. 
 
The different articulations of the roles are certainly blurred in practice because, 
despite the distinctive styles, there are a finite number of outcomes available. 
Therefore, while is true that two different Sheriffs may deal with similar cases 
differently, it is also possible that two different styles may converge in the same 
outcome. Also, as explained in chapter five, the Sheriff's sentencing powers are 
bounded depending on whether the case was prosecuted using solemn or 
summary procedure. Moreover, these powers are further limited, for example, 
by offences with statutory maximums, ‘restrictions on passing sentence of 
imprisonment or detention’26  or ‘presumption against short-term sentences’27. 
As (Sheriff#9) argued ‘I don’t have a discretion about which rules apply. I have a 
discretion within a limited area about what sentence to select’.  
 
Ultimately, the different understandings of sentencing roles adopted by 
(Sheriff#5) and (Sheriff#16) are possible because both positions are contained 
within the limited number of possible ways that the Sheriff role can be exerted 
within this field. This is to say, that as contrasting as their approaches can be, 
both rationales - inasmuch they are consistent with themselves- cannot be 
deemed as incorrect or unfair. 
 
From this dimension, all the sentencing practices that I observed from my 
participants were in a continuum between a greater or lesser use of custodial 
sentences. Those sheriffs who used fewer custodial sentences were those who, 
                                         
26 S. 204 – 204A - Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995. 
27 S. 17 - Criminal Justice and Licensing (Scotland) Act 2010. 
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for one reason or another, gave more chances to recidivist offenders or non-
compliers; thus, they made more attempts to use disposals to help offenders 
and/or reduce reoffending. In other words, the differences were between the 
recognition of the needs of the offenders in sentencing -- and to what degree 
they were recognised. This correlated with how the sheriff used the CJSWRs. 
One sheriff, whose views about sentencing were closer to (Sheriff#16) 
understanding of the role, complained that the reports contained too much 
information. At the other end of the continuum, a sheriff who actively tried to 
help young offenders considered that all the information contained in CJSWRs 
was very useful for their decisions. 
 
In conclusion, it is important also to note that the evolution of the normative 
sentencing framework in Scotland during the last few years has aimed to 
encourage the use of community sentences by the sheriff and to disincentivise 
the use of custodial sentences. Regardless of how political pressures are 
incarnated through these legal reforms, they have managed to shape sentencing 
practices. They have widened the scope of the possible ways to exert the role, 
subverting a merely punitive or robust approach. 
 
9.5. Conclusions 
 
In this chapter, I shifted the gaze from the practices to the Sheriffs themselves. 
The aim was to try to see how the legal habitus - developed by the Sheriffs 
during their legal careers - shapes the way they understand their judicial role. 
Critically, I tried to revisit with the Sheriffs the trajectories that brought them 
to be appointed Sheriffs. The exploration of how their perspectives change after 
being appointed or how their pasts influence their present practices aims to 
reveal how the past is always within the present; the path to becoming a Sheriff 
shapes the practice of being a Sheriff. Every time the Sheriffs use their past 
experiences as ‘knowledge’ to deal with the current issues, past becomes 
present.  
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CHAPTER 10: Being a Sheriff: Doing Justice 
 
This thesis aims to grasp the logic of sentencing practices at the Scottish Sheriff 
Courts. The goal is to try to understand the penology of everyday life for 
Scottish judges; the practical dimension of sentencing decision-making. As 
discussed in chapter two and three, one of the challenges of studying sentencing 
is the need to conceptualise it theoretically. Thus, as explained earlier, I 
adopted Bourdieu's theory of practice which means conceptualising sentencing as 
a social practice. This framework has determined the way I have approached my 
subject, explored it during the fieldwork, analysed it and, finally, the way I have 
structured the last four chapters where I have examined the findings of my 
research. In these chapters, I have tried to grasp the logic of practice behind 
sentencing at the Sheriff Court. The final goal is to try to understand both the 
penological rationale behind these practices, and the way that Sheriffs 
conceptualise their role as sentencers. 
 
In this chapter, I am going to synthesize my four different findings chapters, 
using a Bourdieusian theoretical framework. The structure of the analysis I am 
going to deploy in this chapter will be divided into four sections. Firstly, I offer 
an examination of the encounter between habitus and the field, which aims to 
explore the two aspects that set the structural context for sentencing practice 
as decision-making. Once I have described how the space for decisions emerges, 
I go on to examine how the Sheriffs position themselves penologically and how 
this impacts the way they exert the sentencing role. Next, I discuss how these 
practices reflect and express a penology of daily life. I will end with some 
conclusions and recommendations for research, policy and practice. 
 
However, instead of starting the analysis by centring attention on the practices - 
as described in chapters six to eight - I am going to reverse the structure and 
begin by focusing on the agents and their habitus - as described in chapter nine. 
The reason is that this strategy acknowledges the ‘double’ nature of the habitus. 
As Bourdieu explained: 
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‘…it is important to know that there is, in my view, a key double relationship at the 
centre of any human action: this is, first, a relationship between the field and its 
agents, which can be described in deterministic, causal terms; and, second, a goal-
focused relationship that comes to fruition through the relationship between an 
agent’s dispositions and the field as it is, and which becomes a space of possibilities 
as a system of dispositions, a habitus, begins to assimilate it.’ (Bourdieu, 2013/2017, 
p. 320) 
 
Therefore, the analysis requires a gaze that folds over itself. Like a Celtic knot, 
in which an intricate pattern goes through the same points several times from 
different sides, outlining a complex set of lines that connect with each other, 
the Bourdieusian analysis of practices requires a similar movement.  
 
Next, it is important to stress that the relationship between field and habitus is 
different from the relationship between habitus and field (Bourdieu, 2015). The 
former is the relation by which agents internalise the ‘nomos’, the rules of the 
field. Consequently, there is a first relationship in which the specific field 
conditions the habitus of the agents.  
 
For my analysis, this relationship can be seen at two levels: in chapter nine, the 
Sheriffs explained their legal trajectories and how they adapted to their new 
position in the field. More critically, they told me that they were expected to 
know how to fulfil their new role because of their accumulated legal experiences 
as practitioners. This structural aspect of the judicial system in Scotland sets the 
second level of analysis, which is implicit. In other words, if the Sheriffs know -- 
or are expected to know -- how to fulfil the judicial role because of those 
experiences they internalised when they held a different position in the field, 
then the current practices I described in chapters six to eight are, at least 
partly, the reproduction of those past practices. Consequently, the shift from 
the description of the findings towards the analysis means a regression: to 
progress it is necessary to move back and only then is it possible to move 
forward. 
 
Once this relationship (field - habitus) has been explored; we can progress to the 
inverse relation (habitus - field). In other words, the analysis has to discuss what 
this legal habitus entails, before considering how this specific habitus, faced 
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with the current field, generates a space of possible sentencing decisions. This 
means returning to the practices I described, but for now, I focus on how they 
outline a space of possibilities (and thus constraints upon) for action. 
 
10.1. Summary of findings 
 
In In this subsection, I aim to briefly summarise the findings examined in 
chapters six to nine, which I divided into two topics: the structural context of 
decision making and the habitus of the Sheriffs. The first three chapters - six to 
eight - focus on describing the materiality of the process I observed. Chapter six 
focuses on the ‘When’ and the ‘Where’; chapter seven focuses on the ‘How’; 
and chapter eight focuses on the decision-making itself. Chapter nine aimed to 
explore the specific legal habitus of the Sheriffs - as discussed in the first 
sections of this chapter. Thus, I am going to explore the interconnections 
between the four chapters briefly and see how they outline a ‘space of 
possibles’ (and impossibles) that shapes actions and processes for the Sheriffs. In 
other words, I aim to show how they reveal a larger picture when brought 
together. They depict a structural context in which the individual decision-
making is embedded, which inevitably shapes sentencing practice. Consequently 
- before starting this analysis - I am going to proceed to summarise the findings 
of these three chapters. 
 
In chapter six, I deployed the analysis of two aspects that are central to the 
study of practices within a Bourdieusian framework: time and place. Thus, in the 
chapter, through the exploration of these aspects of sentencing, I was able to 
discover a decision-making process that is framed and subjected to specific 
constraints derived from its temporal and spatial dimensions. Likewise, in the 
field, I found that sentencing takes place in several different places, each one 
with its own temporality. These spatial and temporal contexts - as I explore 
later in chapters seven and eight - are linked to each other forming a structured 
procedure. In brief, chapter six set the stage for the analysis of sentencing. It 
describes the ‘when and where’, before we explore the ‘how’ and ‘what’ of 
those practices. 
 
  212 
 
 
In chapter seven, I focused on the different sources of information Sheriffs have 
to deal with. This analysis sacrifices the temporal context, to understand how 
and when Judges' interact with the information that is provided to them. 
However, this analysis requires a consideration of two aspects. On the one hand, 
the way Sheriffs weigh the information is highly influenced by the professional 
relationship they have with the actors who produce that information. On the 
other hand, this analysis allows us to observe how Sheriffs do not receive all the 
information at once, but rather, have to make sense of it in different moments 
and contexts. In brief, what is supposed to be a simple question - how do 
Sheriffs deal with the information provided to them for making their decisions - 
reveals a set of complex relationships. Thus, we see the Sheriffs and their 
judicial practices in interaction with the court’s structure which requires them 
to carry out their role within specific temporal and spatial constraints. 
Furthermore, this analysis also indirectly reveals a set of interpersonal relations 
that illustrate the courtroom community and its effects on the decision-making 
process. 
 
Chapter eight aimed to explore the outcomes of the sentencing process. Instead 
of asking my participants to talk about sentencing in the abstract or using mock 
exercises, I discussed with them the rationale behind the allocation of sanctions 
in real cases they dealt with on the days I visited their courts. This allowed a 
grounded analysis of the decision-making ‘in action’. This approach allowed me 
to explore the practical rationale behind the use of custodial sentences, CPOs, 
fines and admonitions. In this regard, I discovered how the assessment of the 
seriousness of the offence seems to establish a hierarchy among the different 
disposals: more serious offences will be dealt with through imprisonment; less 
serious ones with a fine or admonition. However, in between, there is plenty of 
space for overlapping and grey areas that reveal a rich and dynamic use of 
practical rationales. This is particularly relevant when Sheriffs are faced with 
recidivists or individuals that do not comply with community sentences. 
 
In the final findings chapter, I shifted the focus from practices to Sheriffs 
themselves. During the fieldwork and, later on, during the analysis of the data it 
became clear that to understand better the Sheriffs' habitus I needed to examine 
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it within its context. The chapter was divided into four sections: what kind of 
experience Sheriffs had before being appointed; then, why they decided to 
become a Sheriff; what was the process of adapting to their new role; and, 
finally, how did they explain their approach to their sentencing role. The 
chapter showed how their past legal experiences are a crucial factor in how 
Sheriffs constitute the judicial role. Unlike in continental systems, in which 
being a Judge is a part of a judicial career that requires specific training, in 
Scotland you become one because of your professional trajectory. Therefore, 
that experience is inseparable from the judicial identity, because it is the 
central core on which that identity is constructed. 
 
10.2. Escaping the ‘fog’ of ‘intuition’ 
 
One of the relevant aspects of the study of practices is trying to understand how 
- within the limited timeframes and the limited information given - agents 
‘know’ how to carry out their practices. During my fieldwork, and particularly 
while discussing their practices (chapters seven and eight) and their past 
trajectories (chapter nine), I noted that Sheriffs explicitly and implicitly 
mentioned that their practices were grounded in the acquisition and possession 
of specific legal experience. This experience, as discussed in chapter seven, 
allows them to acquire - swiftly - an idea of the range of disposals that is 
appropriate for a case simply by reading the case papers. Some Sheriffs 
explained this ease as reflecting an intuitive process, thus establishing a 
connection with intuition grounded in experience or ‘expert intuition’. 
 
Responses of this kind were not unexpected. In recent research on sentencing in 
Scotland, when Sheriffs were asked to describe the sentencing process most of 
them stated that they saw it as an ‘intuitive process’, something that arose from 
the experience they had accumulated within the legal field. For example, Tombs 
(2004) asked her participants ‘whether the decision-making process involved was 
primarily structured or more intuitive and based on experience’ (2004, p. 42). 
All of her participants said that intuition did play a role in their decision-making. 
Even those who described sentencing as structured ‘noted that intuition and 
experience also played a part’ (2004, pp. 42-45). More recently Brown (2017) 
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explored the same issue. From his twenty-five participants, only two described 
sentencing as a purely structured process  (2017, p. 184). Again, the majority of 
his sample recognised that intuition plays a primary or at least secondary role in 
their decision making  (2017, pp. 184-191). 
 
The question of what ‘intuition’ entails in sentencing, and moreover, what the 
use of the term is conveying is relevant not only for methodological and 
analytical purposes. In several common law jurisdictions, the description of 
sentencing as an ‘intuitive’ process is embedded within a ‘wider’ debate on the 
nature of sentencing (Brown, 2017; Hutton, 2006; 2016; Lovegrove, 2000). In 
brief, the issue revolves around the suspicion that instinctive approaches to 
sentencing may lead to ‘inconsistency, both in outcome and principle, and make 
sentencing unpredictable’ (Bagaric, 2015, p. 112). The underlying question in 
these debates concerns the introduction (or not) of guidelines, and thus a 
curtailment of judges' discretionary powers. 
 
Australia is probably the jurisdiction that best encapsulates the different 
positions that this debate elicits. As early as 1975, the Full Court of the Supreme 
Court of Victoria delivered a decision in the case ‘R v. Williscroft’ (Edney & 
Bagaric, 2007). In the leading judgement by Justices Adam and Crocket, the 
sentencing process is described as an ‘instinctive synthesis of all the various 
aspects involved in the punitive process’.28 Thirty years later, in 2005, a new 
decision - Markarian v The Queen – ‘affirmed the desirability - in the absence of 
statutory direction - of the instinctive synthesis approach to sentencing’ (Edney 
& Bagaric, 2007, p. 23). For what matters here, Justice McHugh offered a new 
definition for this approach: 
 
 ‘By instinctive synthesis, I mean the method of sentencing by which the judge 
identifies all the factors that are relevant to the sentence, discusses their 
significance and then makes a value judgment as to what is the appropriate 
sentence given all the factors of the case. Only at the end of the process does the 
judge determine the sentence.’29  
 
                                         
28 Williscroft [1975] VR 292, 300. 
29 Markarian [2005] HCA 25, 51 
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This way of understanding what sentencing should be has been met with 
criticism from sentencing academics in Australia  (Hewton, 2010; Bagaric, 2015; 
Lovegrove, 2000). A full elaboration of this debate is beyond the scope of this 
thesis; however, as I said earlier, inevitably I have to mention this issue for 
three reasons.  
 
Firstly, to say that ‘intuition’ is a ‘method of sentencing’ is to confuse the 
symptom for the cause, thus obscuring the real nature of the process. As I have 
argued in chapter three, the inability of judges to explain how they arrive at 
their decisions is predictable. From a sociological perspective Bourdieu argued 
that: 
 
‘An agent who possesses a practical mastery, an art, whatever it may be, is capable 
of applying in his action the disposition which appears to him only in action (…) But 
he is no better placed to perceive what really governs his practice and to bring it to 
the order of discourse (…) And there is every reason to think that as soon as he 
reflects on his practice, adopting a quasi-theoretical posture, the agent loses any 
chance of expressing the truth of his practice, and especially the truth of the 
practical relation to the practice’. (Bourdieu, 1980/1990, pp. 90-91)  
 
In other words, one of the puzzling aspects of practices is that the ‘knowing 
how’ is not a ‘knowing that’. As Ryle (1945-46, pp. 4-5) argued, ‘knowledge-how 
cannot be defined in terms of knowledge-that and further, that knowledge-how 
is a concept logically prior to the concept of knowledge-that’. Nevertheless - as 
Boltanski (2012/2014; 2009/2011) and Celikates (2009/2018) warn us - this 
should not lead us to incur the methodological mistake of ignoring, neglecting or 
underestimating what agents can do and do tell us about their practices. Agents 
may not be able to convey with clarity what they do, but they are undoubtedly 
offering their first-hand perceptions of the process. If we neglect this, we risk 
increasing the: 
 
‘asymmetry between deceived actors and a sociologist capable - and, it would 
appear from some formulations, the only one capable - of revealing the truth of 
their social condition to them. This leads to overestimating the power of sociology 
as science, the sole foundation on which the sociologist could base his claim to know 
much more about people than they themselves know.’ (Boltanksi, 2009/2011, p. 21) 
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Cognitive psychology research studies on expert intuition sheds light on this 
issue. For example, Simon explains that it is not unusual for ‘experts’ to 
describe their decision-making processes as intuitive. He argues that: 
 
 ‘In everyday speech, we use the word intuition to describe a problem-solving or 
question-answering performance that is speedy and for which the expert is unable 
to describe in detail the reasoning or other process that produced the answer. The 
situation has provided a cue; this cue has given the expert access to information 
stored in memory, and the information provides the answer. Intuition is nothing 
more and nothing less than recognition.’ (Simon, 1992, p. 155) 
 
This psychological account of how intuition works seems to converge with the 
sociological Bourdieusian notion of habitus. As discussed previously in chapter 
three, Bourdieu uses this concept to explain that agents are endowed with 
cognitive schemes and dispositions for practical action which are acquired or 
‘inscribed in their bodies by past experiences’ (Bourdieu, 1997/2000, p. 138). 
These ‘mental schemata’ are acquired because ‘…cumulative exposure to 
certain social conditions instils in individuals an ensemble of durable and 
transposable dispositions that internalize the necessities of the extant social 
environment’ (Wacquant, 1992, p. 13). Therefore, intuition seems to be how the 
Judges perceive a decision-making process which is grounded in their 
experience. Which is to say that using the concept of intuition seems to be a way 
to communicate the ease with which they carry out sentencing. 
Secondly, the obscurity of the explanation further impairs the possibility of 
critical examination of sentencing decisions. As Hutton argued: 
 
 ‘The public is invited to place their trust in the office of the judge.  Judges  are  
uniquely  qualified  to  deploy  these  mysterious  cognitive  processes  and  thereby  
to  deliver  just  sentencing  decisions.’ (2016, p. 146) 
 
Furthermore, some psychological research studies have tried to answer the 
question ‘When can you trust an experienced professional who claims to have an 
intuition?’ (Kahneman, 2011, p. 234). Recently Klein and Kahneman  (2009) - 
who have studied this problem from different approaches - arrived at a 
consensus on a critical aspect of our current discussion: while intuition can arise 
from the development of expertise, the conditions for this to happen are quite 
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restrictive. Thus, as Kahneman (2011, p. 238) bluntly put it ‘there are many 
pseudo-experts who have no idea that they do not know what they are doing’.  
 
In other words, having experience in one area does not mean that ‘expert 
intuition’ will necessarily lead to an appropriate solution. If the conditions for 
successful intuitive decision-making are not met, this can lead to biased 
decisions. This does not deny the value of experience, but it does mean that we 
cannot claim that the possession of experience automatically makes ‘experts’ 
good decision-makers. If we are going to make such claims we need to carry out 
research measuring the quality of their decisions. Otherwise, as Hutton implied, 
claims about intuition are nothing more than an ‘argumentum ad verecundiam’ - 
an appeal to authority. 
 
The final reason why intuition is relevant is the inevitable consequence of the 
epistemological and methodological issues discussed above. While it is true that 
when Sheriffs are asked to explain their decisions, they offered post-hoc 
rationalisations, if you untangle these explanations - as I did in chapters seven 
and eight - they reveal some of the variables and cues that Judges take into 
account during their ‘intuitive’ process; for example, the age and gender of the 
offender or the seriousness of the offence. Their accounts tell us their 
perceptions of structural or local constraints that affect, restrict or limit their 
practices; for instance, the available resources and programmes for community 
sentences. Ultimately, even though these accounts do not allow us to 
understand the rationale behind the decision-making, the do at least allow us to 
grasp some aspects of the mental schemas that make these decisions possible. 
Thus, again, the challenge is to try to go beyond and beneath this ‘intuitive 
process’.  
 
The next step - which I am going to explore in the following subsections - is to 
try to understand the acquisition of the mental schemas that make it possible 
for all Sheriffs to impose a sentence. For this analysis, the role of legal 
experience becomes crucial: how it is acquired, how it changes and adapts over 
time and how the constraints and possibilities of the field reconfigure it. 
Ultimately, the encounter between the habitus and the field is what allows us to 
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explore the Sheriffs’ ‘position-takings’ concerning a penology of ‘everyday life’. 
This penological position-taking implies and entails an understanding of the 
judicial role that involves goals and limitations. 
 
10.2.1. Legal experience as a form of Habitus 
 
When I started my fieldwork, I was unsure of my ability to ‘escape the fog’ of 
sentencing practices. I knew I was going to be able to interview Sheriffs, but 
would I have the chance to go beyond and beneath the ‘intuitive process’ or the 
‘black box’ of sentencing decision-making? Having adopted a Bourdieusian 
framework - and thus having conceptualised and problematized sentencing as a 
practice - I was prepared for the methodological challenges of this task. 
However, I was unsure if the access that I was granted was going to be enough. 
As I mentioned in chapter four, shadowing became a crucial aspect of my 
research, providing me with the opportunity to observe different aspects of 
Sheriffs’ practices. Moreover, the Sheriffs’ openness to discussing, explaining 
and teaching me about their practices was also critical in dispersing the ‘fog’ of 
sentencing practices. During my fieldwork, the Sheriffs directly or indirectly 
mentioned the value of ‘legal experience’ as a way of explaining certain aspects 
of their practice.  However, this notion seemed to work in three different ways. 
 
Firstly, it was used to convey that it was their acquisition of ‘legal experience’; 
that taught the Sheriffs the ‘know-how’ of legal practice in general and of 
sentencing in particular. In this sense, this practical knowledge - that they had 
internalised - allowed them to deal with cases ‘intuitively’ or at least with ease. 
However, the question that arose was ‘what kind of practical knowledge is this’? 
One could be tempted to argue that what constitutes lawyers as such, what 
gives them their particular competency, is their knowledge of the law. But then 
there would be no difference between legal scholars and practitioners. As 
discussed in chapter five, the Scottish legal system is constructed around the 
notion that, to become a practitioner, you are required to acquire court 
experience. In this regard, the acquisition of court experience works as ‘legal 
capital’, which will allow you to progress in your legal career and acquire higher 
positions within the field. Within the Scottish system, one of the higher positions 
  219 
 
 
you can attain, if you have accumulated enough legal capital, is to become a 
Judge. 
 
Accordingly, on several occasions, while discussing their practices, the Sheriffs 
explicitly or implicitly alluded to how their professional trajectories provided 
them with the knowledge to perform their role - as explored in more detail in 
the last chapter. This may seem obvious but it is the direct consequence of 
Scotland’s so-called ‘recognition judicial system’ (Georgakopoulos, 2000; 
Garoupa & Ginsburg, 2009; 2011). Thus, you become a Judge precisely because 
of your legal trajectory and the unique experience – the legal capital - you have 
acquired. Therefore, you are meant to bring this experience to bear in 
performing the judicial role well. Thus, to become a Sheriff - as discussed in 
chapter five - you are required to have at least ten years of court experience. In 
practice, most Sheriffs are appointed after fifteen or twenty years of legal 
practice. 
 
This aspect of the Scottish Judicial system can be better analysed when 
contrasted with some continental systems like the French or Chilean judiciaries. 
In these jurisdictions, there is a judicial career system, where you are expected 
to become a Judge early on in your professional career and to progress within 
the judicial hierarchy (Georgakopoulos, 2000). For example, during 2018, two of 
the most renowned Judges of the Chilean Supreme Court retired after turning 
seventy-five years old: both their professional trajectories within the judiciary 
spanned fifty years. One of them started his career as a court clerk, the other as 
a lower judge in a rural court. Unlike the Scottish system, they were appointed 
very early in their careers, and thus, they were able to be promoted in several 
judicial positions until being appointed as Supreme Court Judges. Depending on 
how you see it, the advantage or disadvantage of this system is that because you 
enter into a judicial career almost as soon as you qualify as a lawyer, judges-to-
be lack court experience in other roles. 
 
This comparison immediately outlines critical differences in what constitutes 
judicial experience. The judicial career system relies on what you learn within 
the hierarchy; the recognition system relies on the court experiences you 
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acquired before becoming a Sheriff. This means that in the latter the Judge is 
someone who has experience of practicing different roles in the field. It is 
noteworthy that - as discussed in chapter nine – solicitors’ and solicitor-
advocates' trajectories before being appointed revealed a notably vibrant variety 
of different legal positions or roles. This inevitably means that their 
understanding of their judicial role will be built on the foundations of their 
experiences appearing before judges or being other kinds of adjudicators such as 
immigration judges. Thus, within a system like this, past legal experience cannot 
be ignored or neglected, nor is it possible to leave it out if we are aiming to 
understand judicial practices. 
 
Furthermore, this experience will also have an impact on the way Sheriffs 
perceive the other penal agents - as we discussed in chapter seven. The court 
experience means that Sheriffs spent time in one or several different roles 
within their professional trajectories. This means that the Sheriffs may know 
first-hand the amount of work that a proper legal performance by a procurator 
fiscal or a defence agent requires. This knowledge has an impact on the way 
they perceive other legal agents once they have become a Sheriff. Critically – as 
discussed in chapter seven - I noted that Sheriffs that had been advocates were 
more critical of solicitors' performance than those who had been solicitors 
themselves. Consequently, their perceptions of solicitors’ performance will 
affect the chances of a PiM successfully persuading the Sheriff to adopt a 
particular course of action. 
 
Moreover, since sentencing is a process in which the Sheriffs need to rely on the 
information that other legal agents offer them - sometimes including information 
provided by the accused - the interactions between the Judges and the 
individuals that appear before them are as important as the quality of the 
information discussed.(Einsenstein, et al., 1988; Ulmer, 1997; Roach Anleu & 
Mack, 2015; 2017). For example, as seen in chapter seven, if a Sheriff is critical 
of the solicitors' performance, it is less likely that s/he will be persuaded by that 
lawyer’s plea of mitigation. On the contrary, a good performance may convince 
a Sheriff to explore a different approach, for example, to give a recidivist a 
robust community sentence instead of a custodial sentence. 
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Overall, the connection between what was discussed in chapters seven and eight 
and the acquisition of legal experience seen in chapter nine seems clearer now. 
The discussion of how my participants became Sheriffs (chapter nine) allows us 
to rethink and contextualise the mechanisms that allowed them to internalise 
the set of practices described in chapter six to eight. In other words, how they 
acquired the ‘know-how’ that enables them to deal the criminal business of 
their courts with ease. From a Bourdieusian perspective, this is the acquisition of 
a specific legal habitus that provides Sheriffs with ‘mental schemas’ for 
practice. 
 
The second aspect that is necessary to stress here is a direct consequence of the 
first: the constant ‘return’ to the past as a way to make sense and solve the 
problems of the present. In other words, legal experience constitutes cultural 
capital precisely because it provides the agents with a practical ‘know-how’. As 
a habitus, past legal expertise is continuously brought to the present providing 
dispositions and schemas for practical issues faced by the agents. Critically, the 
habitus is not immutable nor static, the ‘[h]abitus change[s] constantly in 
response to new experiences. Dispositions are subject to a kind of permanent 
revision, but one which is never radical, because it works on the basis of the 
premises established in the previous state (Bourdieu, 1997/2000, p. 161). 
 
Consequently, it is not possible to speak analytically of a break between ‘legal 
experience’ - acquired before being appointed - and ‘judicial experience’ - 
acquired during their tenure. The habitus can evolve, and new experiences 
adjust it, particularly in the case of the position of Sheriff attained by the 
solicitor or advocate within the Scottish legal field. During my fieldwork, the 
references to their legal experience referenced both that acquired before being 
a Sheriff and that acquired while being in the position. Moreover, it is impossible 
to separate them in practice because, for the agents, their past experiences are 
one; a continuum. 
 
I argue that -- due to the structure of the Scottish judicial field -- the notion of a 
purely ‘judicial habitus’ makes little sense. Instead, I want to suggest that since 
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lawyers are appointed Sheriffs precisely due to their legal trajectories, and thus, 
due to their specific legal experience, they acquire and develop a legal habitus - 
which entails the sum of their experiences in the field. As a consequence of this, 
when agents attain a new position within a field, the set of dispositions that was 
well-adapted to their prior position in the legal field are ‘out-of-tune’ with what 
their judicial practices require of them, without being completely ill-adjusted 
(Bourdieu, 1997/2000; 1980/1990). As Bourdieu explained, in these cases the 
dispositions are ‘at odds with the position that agent occupies. Such effects of 
hysteresis, of a lag in adaptation and a counter-adaptive mismatch, can be 
explained by the relatively persistent, though not entirely unchangeable, 
character of habitus’ (Bourdieu, 2000/2005, p. 214).  
 
However - and accordingly with what I discussed in chapter nine - Sheriffs can 
adapt and update their habitus to their new role. This is so because, overall, the 
new position they acquired is part of the same field, and thus, it requires them 
to use the very same ‘mental schemas’ that they had acquired, to deal with the 
legal problems they deal with before, but from a different ‘perspective’ and 
‘function’. 
 
This interpretation of the field can be summarised as follows. When they are 
appointed Sheriffs, agents do not develop a new habitus; they come to their new 
position with their legal habitus (and accumulated legal capital). The experience 
they acquire while being Sheriffs, mainly by being confronted with the practical 
problems that arise from the field, builds on their past experiences and allows 
them to update, tweak or improve their practices. In other words, the 
emergence of their judicial practices and styles has to be understood as a 
process where they adapt their legal habitus according to the legal and 
contextual constraints and possibilities for action that they have to face in their 
new judicial position.  
 
The final aspect that is necessary to stress here, again, stems from the past two 
points. The acquired experience as a solicitor, advocate, as a criminal or civil 
lawyer, etc. do not prepare Sheriffs adequately for the judicial role. It provides 
a legal habitus, but the judicial practices –- sentencing in this case -– as 
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explained earlier, stems from the encounter between the habitus -- the 
dispositions for actions and mental schemas -- and a specific space of 
possibilities (and therefore constraints) outlined by the field. 
 
Hence, it is not enough to possess a legal habitus attuned to the field; it is 
essential to understand that practices emerge from an agent who already has 
internalised the ‘sense for the game’ and who is in the position of playing the 
game. More critically, the field, the rules and the constraints all create a space 
of limited possible ‘moves’, and this also becomes relevant to understanding 
these constraints. This is what I am going to explore next. 
 
10.2.2. The Field 
 
During my fieldwork I was able to observe the ordinary daily-life aspects of the 
internal court organisation, its bureaucracy, or the ‘gears of the watch’. I 
realised that the courts’ organisational matrix produced the ‘mundane’ 
conditions of possibilities for judicial practices; the space in which sentencing 
decision-making had to be carried out; in other words, the way that institutions 
impose a working process to its members outlines a space of possibilities and 
impossibilities for actions. For example, setting time limitations may encourage 
quick decision making over more deliberation and thus agents will have to adapt 
their practices to manage the time given to them to carry out their task.  
 
Furthermore, it is worth stressing that whenever you outline a space in which, 
according to some rules, action has to take place, in the very process of 
determining the correct ways of doing it (the ‘space of possibles’) you are also 
establishing how it cannot or should not be done. This is to create a space of 
impossibles (Bourdieu, 1991a; 1992/1996; 2013/2017). This is the space that 
recently appointed Sheriffs face when they assume their new position in the 
field. They have been selected because it is presumed that they know how to 
perform the role. However, that does not necessarily mean that they have the 
know-how of the bureaucratic and mundane process that everyday judicial 
court-work requires. Thus, the emergence of judicial practice is situated in the 
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encounter between their habitus and the field that imposes on them a space of 
possible and impossible ways to exert their role.  
 
It worth noting that despite my empirical work, I am unable to discuss the 
nature of the Scottish Sheriffs courts' organisation I observed.  I cannot tell, for 
example, if these organisational practices obey a ‘new public management’ or 
‘third logic professional’ mode  (Vigour, 2015). This is because my analysis was 
focused on Sheriffs’ practices, and I was only limited to the observation of one 
of the several different judicial practices they perform on a daily basis. Also, I 
lack data to compare these practices with those carried out in the past (Hersant, 
2017). Nevertheless, these findings do beg further research focused on exploring 
court organisational models at the sheriff courts (González, 2017).  
 
In my fieldwork, my focus was the Sheriffs' practices as individuals, as decision-
makers. Within that context, through the use of shadowing methods, I was able 
to observe how the courts' forms of work organisation structured the Sheriffs' 
practices. In what follows, I am going to discuss three different aspects of how 
the field determines sentencing practice. The following analysis relies heavily on 
what I discussed in chapters six, seven and eight. The description of the practice 
requires an understanding of the contextual setting where these practices are 
located. 
 
First, - if we shift our analysis from ‘sentencing in books’ to ‘sentencing in 
action’, it is necessary to contextualise the interplay of both the legal and extra-
legal factors that influence sentencing in everyday life. From what I could 
observe during my fieldwork - as discussed in chapters six to eight - I found a 
very structured and organised bureaucratic process in all the Sheriff courts I 
visited. Thus, regardless of how Sheriffs perceived their sentencing process 
subjectively, objectively I was able to observe that their working processes - i.e. 
the timeframes available to read reports, prepare for the hearings, etc. - were 
similar in all the courts. Therefore, the way that Sheriff Courts organise 
themselves to deal with the bulk of cases brought before them imposes on all 
Sheriffs a structured process - or bureaucratic routine - within which they have 
to deal with all the cases ascribed to them. 
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It is essential to bear in mind that despite the size of criminal business, Sheriffs 
also deal with civil and family matters and thus, the court business does not rely 
upon criminal cases alone. The court organisation at the Sheriff court is not 
specialised, thus the way the court deals with criminal business is embedded in a 
larger matrix of court organisation or management. This means that the court 
structure is organic and difficulties or changes in how the court deals with one 
kind of business may have an indirect impact on others. In brief, to truly 
understand the court organisation it has to be considered as a whole. While this 
was beyond the scope of my research, it is worth bearing in mind for the rest of 
the analysis. For instance, the temporal dimension of practice - explored in 
chapter six - is the temporal space in which Sheriffs are required to deal with 
both individual cases and all the cases on the list for a given day. However, it is 
also - indirectly - a part of the temporal space allocated for Sheriffs to deal with 
the criminal business, which, in turn, implies a distribution between the other 
different kinds of business.  
 
Temporality becomes a vital aspect of this bureaucratic process. This has two 
sides, on the one hand, the prediction or assumption that any Sheriff can deal 
with a determined number of cases each day. On the other, the discretion every 
Sheriff has in how they deal with that number on that day. In other words, to 
take more time for dealing with one case or with all the criminal business means 
that you have less time to deal with something else, be that other cases or other 
kinds of legal business. In practice - as discussed briefly in chapter six - this can 
mean that Sheriffs may finish very early or possibly very late. This also means 
that, for example, a delay or disruption dealing with civil law cases one day may 
impede on the time available for a Sheriff to read the CJSW reports the day 
before the RC. Likewise, finishing the list of criminal cases too late one day will 
have a negative impact on the time the Sheriff will have to prepare for the next 
day’s cases. The temporality of practice becomes an ‘invisible’ aspect that 
constrains sentencing. 
 
A second issue derives from the first, and is related to how little control recently 
appointed sheriffs have over the organisational structure that is imposed on 
  226 
 
 
them. As discussed above, they have their legal habitus, the accumulation of 
experiences, and thus, an idea of how the role has to be performed. However, 
because judicial practice does not occur in a vacuum, they encounter a 
thoroughly organised and structured bureaucratic backstage with which they 
have to catch-up. To clarify, this does not mean that the judicial structure 
determines the Sheriffs' practices, but rather that their role has to be performed 
within the space for action that the structural organisation outlines for them. 
Thus, judicial practices are the encounter of both worlds, between the legal 
habitus – the accumulation of legal and practical knowledge the Sheriffs 
acquired during their professional career in the field - and the space of possibles 
and impossibles imposed on them by the structural organisation of judicial 
practices.  
 
Consequently, once the Sheriff has internalised the ‘routine’ and so long as they 
deal with all the cases, they are free to decide how to use their time better. 
This means, for example, they can manage how much time they want to spend 
on individual cases. A habitus synced to the field can adapt the processes but 
only within the boundaries allowed by the ‘game’. More critically, if a law 
requires Sheriffs to exert a new function without establishing any clear 
normative regulation on how it should be carried out, Sheriffs will have to find a 
way to ground it; creating a practice during such a process. This was the case 
with CPO reviews discussed in chapter eight. Section 227X of CJL-2010 Act 
introduces the possibility to impose periodic reviews for CPOs, however, it left 
the practicalities of the review to the court. Thus, during my fieldwork, I could 
observe very different ways of carrying out these reviews. The different 
approaches depended largely on the ways the Sheriffs understood their role. I 
am going to discuss this in more detail in the next section. 
 
The final aspect requires us to discuss how contextual factors may shape, or at 
least influence, sentencing. Quantitative research on sentencing has long 
emphasised the relevance of measuring so-called ‘non-legal contextual factors’, 
and thus, it has tried to address the ‘localisation of sentencing’ (Pina-Sanchez & 
Grech, 2018; Einsenstein, et al., 1988; Flemming, et al., 1992; Ulmer, 1997; 
2012; 2014). Relevant contextual factors have included, for example, the court 
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caseload, local criminal justice resources, demographics of the area surrounding 
the court and local crime rates  (Ulmer, 2014). However, as discussed earlier, 
several researchers have argued that these quantitative findings still require a 
further qualitative understanding of sentencing practices to be able to identify 
more accurately which variables are affecting sentencing outcomes and how 
(Hogarth, 1971; Hagan & Bumiller, 1983; Spohn, 2000; Ulmer, 2012). The 
description of the process in chapters six to eight helps us to understand better 
how contextual variables influence sentencing, at least at the Sheriff Court. For 
example, in chapter six I discussed the multiple spatial and temporal dimensions 
that shape the Sheriff's sentencing routines. Or in chapter seven, I explored how 
the interactions and professional relationships among the penal actors also 
impacts the Sheriff's decision-making.  
 
The question of the impact of non-legal contextual factors also reveals how the 
court’s structural organisation is a complex and interwoven set of practices that 
tries to keep a consistent approach despite local divergences. However, as I 
observed in the field, at its best, it can only minimise but not eliminate the 
influence of non-legal local factors. The issue is that, at least in Scotland 
(though this is also applicable to other jurisdictions), the court size and the 
territorial boundaries of the courts already considers an approximate number of 
caseloads. In other words, the number of Judges allocated to an individual court 
is not arbitrary; to a greater or lesser extent, it is based on a prediction of 
expected minimum and maximum workloads. Otherwise, you would be taking 
human resources away from the courts that need more Judges to be able to deal 
with heavy workloads.  
 
The idea is simple, courts boundaries need to take into account the population 
density. In Scotland, for example, there is a correlation between population 
density and the extension of the Sheriff court’s boundaries. More populated 
areas, like Glasgow, have smaller jurisdictions; while less populated areas, like 
the Highlands, have large ones. The rationale behind this is straight-forward; 
population density translates into a workload. Thus, courts need to organise in 
such a way that they can manage the size of the business. The consequence of 
this is straightforward, the structural organisation of Sheriff Courts tries to 
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minimise the impact of the size of the business, and it is very likely that this 
happens in other jurisdictions as well. Thus, while this variable does probably 
affect practice, if one does not realise that the court structure is organised 
taking this variable into account, then one may misconstrue how this variable 
influences  practice or fail to recognise other factors with which it interacts? 
 
Moreover, we cannot assume that Sheriffs or the Judiciary are unaware of the 
influence of non-legal contextual factors. At least during my fieldwork - as 
discussed in chapter eight - Sheriffs were aware, for example, of regional 
differences. One Sheriff in a rural court, knowing how a particular offence was 
dealt with in urban courts, decided to impose a harsher sanction than would 
have been imposed for the same offence in the urban court. The rationale 
behind this was that the Sheriff considered that since this offence was 
committed in a small rural community, the penal sanction needed to be 
deliberately harsher than in other places as a mechanism to deter others from 
committing those offences within that particular jurisdiction. Thus, the 
contextual variable was consciously used to ground the principle of the 
seriousness of the offence. Consequently, the impact of some non-legal 
contextual variables may be minimised or maximised depending on the Sheriffs’ 
practices. 
 
These considerations illustrate that ‘sentencing in books’ is radically different 
from ‘sentencing in action’. The localisation of sentencing matters: it shapes, 
directly or indirectly, the practices that emerge from it. This means that an 
agent - trained and with the experience to carry out the role - faces contextual 
constraints that will require him or her to adopt a position regarding those 
problems. Therefore, practices emerge not from the decision-maker themselves, 
but rather as the consequence of the relationship between the agents and the 
specific space of possibilities and constraints that the field imposes on them. 
 
10.2.3. Space for decision-making 
 
The notions of habitus and field help us to understand how sentencing practices 
emerge between the encounter of an agent and structural constraints. As I 
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argued earlier, the dynamics between the two resemble a Celtic knot. The agent 
who has internalised the rules of the field becomes a player within that very 
field, adopting strategies and taking-decisions to deal with the problems that 
field presents to them. In doing so, their actions may reshape the field and these 
changes will, inevitably, affect the agents. It's a knot which passes several times 
over the same points outlining complex patterns that fold over one another.  
 
Thus, we could say that the analogy means that one aspect influences another, 
which in turn, affect it by opening a new path of complex interactive relations. 
The argument that I have outlined in sub-section 10.2. is that sentencing cannot 
be understood as individual decision-making carried out by a Judge in isolation 
from their context, nor as the mechanical process imposed by the penal 
structure on the accused. In practice, sentencing practices emerge in the space 
that is the result of the encounter of the legal habitus of the Sheriffs and the 
social, temporal and material realities outlined by the field. This is to say, 
practices are developed by an agent who knows ‘the rules of the game’ and is 
able to play it within certain boundaries. Therefore the main difference 
between the ‘sentencing in the books’ and the ‘sentencing in action’ is the 
relationship between the Judges and the context of sentencing, which outline 
the boundaries of a space within which individual decision-making can be carried 
out. 
 
This outlined space for decision-making is the space in which sentencing 
practices emerge. As discussed in chapters six, seven and eight, this space is 
subjected to different kinds of constraints, such as temporal limitations, the size 
of the criminal business, the available resources for community sentences, etc. 
More critically, at the summary procedure level, the outcomes are finite and 
determined. For example, without prejudice of a mandatory or statutory limit, 
Sheriffs cannot impose more than a year of imprisonment. Likewise, as discussed 
in chapter five, the most common disposals imposed by Sheriffs are custodial 
sentences, CPOs, fines and admonitions which together account for the 98% of 
the disposals imposed every year. Furthermore, in every court I visited I found 
that regardless of the different perspective on sentencing taken by the Sheriffs, 
the bureaucratic preparations for the hearings were similar. Thus, the Sheriff 
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received the ‘papers’ the day before the RC, read them, and prepared a 
provisional sentence which could change or not depending on what was said at 
the hearing.  
 
Therefore, the encounter between the habitus and the field outlines a very 
structured space of decision-making. Even within the Sheriffs' different 
sentencing styles, the possible variations are narrowed down by the finite 
number of possible outcomes for each case.  It is within this space where the 
logic of sentencing practices lies. This rationale of practice emerges in the 
strategies adopted by individual Sheriffs –their position-taking - in response to 
the problems and constraints that they face in their judicial role. 
 
Finally, after having explored the Sheriffs' legal habitus and the field they face, 
the last aspect of sentencing practices I need to analyse is the Sheriffs' 
penological position-taking. As explained in chapter two, I am using ‘penology’ 
to refer to a rationale or a set of principles - linked to sentencing principles - 
that guide or explain the allocations of specific disposals to individual cases. 
However, I am not aiming to label Sheriffs using normative definitions from the 
philosophy of punishment or sentencing purposes, but rather trying to 
understand their penologies of everyday life. The natural consequence of 
studying sentencing as a practice is to frame penological positions within the 
logic of practice, which is entirely different from the scholarly understanding of 
sentencing purposes. This is what I am going to explore in the next section. 
 
10.3. Position-taking and everyday life penology 
 
It is worth remembering that my research aims to grasp the ‘logic of practice’ of 
the penology of everyday life. If sentencing can be considered a ‘human process’ 
(Hogarth, 1971) or a ‘social practice’ (Hutton, 2006), then from a socio-legal or 
criminological perspective it is necessary to ask what this entails. As discussed in 
chapters two and three, from a sociological perspective I have conceptualised 
sentencing as a practice, and thus, adopted Bourdieu's theory of practice to 
analyse it. Consequently, when you conceptualise sentencing as a practice, and 
thus, argue that it has a practical logic, that also means that the penology of 
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everyday life is a practical rationale, and thus ‘has a logic which is not that of 
the logician’ (Bourdieu, 1980/1990, p. 86). This means that ‘penology in action’ 
has a rationale that is not the based on the normative discussion of the 
philosophy of punishment or sentencing purposes. However, I have to recognise 
that before starting my fieldwork, and even during its early stages, I was 
expecting that Sheriffs would have an explicitly articulated penological 
discourse; the reality was more complicated than that. 
 
While, during my fieldwork, I did find a few Sheriffs with a very well-articulated 
penological discourse, like (Sheriff#5), this was not the case for most. 
Sheriffs#7, #15 and #16 approached the penological dimension of their practices 
‘intuitively.’ They could explain how and why they used specific disposals in 
several cases, but they did not have a conscious or deliberate discourse that 
followed from what they thought their role asked them to do. Again, everything I 
discussed earlier concerning the relationship between ‘intuition’ and practices 
helps us to understand these analytical obstacles. Taking these difficulties into 
account, the aim of the current level of analysis is trying to grasp Sheriff’s 
understanding of the sentencing role and their position-taking on how it should 
be performed – by using the encounter between the habitus and field as a 
starting point. This, in turn, helps us to understand the practical rationale 
behind their sentencing practices. 
 
How can we understand the penology of everyday life? On the one hand, the 
question requires us to find a way to ‘escape the fog’ of an ‘intuitive rationale’. 
On the other, I was faced with the issue of how to describe these practical 
rationales without relying on normative ‘labels’, originating in from the scholarly 
world. The first thing I discovered was that Sheriffs are aware that there are 
different sentencing styles. However, during the interviews, they never 
criticised their peers' approaches. Instead, they explained they were more 
concerned about being consistent in their own practices. It took me a while to 
realise that the lack of a rigid framework allowed Sheriffs to adopt different 
approaches towards their sentencing - although always within specific limits. 
Thus, as I will discuss in more detail later, the differences between styles could 
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not be framed as ‘good’ or ‘bad’, because they were part of a range of potential 
approaches within the ‘space of possibles’.  
 
This is where what I described in chapter eight becomes central; the discussion 
of real cases with the Sheriffs and the observation of the hearings of those very 
cases. Through a discussion grounded in their practice of why they decided to 
impose particular disposals in specific cases, I was able to start to grasp parts of 
their penological approaches. I structured the discussion with the Sheriffs by 
analysing the use of one specific disposal at a time. Nevertheless, I faced a new 
methodological issue here. There is a thin line between discussing the rationale 
that led them to choose the disposal, and debating the purpose of that disposal. 
However, it is a critical difference that needs to be explored with caution. 
 
10.3.1. The structured mundanity of sentencing 
 
In chapters six and seven tried to offer a description of the mundane dimension 
of the sentencing process. This means that instead of the reconstruction of 
mental processes that we cannot see, I focused on what can be seen. In this 
regard chapters six, seven and eight aimed to discuss sentencing practice from 
the Sheriffs' observable working-process. 
 
As it can be seen in diagram (3), the sentencing process as it can be observed - 
for explanatory purposes - can be simplified into two ‘moments’ and ‘places’. As 
discussed in more detail in chapter 6, the first moment is Sheriff’s preparation 
for the RC, which usually takes place in her/his Chambers. As explored in 
chapter seven, it is in this place - before the sentencing diets - that Sheriffs 
deals with two different sources of information: the ‘papers’ and the CJSW-
Reports. Then, the second moment is the sentencing diet itself which takes 
place in the courtroom. In this place, the Sheriff has to deal with two further 
potential sources of information: the facts of the case and the PiM. 
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Diagram (3) The observable sentencing process 
 
 
 
As explained in detail in chapters six and seven, this process is embedded within 
a case and time management frame within which the Sheriff has to be able to 
perform their role. Diagram (3) depicts a bureaucratic routine or working 
process that was common to all the Sheriffs I observed. Even in those cases 
where the Sheriff may perceive that his/her decision-making was an intuitive 
process, the routine was there. And the reason the working process was not 
considered as part of the decision-making is that the mundanity of it makes it be 
taken for granted. I was able to observe this very same working-process in the 
fourteen courts I visited, and with the sixteen Sheriffs I shadowed or observed. 
Furthermore, most of the time the process followed the same pattern, the 
Sheriff read the papers, then the reports. Afterwards - during the hearing - they 
hear the facts and then the plea. 
 
Having said this, it worth stressing that this is a general depiction of working 
practices, and more often than not there were variations to this. For example, in 
some cases, Sheriffs did not hear the facts because they had heard them before. 
Also, one Sheriff used to read the report first and then move to the papers. 
Nevertheless, in most of the cases, this was the flow of the process of making 
sense of the information they require to arrive at an informed decision. And as 
Final sentence
Sentencing Diet - Courtroom
Source 3 : Facts of the case 
(if not heard previously) - Provided by the PF
Source 4 : Plea in Mitigation 
Provided by the solicitor
Sentence draft
Preparation for the RC - Chambers
Source 1 : The study of the papers
(Very limited information)
Source 2 : The study of the CJSW-Report
(In-depth information of the offender)
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such, it is a good starting point to try to explore the penological rationales 
behind the sentencing practices. 
 
10.3.2. An Everyday Life Penological Position-taking 
 
Using the observable sentencing working-process as a starting point, I aimed to 
try to understand the practical rationales of the sentencing practice. The chart 
does not show us how the Sheriffs make their decision, but it does offer a 
window on the structure of the process and how it is followed, to a greater or 
lesser extent, by all the Sheriffs. As such, the exploration of the Sheriff's 
penological position-taking required - as I did in chapter six - to explore several 
aspects such as: which kind of data they received; when they make sense of it; 
how do they make sense of it; and how do they use it? Furthermore, the 
exploration of in which were the factors that the Sheriff considered to impose 
any given disposals - as discussed in chapter eight - allowed me to link the use of 
the data with specific outcomes. This also helped me to understand the 
relationship between the data provided to the Sheriff, how they make sense of it 
and the disposals that were finally imposed using that data. 
 
From there I progressed to a study of the penological views of the Sheriffs. I 
found that only two or three of my participants articulated a clear position-
taking towards the issue of philosophies of punishment or sentencing purposes. 
This did not mean that the other Sheriffs had no rationale behind their decisions. 
The difference is that the scholarly, philosophical, discussion on what 
punishment ‘ought to be’ was felt by some Sheriffs to be irrelevant for 
sentencing practice. Conversely, the absence of an articulated penological 
discourse did not mean a lack of a penological rationale in their practices. This 
allowed me to understand that there were different practical penological 
rationales. Furthermore, the Sheriffs had an internalised sense of their role as 
sentencers, but they never articulated the role in positive terms. On the 
contrary, it emerged in negative terms, mainly, by stating that they would fail 
their role if they did not impose a custodial sentence for serious offences. This 
allowed me to observe that the role - in its negative terms - seemed to be linked 
to a perception of the judicial function that was performed for the community. 
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If they were too lenient, they would be failing the community in their judicial 
duty as sentencers. 
 
As a consequence of this, my attempt to try to reconstruct the Sheriffs 
penological position-taking through the study of their practices led me to outline 
the following process. Let’s consider diagram (4): 
 
Diagram (4) Proposed sentencing process 
 
  236 
 
 
 
Diagram (4) aims to offer an explanation of the sentencing process using the 
observable routines and working-processes on the one hand and discussion about 
the imposition of specific disposals in individual cases on the other. Again, the 
shadowing method and the chances I had to discuss the same cases before and 
after the court become essential in the outline of this chart. It is important to 
stress that the chart aims to organise how the data provided to the Sheriffs is 
used. Therefore, this process is outlined from practice as it can be observed in 
the field.  
 
The proposed flow is divided into two stages - which does not mirror the 
‘moments’ of practice as described in diagram (3). However, the first stage is, 
indeed, linked to the first step of diagram (3), reading the papers. As discussed 
in chapter seven, solely by reading the complaint, the age and gender of the 
accused and if they have previous convictions, they can narrow down the 
possible outcomes for the case. As (Sheriff#2) explained in the last chapter, they 
can do so because they have internalised a ‘whole body of common law setting 
out parameters as in what is an appropriate sentence’. Thus, the starting point 
for the Sheriffs is provided by their legal habitus (acquired knowledge of both 
the ‘law in books’ and ‘law in action’) that outlines ‘parameters’, ‘rules’ or 
limits around which they have to determine the ‘appropriate sentence’. This 
works as both a starting point and a negative limit of their role. For example, 
despite the fact that the papers contain very limited and basic information, the 
information about age or the criminal records are critical for the ‘restrictions on 
passing sentence of imprisonment or detention’ of section 204 of the Criminal 
Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995.30 These rules automatically reshape the 
decisional space that Sheriffs will have to deal with that case. 
 
This first stage also involves a normative assessment of the seriousness of the 
offence. All penal systems are constructed around a hierarchy of offences which 
                                         
30 As it happens in other jurisdictions, Scots law has presumption norms against the imposition of 
a custodial sentence of young offenders. This presumption also applies to people who have 
never been imprisoned before. That said, this does not mean that the Sheriff cannot impose a 
custodial sentence, but instead that s/he will be required to call for backgrounds reports first 
and justify her/his decision in detail. In this regard, the Judge will have to explain why there 
was no other option but imposing a custodial sentence. 
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are assessed in relation to their perceived seriousness. The most serious ones are 
deal harshly, and this very often involves long custodial sentences or even 
death. In continental systems, the assessment is already contained in the law; 
criminal codes establish a range of sanctions for cases, creating a hierarchy. In 
the Common Law systems, like the Scottish one, the seriousness of the offence is 
not entirely determined by the law or tradition, but it is common to find laws 
that introduce statutory minimum31 or maximum32 penalty sentence for some 
cases. 
 
In practice, the legal habitus of the Sheriffs allows them to outline a range of 
options by only knowing the charge and without knowing the facts of the case. 
The longer that a Sheriff has been in a particular court, they will learn what the 
most common types of offending behaviour are and, equally important, what are 
the prosecution's practices towards those offences. In other words, some 
offending behaviour may be more prevalent in certain jurisdictions, and the 
prosecution may consistently use the same charges to prosecute them. Thus - 
unless they deal with exceptional circumstances, which is always a possibility - 
by only reading the charge, Sheriffs can predict the seriousness of the offence 
and the decisional space within which they will have to impose a disposal. 
 
The second stage is linked to the study of the rest of the sources of information 
provided to the Sheriffs by the SWs, the PFs and the solicitors; the CJSWR, the 
facts of the case and the PiM. In this regard, since this process depends on 
making sense of several sources of information, the process takes place both at 
Chambers and in the Courtroom. This second stage is - what in continental law is 
known as - the process of the individualisation of punishment (Pifferi, 2016; 
2012; Plesničar, 2013). Pifferi defines this notion as ‘the idea that instead of 
being abstractly proportioned to offences, criminal penalties should be flexibly 
adjusted to criminals, their dangerousness, the likelihood of their rehabilitation, 
and their deviant inclinations’ (Pifferi, 2016, p. 17). This means the process by 
which a Judge - after taking into account the applicable law for a case in the 
                                         
31 For example, section 205B of Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, that contains a minimum 
sentence for a ‘third conviction of certain offences relating to drug trafficking’ 
32 For example, Sexual Offences (Scotland) Act 2009. 
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abstract - makes an assessment of the particularities of the offence and the 
offender's background to aggravate or mitigate the sanction.   
 
It was in this part of the process that I detected emerging differences in Sheriff's 
sentencing styles. I used the shadowing and observational methods with the 
interviews to focus on how the Sheriffs individualised the sanctions. I quickly 
noticed that there were differences in the way that the Sheriffs made sense of 
the information provided by the reports. It took me a while to realise that these 
differences were not related to the quality of the information provided by the 
report, nor to the perception the Sheriffs may have of the SWs or their work. 
Instead, I noticed that the differences emerged from the extent to which 
Sheriffs considered the offender's background relevant to sentencing.  
 
If you strip down the process of ‘individualisation of punishment’ to its core, you 
can see that - after Stage 1 - sentencing is a relational process between two 
principal axes: the offence and the offender. Where the Judge emphasises the 
offence, the individualisation process tries to find a sanction that matches the 
seriousness of it. Thus, the individual characteristics of the offender are only 
relevant in as much as they can provide information about the feasibility of the 
sanction. Conversely, where the emphasis is put on the offender, their personal 
characteristics or attributes or situations will be the primary determinant of the 
sanction. I am going to explore the implications and consequences of both paths 
in the following subsections. 
 
10.3.2.1. The Seriousness of the Offence and the Role 
 
The notion of the seriousness of the offence is a critical element for the 
sentencing process, and it plays a relevant role in both stages of the process I 
described. Nevertheless, we need to deal with several questions such as: ‘how is 
this normative concept put in practice?’ or ‘how Sheriffs give it substance in 
practice?’ At the more fundamental level, the Scottish judicial system relies on 
this assessment. Let's remember that the more ‘serious offences’ like murder or 
rape will not be dealt at the Sheriff Court but in the High Court. Thus, it was no 
surprise then that for my participants any offence that involves a violent 
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behaviour will be deemed serious, and, as a consequence, will be given a 
custodial sentence.  
 
In this regard, the seriousness of the offence was very often linked to the 
imposition of custodial sentences. The rationale was that there was always a 
point at which an offence is so serious that there is no other way to deal with it 
than a custodial sentence. This rationale outlines how the Sheriffs perceive the 
limits of their role as sentencers, at least negatively: imprisonment was used as 
the last resort, to deal with the more serious offences; behaviours that should 
not be tolerated. Failure to comply with this will equate to failing in their role 
as sentencers. For example, as (Sheriff#2) explained in the last chapter: ‘I would 
fail my duty if I do not impose a custodial sentence in serious cases’. Thus, it not 
only allows the creation of a hierarchy of disposals but also becomes a standard 
that the Sheriff cannot neglect. 
 
 Consequently, this way of understanding the ‘seriousness of the offence’ implies 
a relationship between the Sheriff and the community. It is the community you 
fail if you are unduly lenient. In other words, I realised that behind the 
discussion of what can be considered a serious offence there was a 
conceptualisation of their roles as sentencers that goes beyond a formal 
understanding of Judges as allocators of sanctions. By stating that serious 
offences deserve imprisonment, you are equally stating that others do not. As a 
consequence of this, the imposition of non-custodial sentences for ‘less serious 
offences’, is always determined in a negative reference towards imprisonment.  
As a result, the ‘seriousness of the offence’ and ‘imprisonment’ are the critical 
hermeneutic elements that inform all sentencing practices.  
 
However, this does not mean that imprisonment is the default option for all 
offences. The hierarchy that exists ensures that different offences will have 
different starting points, ‘default’ options in line with their perceived 
seriousness. The Sheriffs’ role as sentencers, therefore, operates as a negative 
limit, as the ‘ultima ratio’, ‘the last resort (of force)’. However, as discussed in 
chapter eight, violent offences were not the only kind of offences that resulted 
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in a custodial sentence, which means that some other circumstances may be 
constructed as serious, and thus, as requiring imprisonment. 
 
As I argued earlier, Sheriffs are not just influenced by their local contexts 
subconsciously, they deliberately relied on their local knowledge of the 
community for their decision-making. Thus, during stage one, they are aware of 
the role they play for the people living within their jurisdiction. Thus, instead of 
an assessment in the abstract, the normative notion of ‘serious offence’ was 
grounded according to local realities and the impact of violence on them. This 
inevitably meant that for some Sheriffs - as discussed in chapter eight - some 
offences were more serious if they took place in small and rural communities. 
Regardless of how consistent or justified this practice is, the consequence of it is 
that - while doing the assessment at stage one - the same offences may be 
deemed more or less serious depending on the part of Scotland they were 
committed in. 
 
When we move towards stage two, the circumstances surrounding the offence or 
the offender may change the initial perception of its level of seriousness. This is 
the undoubtedly the effect of the individualisation of punishment. However, two 
circumstances completely subvert the rationale we described above working as 
an exception to the main principle described above. While the assessment of 
seriousness may vary according to the facts of the case it seems evident that 
some offences, no matter how bad they are in comparison with other similar 
offences, could never be equated with an assault. Furthermore, the notion of a 
hierarchy of offence in which the degree of perceived violence is used to order 
them implies that the default range of sanctions for some behaviours will never 
include imprisonment.  
 
However, in practice, it is still possible to see that some individuals receive 
short or relatively short custodial sentences for non-serious offences. In this 
regard, recidivism of petty offences is one of the two issues that subvert the 
principle of the seriousness of the offence. I would also suggest this is one of the 
historical problems of lower courts, at least from the late 19th century 
(Velasquez, 2014; Pratt, 1995; Bottoms, 1977). It is worth noting that it is not 
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recidivism per se which creates a problem for the principle stated above, but 
rather a specific kind of persistent low-level criminality. Another issue which is 
undoubtedly linked to the first but by no means can be conflated with it: the 
persistent breach of CPOs conditions. 
 
Concerning the first issue, my findings suggest two relevant problems: firstly, 
that despite the fact that the Sheriff Court deals largely with less serious 
offences, particularly at summary court, this does not mean that these 
behaviours cannot be perceived as disruptive or abusive. While anti-social 
behaviour and shoplifting are at the lower end of seriousness - they can be very 
upsetting or disturbing for the individuals who live within the affected 
community, and the Sheriffs acknowledge that.  
 
Secondly, this has an impact on the construction and perception of which 
behaviours are tolerable at the Sheriff Courts. Indeed, there are ‘black and 
white’ cases as discussed in chapter eight, such as assaults that involved the 
accused kicking the victim in the head. Nevertheless, abusive behaviour also 
seems to be perceived as an accumulative notion. While one or two unrelated 
offences may be tolerated, long-term anti-social behaviour may be constructed 
by the Sheriffs as equally harmful as one single violent offence, and thus can 
lead to custodial sentences. Also, as discussed in chapter eight, in some 
circumstances recidivism is not related to past offences but rather to an 
offending spree which some Sheriffs deal by rolling-up cases, and thus, 
sentencing all the cases together in a holistic fashion. Thus, the seriousness of 
the ‘offence’ will be the sum of different offences that in isolation would be 
deemed as not serious. 
 
Interestingly enough, there was a recognition by all Sheriffs that an offender 
could have setbacks, which would not automatically transform him or her into a 
‘lost cause’. DTTOs were a very interesting example of this; most of the 
offenders who were offered this option had a long history of offences behind 
them. Thus, when and why an offender could shift from being ‘someone who 
deserves another chance’ to someone – using Tombs & Jagger’s terminology 
(2006) - ‘irredeemable’, was different depending on which one of the paths 
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described in Diagram 4 (i.e. the ‘offence’ pathway or the ‘offender’ pathway) 
the Sheriffs adopted. I will discuss this issue in more detail in the next 
subsection. 
 
The second issue refers those individuals who persistently fail to comply with the 
conditions of the community sentences imposed on them. While one may assume 
that this phenomenon is linked to reoffending behaviour, this is not always the 
case. I observed several instances in which the individuals who committed a new 
offence while complying satisfactorily with a CPOs' conditions. I also was able to 
observe the opposite: individuals who had not committed a new offence, but 
kept breaching the conditions of the CPOs. The latter group of cases are often 
very problematic because their behaviour – breaching their order - cannot be 
framed as violent or even as abusive, they simply either fail or refuse to comply.  
These cases became a headache for some Sheriffs who did not want to use a 
custodial sentence - how could they when the offence was not serious? - but 
realised that they had to enforce the law and protect their credibility to the 
community and (potential) offenders. How many chances can they give to an 
offender who does not comply with the CPOs? This is why the ‘main ‘crime’ of 
‘CPOs breachers’ is undermining the credibility of the judicial role even if they 
do not commit serious offences. Again, the path the Sheriffs choose at stage two 
will allow them to deal with this issue differently. However, the central issue is 
the same for all of them, there are only so many times that an offender can 
breach the CPO.  How many opportunities are to be given, and under what 
circumstances, varies from Sheriff to Sheriff, but once labelled as a ‘breacher’, 
a custodial sentence is imposed.  
 
In this section, I wanted to describe the relevance of the assessment of the 
seriousness of the offence. While this assessment is vital at stage one, it may be 
re-assessed at stage two: that is the usual consequence of the individualisation 
of punishment. However, within this rationale, one would expect that petty 
offences, no matter how serious within their context, would never land a 
custodial sentence. Nevertheless, that is the effect that the two exceptions 
described above produce in sentencing. They subvert sentencing practices that, 
at least prima facie, are built around a hierarchy of presumed seriousness.  
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Moreover, an external observation or statistical analysis of these practices may 
only reveal that an offender received a custodial sentence for a petty offence, 
missing the complex rationalities that I have described. Here I have tried to 
offer a more complex and layered construction of seriousness and, by extension 
of sentencing decision-making. 
 
10.3.2.2. The axis 
 
Once the normative assessment carried out in stage one has led to a range of 
possible disposals for a case, Sheriffs move towards a different level of analysis: 
an exploration of the circumstances of the offence and the offender. This is the 
core of the process of individualisation of punishment. Thus, after identifying a 
default range of options applicable to an offence - according to its presumed 
seriousness in the abstract – the Sheriffs need to see if the surrounding 
circumstances of the case and the background of the offender will modify their 
assessment, aggravating or mitigating it. Ultimately, this individualisation should 
lead them to find - within the range of options that they have already 
determined - the most appropriate one; one that fits both the offence and the 
offender. 
 
However, it is at stage two that the different sentencing styles begin to diverge 
significantly. Consequently, by observing how they deal with the disposals, one 
may be tempted to classify Sheriffs as ‘rehabilitationist’ versus ‘retributionist’ 
or ‘progressive’ versus ‘conservative’ sentencers. Nevertheless, this would be to 
impose scholarly or normative labels on practical rationales or worse, to try to 
present their practices in line with our subjective appraisals, risking 
confirmation biases. Moreover, one can also be tempted to use the sentencing 
purposes as a way to classify the different Sheriffs styles, but this will contradict 
part of my findings. Most of the Sheriffs did not have an articulated discourse on 
sentencing purposes, and even if that were the case, their practices could never 
be reduced to one sentencing purpose nor a unique philosophy of punishment. 
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To carry out this analysis, firstly I had to be able to break with my epistemic 
obstacle, and instead of trying to put scholarly labels on the practices, I realised 
I needed to (re) focus on the description of the mechanics of the process. There, 
I could see that the practical rationale behind the differentiation I was observing 
could be traced to the crossroads that emerged at the stage of the 
individualization of punishment.  
 
In some cases even adopting two different paths, the outcomes may be similar; 
the seriousness of a more serious offence can be mitigated or offset by 
something about the offender’s attitude or circumstances, and a less serious 
offence can be aggravated. Equally, the fact that two Sheriffs prefer the same 
axis does not mean for sure that they will impose the same disposals, as I argued 
earlier; other variables, like their readings of their local contexts (such as 
whether the court is in an urban or rural location), may come into play and 
ensure critical differences. Yet, overall, despite the different outcomes that 
may derive from following one or other axis, these decisions are always framed 
within a ruled space with very limited choices available, which ensures a certain 
convergence. 
 
In this regard, the decisional space that is formed between the legal habitus and 
the judicial field - that I have described in this and the findings chapters - allows 
Sheriffs to adopt a position concerning the axes freely and thus a practical 
rationale of the individualisation process. This decisional freedom tolerates 
different outcomes as far as they are consistent and fair within the logic of 
practice that exists behind the axis they have adopted. Nevertheless, from what 
can be observed at the courtroom or through the statistics, much of this 
rationale is hidden or is inaccessible. It does not help most of the time that the 
explanations the Sheriffs provide for their decisions in court does not reflect 
these practical rationales fully. 
 
As explained earlier, it is hard to offer an example of the sentencing process, 
because it will inevitably provide a distorted image of practice. However, to 
illustrate the manner in which the axis operates, I am going to explain the 
relevant questions that both of the paths outlined in diagram (4) pose to the 
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Sheriffs. To do so, I am going to outline a scenario in which two hypothetical 
Sheriffs - A and B - deal with the same case. 
 
Let us consider a single charge of assault - it does not matter if the case was 
brought under summary or solemn procedure. Let us say that both Sheriff A and 
B, at Stage 1, deemed the charge to be a serious offence. Thus, they draft a 
sentence thinking of custody. Let us remember that at this stage they have read 
the charge and they know the age and the criminal record of the accused. The 
next step is to focus on the circumstances surrounding the offence and the 
offender. Sheriff A will follow the path that stresses the circumstances of the 
offence and Sheriff B will follow the other path. 
 
To take Sheriff A first, s/he is faced with the question of identifying the 
circumstances s/he has to weigh up in order to individualise punishment. 
Stressing the relevance of the offence means narrowing the factors to only those 
which may change the assessment of the seriousness of the offence. 
Consequently, Sheriff A will have to examine the facts of the offence and 
analyse if they mean the assault was more serious than previously thought. Any 
fact that is not directly connected with the offence is irrelevant. Thus, the 
circumstances of the offender are only relevant insofar as they are normatively 
pertinent. For example, the age and the gender of the offender, which is her/his 
attitude towards the offence are relevant aspects. However, other than that, 
any other biographical data that can provide a background of who the offender 
is or why s/he offends, is irrelevant unless it relates directly with any normative 
consideration that the Sheriff needs to take into account.  
 
The other path will allow Sheriff B to consider a different and broader 
understanding of the relevant factors. In this regard, the centrality of the 
offender construes the process around the question that aims to tackle offending 
behaviour. Consequently, any information about the life of the offender that 
may explain why s/he committed the offence and if s/he will or will not re-
offend is relevant. However, this inquiry will be restricted to the narratives and 
information that the CJSW-Reports and solicitors provide. Thus, Sheriff B will 
have to examine the seriousness of the offence in light of the circumstances that 
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may explain the offender's behaviour. This may allow the Sheriff to construct the 
‘assault’ as the consequence of an individual who needs help to stop 
reoffending, as committed by an individual that has become a risk to the 
community, or as a ‘one-time mistake’. 
 
In this section, I have tried to show how the stage at which the Sheriffs must 
individualise punishment allows two different paths depending on which aspect 
(the offence or the offender) is prioritised. In the next section, I am going to 
explore how these paths may help us to understand how the Sheriffs perceive 
their role as sentencers. 
  
10.3.3.  The Sheriffs’ sentencer role? 
 
All that I have explored in this section, as the result of studying the Sheriffs' 
practices, has to end by acknowledging the role of the Sheriffs as sentencers. In 
a similar fashion to what happened with regard to the articulation of the 
philosophy of punishment, Sheriffs did not provide me with an articulated 
discourse on how they see their role. Nevertheless, the analysis of the 
sentencing process, as described above, was also linked with the Sheriffs’ 
practical understandings of their role as sentencers. 
 
For example, during the discussion of the use of custodial sentences most of my 
participants offered a negative conceptualisation of the role. In other words, 
they never told me what they think their role as sentencers entails. Instead, 
they did tell me in which circumstances they felt they would fail in their duty if 
they did not impose a custodial sanction. As discussed earlier, the use of 
custodial sentences is linked to violent offences, long-term abusive behaviours 
and in some cases, non-compliance with community sentences. In the first two 
cases, the Sheriffs denoted that their role as sentencers was aimed at protecting 
the community from violence but also from other persistent but less serious 
offending that may cause distress or disrupt the community.  
 
In this case, the articulation of what constitutes a limit of their duty as 
sentencers, allows us to note how the role is partly constructed in relation to 
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the communities that live within their jurisdiction. This was particularly 
interesting because all of my participants dealt with small or medium-size 
communities. As a consequence of this the Sheriffs managed to know very well, 
the community living within their jurisdictions and issues affecting them. They 
were also aware of some individuals, whose re-offending behaviour made them 
appear before the court constantly. Likewise, they very often raised this point to 
contrast their courts with the "big courts" in the "big cities" in Scotland, where 
the size of the business produces a distant relationship between the Sheriffs and 
the community.  
 
This relationship with the community outlined an understanding of the 
sentencing role that goes beyond the formalistic scholarly understanding of 
sentencing as the mere allocation of penal sanctions. This shed a new light on 
my analysis of the Sheriffs’ relationships with their local contexts. In other 
words, the findings on how non-legal contextual factors influence sentencing can 
be better understood if we know that Sheriffs thinks that their role as 
sentencers are carried out for the community. This may sound obvious because, 
as I discussed at the outset of this thesis, punishment is a social function. 
However, there is a vast difference in exerting the role for society as a whole, 
compared to carrying it out for - and within - a particular community.   
 
The limitation of this analysis is that again I only obtained indirect glimpses - 
through my study of their practice - of the way in which Sheriffs understand 
their role as sentencers. Nevertheless, another aspect of practice that hinted at 
a particular construction of the role was the discussion of the use of non-
custodial sentences. Some Sheriffs expressed their willingness to use the 
disposals available to them to provide offenders with a real chance to stop 
reoffending. The Sheriffs who did so were the ones who - at Stage 2 of Diagram 
(4) -preferred the path that put the offender at the centre of their 
individualisation process.  Critically, this revealed that these Sheriffs construed 
their sentencing role partly around the idea of helping or supporting the 
offender to stop reoffending. Conversely, those Sheriffs who put the emphasis on 
the offence, differed starkly in their approach from those described above. For 
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these Sheriffs, such considerations were neither part of their role nor a proper 
function of the penal system.  
 
I found it very interesting how these differences were linked to the question of 
what their role entails. As I explained earlier, all my Sheriffs, at least 
negatively, seemed to me to construct their role in relation to the community. 
This, particularly within the sentencing context, seemed to mean protecting the 
community from harm, which was the practical rationale behind not tolerating 
serious offences. Evidently, this means that their sentencing role is understood 
beyond the mere allocation of penal sanctions. However, as discussed in chapter 
eight, offences prosecuted in the Sheriff Courts are not necessarily particularly 
serious, requiring Sheriffs to articulate their practical decisions, and per 
extension their role, differently.  
 
Furthermore, there is a grey area for offences that may at first glance be 
deemed serious but in respect of which, after contextualising them, a Sheriff 
can be persuaded to impose a community sentence instead. Thus, within this 
space of less serious offences, and in a context where the more recent penal 
reforms seem to encourage the use of non-custodial sentences by Sheriffs, this 
inevitably will require them to adopt a position on this subject. Thus, their 
position-taking appears to be translated into another aspect of what their role as 
sentencers entails. 
 
Another example of these differences emerged in the way the Sheriffs grounded 
the CPO reviews. As discussed in chapter eight, some Sheriffs - those who put 
the offender as the central axis of their sentencing practice - used the reviews 
as a way to encourage offenders to comply with the conditions of their 
community sentence. It was equally an opportunity that some of those Sheriffs 
used to acknowledge or bear witness to the efforts individuals had made in 
attempting - or struggling- to comply with a CPOs. Ultimately, deploying an 
understanding of their role as sentencers, that considered that part of their duty 
was to tackling reoffending through providing offender support and help to 
address the causes of their disruptive behaviour.  At the other extreme, those 
who put the offence as the central aspect used reviews as a 'sword of Damocles', 
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meaning that they adopted a disciplinarian approach, using it to convey to 
offenders that the Sheriff was keeping an eye on them and would impose a 
custodial sentence if they failed to comply. Again, this approach seemed to 
suggest a sentencing role that only cares about the offence and the sanction it 
entails. In this regard, the review is only used to ensure compliance. 
 
In any case, the present study of sentencing practices only allowed me to get a 
tiny glimpse of the way in which my participants construed their role. However, 
this window seems to match the practical rationales discussed in the findings 
chapters. 
 
10.4. Researching sentencing as an everyday penology 
 
The penology of daily life at the summary sheriff court - outlined in this study - 
offers us a localised sentencing practice, or at least one influenced greatly by 
structural, legal and non-legal contextual factors. Also, by putting the 
‘seriousness of the offence’ at the core of the practice, the Sheriff’s role may be 
conceptualised as one focusing most fundamentally on the protection of 
communities. These two factors inevitably establish an important local 
connection between the community and the decision-making. What does this 
analysis mean for sentencing research studies? I am going to discuss briefly six 
different aspects that my findings highlight and how they encourage further 
research. 
 
Firstly, this research highlighted the importance of having a better 
understanding of the Scottish legal field. This means being aware that, if the 
Sheriffs’ appointment mechanism is based on the ‘recognition’ model of judicial 
organisation (Georgakopoulos, 2000), this structure influences their 
understandings of the judicial role and their practices, mainly because the past 
experiences of the Sheriffs help them to shape not just their role, but also their 
practices. In this regard my findings were consistent with Jamieson (2013) in 
terms of highlighting the relevance of understanding the career trajectories of 
the Sheriffs. However, Jamieson's work underplays the impact of the Judge's 
trajectories before being appointed. In this regard, research studies like those 
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by Hammerslev (2003) or Hilbnik (2007), or the classic works by Hood (1962; 
1972) and Hogarth (1971) highlight the relevance of examining how the 
individuals became Judges and how that may influence their practices. 
 
I suspect that in jurisdictions with a career judicial model - like most of the 
continental law countries - the influence of the institutions in which the judges 
are trained may be more important. In other words, I suspect that because 
Judges are trained within a particular institution and will have to acquire and 
conform to that institution’s culture, norms and rules, it is necessary to know 
how that specific institution shapes the Judges' habitus. In Scotland, some of the 
relatively recent research on sentencing (Tombs, 2004; Brown, 2017) appears to 
be oblivious to these aspects; assuming the Judges are what they are without 
exploring where they have come from. This approach implies the recognition of 
Judges as holding an elite position, without asking why this is the case and what 
this means for practice.  Moreover, the relationships between penal actors are 
also mediated by the previous positions occupied by the Sheriffs before coming 
to the shrieval bench. Thus, trying to understand judicial practices without a 
minimum understanding of how those judges became judges impairs the 
analysis. 
 
A second aspect that my research emphasises, linked to the first, is the 
relevance of the court-community interactions in judicial decision-making. One 
of the limitations of my study was the inability to interview solicitors, 
prosecutors, social workers and court officers, even though I was able to observe 
them in court. During the interviews with the Sheriffs (as described in chapter 
seven), it became apparent that their interactions with other actors were 
central to the sentencing process. Tata et al (2008; Halliday, et al., 2009) have 
already explored some of these issues. In their research shadowing social 
workers, they were also able to interview and observe other agents, notably 
Sheriffs. Nevertheless, a more ambitious research study is required, if possible 
mixing court observations with the possibility of discussing court interactions and 
their practices with all the agents that take part in the process of a specific 
case. Of course, there is no single way to do this, but this kind of ‘360-degree’ 
analysis is needed if we want to improve our knowledge of not only judicial 
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practices but also of other penal agents’ practices in the criminal courts in 
Scotland. 
 
The third aspect also arises from recent research studies in Scotland by Brown 
(2017) and Jamieson (2013): we need a re-examination of theoretical 
frameworks for and conceptualisations of legal and judicial practices. In recent 
years several researchers have provided us with theoretical discussions of or 
useful theoretical frameworks for research in the legal field, for example Tata  
(2007), Hutton (2006; 2014; 2016), Henham (2014), Dupret (2006) or Dezalay 
(2013). However, there still seems to be no consensus on the nature of 
sentencing. The problem is that if we take for granted the (social) nature of 
what sentencing is, our analysis of the phenomena may be thwarted by our weak 
understanding of its social dimension. In this thesis, I tried to address this issue 
through the conceptualization of sentencing as a social practice. While I do not 
mean to suggest that the adopted Bourdieusian framework is perfect, I do 
propose that sociological theories of practice offer us substantial theoretical and 
methodological tools for our analysis and should not be disregarded. 
Nevertheless, the inevitable next stage is using the recent research studies 
within the Scottish field to engage in an iterative debate concerning how both 
the methodological issues we faced in the field and our findings can help us to 
improve theoretical approaches.  
 
The fourth aspect emerges as a critique of Tomb's research (2004). In her work, 
she took a narrow approach to trying to understand only the use of custodial 
sentences. However, my research suggests that the dynamic and complex 
process behind the imposition of sanctions makes such an approach problematic. 
On the one hand, you may end up over-stressing the use of custodial sentences 
by not being able to observe their use within the wider context of all disposals 
that are passed by Judges. On the other, you unnecessarily limit your analytical 
scope. In this regard, I suggest that further research should try to keep a focus 
on sentencing practices in the round, trying to better understand the rationale 
behind the imposition of all kind of disposals, as I have attempted to do in this 
research. 
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The fifth aspect, and no less important, is how my findings offer a depiction of 
the sentencing practices at the Sheriff Court as largely influenced by its context. 
As I argued above, there is a relationship between determining the seriousness 
of the offence and the perception of violent behaviour. This suggests that we 
should further study how Judges construct or ‘read’ violence in the context of 
small courts and explore the impact of anti-social behaviour in these 
communities. Recently Garland argued for the need to ‘address the criminal 
violence that is so often intertwined with -- and used to justify -- penal violence’ 
(2018b, p. 161). While this is an issue that is more evident in societies with high 
rates of violent crimes like the USA (Western, 2018; Miller, 2015), this does not 
excuse us from asking such questions.  
 
As a matter of fact, because it is not so evident, it may be unexplored or 
neglected. For example, one of the findings of this research concerns the use of 
custodial sentences against offenders who have breached the conditions of their 
CPOs and are perceived as undermining the credibility of the court or against 
recidivists of less serious offences. These two categories of offenders – which 
often apply to the same individual – are framed as exerting abusive behaviours 
towards the community or the court, and thus are dealt with accordingly. 
Because of this, within a context where the political aim is to reduce the use of 
custodial sentences, neglecting these issues may cause well-intended reforms to 
produce unintended consequences. For example, the use of custodial sentences 
in the cases described above obeys a practical rationale that is not based solely 
on the seriousness of the offence. The extension of the presumption against 
short sentences is very likely to affect this practical rationale and may change 
practices counter-productively. This is to say, if Sheriffs, as discussed earlier, 
think these offenders deserve custodial sentences they may – instead of 
selecting a non-custodial option – actually impose longer custodial sentences, or 
alternatively, the prosecution may change their practice to ensure that these 
cases will be dealt with harshly. For example, they could start bringing cases to 
the solemn procedure instead to the summary court, where Sheriffs can impose 
custodial sentences up to five years. 
 
The final aspects refer to the lessons that arise from the limitations of my 
research. I will briefly discuss four different limitations or practical problems I 
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faced. The first challenge of this research, which is also one of its limitations, 
was related to the inherent difficulties of carrying out research with elite 
subjects - the judiciary - within the UK. This meant a long period of negotiation, 
a short period of fieldwork and a lack of control during the final phase of the 
sampling process among other issues. Since I discussed these issues at length in 
chapters two and four, I am only going to add that the research would have 
benefitted from a longer period of court observation and shadowing. Likewise, it 
would have also benefited from interviewing the others actors involved in the 
sentencing process such as social workers or solicitors. Also, while the final 
sample of courts and Sheriffs reflected the varied social, economic and 
geographical differences within Scotland, it was indeed a limitation of this 
research that I was not granted access to either of the two biggest courts in 
Scotland. This limitation was undoubtedly relevant considering how most of my 
participants often compared their practice in opposition to what they believed 
the practice was in those big urban courts. 
 
A second challenge related to the difficulties of balancing the social or 
sociological aspects of socio-legal research with the legal and normative ones. If, 
for example, I argued that Brown’s work seemed imbalanced by focusing too 
much on the legal aspect, neglecting the socio, I think I may have done the 
opposite. I think one of the limitations of this research is that I focused too 
much on the social and sociological aspects of the study of practice and because 
of that I may have underplayed the impact of the legal or normative character of 
these practices. From the outset, this was one of my concerns because, despite 
being a lawyer, I am trained in continental law, not in common law. However, as 
part of the reflexive exercise required of a sociologist, I kept reassessing this 
issue during my research to try to avoid this bias. Nevertheless, I am not sure to 
what extent I succeeded in this, and in any case, this represents a potential 
limitation in the scope of my analysis. 
 
From a more theoretical level, another limitation is inevitably derived from my 
use of Bourdieusian theory. As I argued in chapter three, of the different 
theories of practice, Bourdieu’s work seemed to me to be the strongest one. 
This is so because it was a theory that emerged from practice itself rather than 
theoretical and scholarly discussions. In this regard, it is a theory that offers a 
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lot of epistemological and methodological tools for the researcher. However, to 
be "married" to a theory, as I was, means that my work will also be subject to 
the weaknesses and criticisms made of that theory. Being aware of them I tried 
to adapt and address them in my research. On the one hand, I decided to deal 
with some of the criticism that Boltanski and Fabiani direct to the concept of 
Habitus to improve my analysis of my participants' justifications of their 
practices. On the other hand, I incorporated psychological studies on expert-
intuition, which enhanced my analysis of intuition and decision-making. 
 
Nevertheless, by self-limiting my gaze to Bourdieusian scope, I have neglected to 
examine the field from a different perspective. This was a price I decided to 
pay, to avoid cherry-picking or biased interpretations which sacrifice 
epistemological and methodological rigour. Even so, I can recognise now that it 
may also be the fact that it fitted my legal habitus, which was more comfortable 
by following a set a normative epistemological and methodological rules, rather 
than a more open or flexible framework like grounded theory. 
 
Finally, and linked with the previous limitations, is the issue of my position 
within the Scottish legal field. While the fact that I am a foreign lawyer may 
have allowed me to develop an externalist gaze into the field, at the same time 
was a limitation. For starters, I risked introducing an ethnocentric bias, judging 
the Scottish legal field through the lens of own my legal culture. Also, my 
position as outsider meant that I might have been unaware of social or legal cues 
that a native researcher may have been able to detect. To try to address this 
issue, the conceptualisation of reflexivity as developed by Bourdieu was very 
useful. However, in the end, this research is part of my study of the field which 
is influenced by my own set of habitus. I can only hope that what I have 
described and examined represents a truthful account of the complexities of the 
Scottish sentencing practices. 
 
10.5. Conclusions and recommendations 
 
What does sentencing at the Scottish Sheriff Courts entail? If I had to provide a 
short answer, I would say that it means doing justice to and within specific 
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communities. In this regard, one of the aspects of my analysis that surprised me 
most was the pervasive influence of community as an influence on sentencing 
practices. Since I lived all my life in Santiago, a city with a population over 7 
million, and worked in one of the biggest prosecution services in Chile, the 
concept of community was to a certain extent alien to me. That is perhaps why I 
was surprised by how relevant local realities, even in the mid-sized urban 
jurisdictions, turned out to be for sentencing practices. Even though Sheriffs 
adopted diverse sentencing styles, all of them aimed at serving the local 
communities where their decisions took place. 
 
I must confess that I was very sceptical about the notion of a unique identity of 
Scottish justice. I was willing to believe that the Scottish field could be more 
progressive than its neighbours in the south, but I thought that the idea of 
"tartanised penal justice" was an exaggeration. However, after living for four 
years in Scotland and going native to a certain extent, I do think that "doing 
justice" in Scotland, at least in the Sheriff Courts, has a unique Scottish identity. 
However, as I discussed throughout all my thesis, I am not sure that it is the 
romanticised and progressive identity that some people may prefer. For there is 
a difference between how Scottish sentencing is described and what sentencing 
in Scotland is. 
 
Sheriffs construct their role in relation to the communities that live within the 
boundaries of their jurisdictions, this certainly gives rise to a localised and 
specific penal culture linked to those local realities. However, as I discussed 
above, there are different approaches, that diverge starkly from one another. 
Thus, if there is a consensus among Sheriffs that sentencing is for a community, 
there are different ways of understanding the best way of sentencing 
individuals. And, within the Scots law and its common law tradition, these 
different styles reflect different possible ways to exercise the sentencing role.  
 
There seems to be a lack of public discussion on what sentencing entails. On the 
one hand, the Judiciary protect their judicial independence and have been 
reluctant to engage with academic research. On the other, the part of criminal 
proceedings that we can observe does not help us to understand the practical 
rationales behind sentencing. And this lack of understanding is detrimental to 
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both society and the Judiciary because it affects the intelligibility of their 
decisions. The sentencing practices that I found during my fieldwork seemed to 
be affected or influenced at least indirectly by the attempts of the Government 
to reform the Scottish Criminal Justice system. Nevertheless, as I stated earlier, 
these reforms seem to neglect "street-level" sentencing practices and their 
practical logic. And all the practices that I have described in all their 
complexities are undoubtedly relevant for achieving any reform, but they are 
not known because there is so little research in this field. Any discussion about 
the future of the Scottish penal field cannot ignore the current realities of 
practices. 
 
Facing these issues, the only way to improve our understanding of the field and 
to discuss the future of it pragmatically is to continue enhancing our knowledge 
of penal practices. There is certainly a Scottish identity apparent in the 
sentencing practices I described because they are localised but also because 
they are the by-product of Sheriffs that are in turn the by-product of the 
Scottish legal field. However, is this identity what we want for Scotland? Should 
we improve it, change it or leave it as it is? So far, I cannot answer these 
questions, because the practical rationales behind the different Sheriffs’ 
sentencing styles were consistent with very good reasons. The question is not 
which is ‘better’ than the other, but rather which reflects the penal system that 
we want to produce in the future? But then, any discussion of what the Scottish 
penal field ought to be is doomed to fail if it is not grounded in the complexities 
of real practices. 
 
For example, if you approach the Scottish field with an abolitionist position, and 
you might argue, with very good reasons, that there should be no custodial 
sentences at the Summary Sherriff Court level. Would that be enough to reform 
practices? And the answer would be no that would not be enough. This is so 
because the field showed to me that even if one disagree with the use of 
custody with people that fail to comply with CPOs or with persistent petty 
offences, custodial sentencing practices emerged as a practical reaction to the 
problems caused by those disruptive behaviours. Thus, the more you look at the 
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real practices, the more issues and nuances you discover and then, the more 
complex any kind of reform becomes. 
 
I hope my research serves as a way to keep encouraging researchers to look at 
the practices in the Scottish Legal Field. In this regard, future research should 
engage with communities in two different ways. First, it would be valuable to 
study the practices of the legal communities formed by the Sheriffs, lawyers, 
social workers and clerks that work within the court. Thus, research should focus 
on sentencing, and other court practices co-produced through the interactions of 
these individuals. Second, it would be equally valuable to study the more critical 
relationship between the small or midsized courts and their practices and the 
way they impact upon and are perceived by their communities. 
 
Finally, any penological discussion on the future of Scottish sentencing practices 
cannot be carried out successfully without a proper understanding of everyday 
sentencing practices. My research joins a couple of emerging research studies in 
this area, but there is still a lot of work to do to better understand everyday 
practice. And after having the privilege of talking to and discussing with those 
practitioners, I am aware that there is a lot to learn from their experiences. 
Luckily, the increase in the number of research studies may improve the 
collaboration between the judiciary and socio-legal or criminological 
researchers. 
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Appendices 
 
 
Plain Language Statement 
 
Title of Project:   Doing Justice: Sentencing in Sheriff Courts 
Name of Researcher:   Javier Velásquez    
Supervisors: Professor Fergus McNeill, Dr. Marguerite Schinkel and Professor Fiona 
Leverick 
 
You are being invited to take part in a research study. Before you decide it is important 
for you to understand why the research is being done and what it will involve. Please take 
time to read the following information carefully and discuss it with others if you wish. 
Ask me if there is anything that is not clear or if you would like more information. Take 
time to decide whether or not you wish to take part. Thank you for reading this.  
 
1. Aims, purposes and outcomes of the project 
 
The Scottish judiciary, and sheriffs in particular, fulfil an important social duty: they 
punish offenders and symbolically restore ‘peace’ into the community. The uniqueness of 
Scots law also means a unique Scots approach to punishment, and hence a particular 
judicial culture. The aim of the proposed research is to better understand the practice, 
culture and identity of sheriffs in their sentencing role. The project, therefore, seeks to 
explore your views about the role of the sheriff – especially as it relates to sentencing – 
in more depth. Your experience and knowledge are invaluable in order to be able to 
understand the unique Scottish approach to punishment.  
 
2. Publications 
 
This research is conducted as part of a Ph.D. degree in criminology. Hence, the result of 
this investigation will be a Ph.D. Thesis. Part of it might also be converted into academic 
research publications, such as academic journal articles and books. 
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3. The research process 
 
This research has been designed taking into account judicial workloads and with the aim 
of trying to disturb the regular labour of the sheriff courts as little as possible. If you 
agree to participate in the research, I will spend two weeks visiting your court. During 
this time, I will observe sentencing diets and I would hope to carry out an interview. The 
interviews are designed to last between 60 and 90 minutes, but they can be split into 2 
or 3 shorter sessions if that suits you better. They could take place in your office after 
court proceedings have finished or if that is not convenient at any time or place that 
would suit you on court premises. 
 
 
4. Confidentiality 
 
With your permission, the interview will be audio recorded. The audio files will be kept 
in a secure server at the University of Glasgow. Any recording or note made of your 
interview will be accessible only to the researcher and his supervisors and to any 
transcribers used. Interviewees will not be identified other than by a number in any 
recording or any transcript.  Any socio-demographic or personal information collected 
(relating to particular cases observed or information about judges) will be anonymised.  
Judges' identities will be coded, as well as the Sheriff Courts, the Sheriffdoms and any 
case observed in order to ensure full anonymity. No names will be used in any publication 
of this research. Nevertheless, If a court of law issues a warrant requiring us (the 
researchers of the University of Glasgow) to provide them with our data for its purposes, 
we would have to do so. 
 
5. Data collection and storage 
 
All the data, notes and any kind of paper will be stored in a secure cabinet at the Ph.D. 
researcher's office at the University of Glasgow. The audio files and any digital files will 
be kept in a secure password-encrypted computer. As stated above, the notes and audio 
files will only identify the participants by a number. The list with the numbers and real 
names will be kept apart, in an external hard-drive, locked in a different cabinet. This 
file will always be handled and kept away from the rest of the data to prevent any 
identification. Personal data of all participants will be destroyed no later than 5 years 
after the end of the fieldwork. The judiciary will be informed that the data is being 
destroyed. This lapse of time is to allow for the possibility of preparing a book or report, 
with the proper authorization of the participants and the Scottish Judiciary. 
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6. Funding: 
 
This research is founded by a Scholarship from the Chilean National Scholarship Program 
(PhD Scheme) awarded by CONICYT (National Commission for Scientific and Technological 
Research). 
 
7. Ethics 
 
This project has been considered and approved by the College Research Ethics Committee 
on XX/xx/2016. 
 
8. Contact for further information 
 
The PhD researcher on this project is Javier Velasquez, j.velasquez-
valenzuela.1@research.gla.ac.uk. The principal supervisor on this project is Professor 
Fergus McNeill, Fergus.McNeill@glasgow.ac.uk. 
 
If you have any concerns or complaints about the research, please contact Dr. Muir 
Houston, College of Social Sciences Ethics Officer, Muir.Houston@glasgow.ac.uk.  
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Sample Consent Form 
 
 
Title of Project:   Doing Justice: Sentencing in Sheriff Courts 
Name of Researcher:   Javier Velásquez    
Supervisors: Professor Fergus McNeill, Dr. Marguerite Schinkel and Professor Fiona 
Leverick 
 
1. I confirm that I have read and understood the Plain Language Statement Sheet for the 
above study and have had the opportunity to ask questions. 
 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any 
time, without giving any reason. 
 
3. I consent to interviews being audio-recorded and the audio files transcribed. 
 
4. I consent to take part in the cases studies exercise.  
 
5. I acknowledge that participants will be coded by number. 
 
6. I understand that the data collected from this research will be stored securely with my 
personal details removed and agree for it to be held as set out in the Plain Language 
Statement. 
 
7. I agree that the data collected in the course of this research will be shared with other 
genuine researchers as set out in the Plain Language Statement. 
 
8. I agree to waive my copyright to any data collected as part of this project. 
 
 
I agree to take part in this research study    
 
I do not agree to take part in this research study   
 
 
 
 
Name of Participant  ………………………………………… Signature   …………………………………………………….. 
262 
 
 
Date …………………………………… 
 
 
 
 
Name of Researcher  ………………………………………………… Signature   
…………………………………………………….. 
 
Date …………………………………… 
 
 
 
  
263 
 
Research Questions  
1. Background 
 
a. Demographics (age/gender) 
b. Academic degrees 
c. Legally-defined qualifications (Solicitor/Advocate/Solicitor-Advocate/QC) 
d. When and why do you decide to become a Sheriff? 
i. Did you start as Part-time sheriff?  
 
e. Transition question: Did your perception of the sheriff's role change or 
evolve after you became one? 
 
2. Role/Social implications/Purpose 
 
a. Role: In your [personal / professional] opinion, how would you describe the 
sentencing role of the sheriff to a foreign person from a non-common law 
country?  
a. Alternative: What is the Ethos of the Sheriff in his or her sentencing 
role? 
 
b. Social implications: In your opinion, to what extent is your roles responsive 
to the community or Sheriffdom in which you practice? 
a. Follow-up question: Do you think you have a good knowledge of 
the community that lives within your jurisdiction? 
b. Follow up question: In your [personal / professional] opinion, Does 
dealing with civil and criminal law cases provides you with a better 
knowledge of the problems or/and needs of the community that 
lives within your jurisdiction? 
c. Follow up question: To what extent (if any) does this knowledge 
influence or shape your sentencing role?’  
 
c. Purpose: Taking into account that sentencing purposes and sentencing 
principles can be contradictory at certain times, based on your professional 
experience, how do you resolve the tensions between them?  
a. Follow-up question: Is there any hierarchy between the different 
purposes and principles in practice? Or, in what instances might you 
consider that one purpose or principle becomes secondary to 
others? 
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b. Follow up question: How relevant are the individual characteristics 
and circumstances of the offender in solving these tensions?  
 
3. Sentencing decision-making 
 
a. How would you describe your approach to sentencing decision making? 
Could you briefly describe your working process when you pass sentence 
on an offender? 
i. Follow up question: Given your approach to sentencing decision-
making, which, in your opinion, are the most important sentencing 
purposes and principles?  
 
b. For you, as a sentencing decision-maker, what is the most valuable 
information in terms of arriving at the best solution for a given case? 
i. Follow up question: To what extent do you think that the 
procurators fiscal, the offenders’ lawyers and/or social workers 
always provide you with the proper and necessary information 
required to make a fair decision? 
ii.  
4. Disposals/ The meaning of punishment / Purpose of punishment 
 
a. To what extent are the available disposals (custodial sentences, 
community sentences, fines, admonition, etc.) able to convey to the 
offender and society, the message implied by the sentencing purposes and 
principles we have discussed? 
 
i. Follow up question: Which is/are the sentencing purpose(s) that 
you aim to achieve by using a particular disposal? 
 
ii. Follow up question: Taking into account the different functions 
and purposes of the disposals (considering only admonitions, fines, 
community sentences (in a broad sense) or custodial sentences), 
based on your experience, how do they perform in practice 
regarding their effectiveness? (And how do you define 
effectiveness?) 
 
iii. Follow up question: How often do you get feedback, if any, about 
what happened with an offender in a given case? 
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b. Regarding the use of short-term custodial sentences: What is the main 
sentencing purpose of a short-term custodial sentence?  
i. Follow up question: Does the use of short-term sentences 
whenever ‘no other method of dealing with the person is 
appropriate’ mean community sentences are inadequate to deal 
with certain offenses or certain offenders? (If so, which offences 
and which offenders?) 
 
c. There has been some discussion/public debate over the use of community 
sentences over custodial sentences and the need to promote payback or 
rehabilitation instead of retribution. To what extent do you think that this 
debate contains an adequate understanding of the complexities of 
sentencing? 
i. Follow up question: What sorts of nuances do you think are absent 
from these current debates?  
 
d. To what extent do you think that community sentences (or fines), should 
be the primary sentencing response in summary cases in the sheriff courts? 
i. If applicable, in which cases is a short-term custodial sentence 
more suitable than a CPO? In which kinds of cases is it otherwise? 
 
5. Offenders’ Perceptions 
 
Taking into account particularly the problem of reoffending: While dealing 
with offenders that have multiple previous convictions or a substantial 
record of non-compliance:  
a. Are such offenders always likely to receive a custodial sentence (as 
opposed to a community disposal)? 
b. What kind of information might make you inclined to give such an offender 
another chance at completing a community sentence? 
c. Do you think that the different disposals available offer offenders real 
chances to rehabilitate themselves? 
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